” 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 \” 12 t \u00b7-ci E 13 0 c8 u c:: ~ \” uu \u00b75 +< 14 ,,, 0 5 ~ 15 0 ,,, \u00b7r:: V ~ ~ V, \" \u00b7- 16 (\/) Ci -0 E 0 z 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 3:15-cv-03592-JST Document 52 Filed 06\/30\/16 Page 11 of 15 history clearly indicates that Congress meant something other than what it said.\” Close v. Jhomas, 653 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotntion marks omitted). The USDA does not cite to any legislative history on point. Rather, the USDA relies on general provisions of the Food Stamp Act, providing that Congress’ goals in enacting the statute included \”hold[ing] program costs close to current program levels\” and \”simplify[ing] administration.\” ECF No. 44 at 27 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-464. 1 ( 1977)): ECF No. 41 at 21-23. Because the legislative history does not \”clearly indicate[] that Congress meant something other than what it said,\” the Court need not examine it to aid its interpretation of the statute. Finally, the USDA argues that \”Congress affirmed USDA’s interpretation [of the challenged regulation] by ,\u00b7ecnacting the relevant provision of the Food Stamp Act withmil change.\” ECF No. 44 at 29: ECF No. 41 al 23-24. According to the USDA. since the challenged regulation was promulgated, \”the Food Stamp Act has been amended by Congress over twenty times, most recently by the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, which was enacted July 22, 2014.\” ECF No. 41 at 19. \”By repeatedly amending the Food Stamp Act, and yet reenacting Section 20 15(g) of the statute without change, Congress effectively accepted USDA ‘s interpretation of what it means to be an ‘individual who receives’ SSI and SSP in cash-out states.\” hl (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845–46 ( 1986)). This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike in some of the authority cited by the USDA in which Congress \”explicitly affirmed\” the agency\u00b7s interpretation of a statute thrmrgh amendments to the legislation in question, Schor, 478 U.S. al 846, the USDA provides no evidence that rn1y member of Congress was ever aware of its interpretation of the 7 U.S.C. 2015(g), let alone that Congress \”explicitly affirmed\” that interpretation. In such circumstances, \”we consider the … re- enactment to be without significance.” Brown v. Gardener, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (quoting United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351,359 (1957)). Moreover, where, as here, \”the law is plain, subsequent reenactment docs not constitute an adoption of a previous administrative construction.\” Gardener, 513 U.S. at 121 (quoting Demarest v, Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 ( 1991 )). See also id. ( citing Mass. Trustees of Ens tern Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United Stales, 3 77 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1964) for the proposition that \”congressional reenactment has no interpretive 11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Cl 12 t ;::J 0 ,0 13 u~ – Cl .Sc: u 14 }::: ‘+-< .~ 0 0 - 15 u if, ';:: V -- V, cJ r in 0 16 r -0 i: V V 17 ,\"\";::: ...c ;::J t :::, 0 z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 3:15-cv-03592-JST Document 52 Filed 06\/30\/16 Page 12 of 15 effect where regulations clearly contradict requirements ofstattitc\"), Ultimately, the Court concludes that the USDA's interpretation of 7 U.S.C. 20 l 5(g) fails at step one of the Chevron analysis, Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Jtidgrncnt and denies the USDA's Motion for Summary Judgment. IV, PLAINTIFF'S AND CDSS'S CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiffs second claim seeks a w,\u00b7it of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that this court may set aside the Administrative Law Judge's decision holding that Plaintiff owed Humboldt County reimbursement for the months of February through May 2014 becuuse that decision, which relied on 7 C.F.R. 273.20(b), was contrary to 7 U.S.C. ij 2015(g). See CaL Code Civ, Pro, s 1094.5(b), (f), CDSS offers three arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of its own Motion for Sumn1ary Judgment on Plaintiffs second claim. A, Subject Matter Jurisdiction First, COSS argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the sole cause of action against COSS. California Code of Civil Procedure section I 094,5, is a state law cause of action. ECF No, 42 at 12. The Court disagrees. 28 U.S.C. 1331 provides: \"The district courts shall have original jmisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.\" According to the \"well-pleaded complaint\" rule, \"a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law,\" Metro. Life Ins, Co, v, Taylor, 481 U.S, 58, 63 (1987). Although the '\"well-pleaded complaint' rule.,. severely limits the number ofcascs in which state law 'creates the cause of action' that may be initiated in.,. federal district court,\" causes of action created by state law \"might still 'arise under' the laws of the United States ifa well-pleaded complaint established tlwt [the plaintiffs] right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.\" Franchise Tax Bel. of State ol'Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. California, 463 U.S. I, 13 ( 1983). Plaintiffs second cause of action, while created by state law, \"turn[s] exclusively on 12 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 3:15-cv-03592-JST Document 52 Filed 06\/30\/16 Page 13 of 15 federal law\" because the only question in dispute between the parties is whether the challenged regulation is a permissible interp1\u00b7etation of7 U.S.C. ~ 20\\S(g). ~itLQt'Chicago v. Int'\\ College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997). Accordingly, Plaintiffs second claim fits within the well- pleaded complaint rule. Id.: Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (federal question jurisdiction exists where \"a state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial rcsponsibilities.\"). 8 B. Eleventh Amendment Bar \"Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may [generally] not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise or power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.\" Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 ( 1985). However, \"a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to confonn thcirji.1ture conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury.\" Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 ( 1979) (emphasis added). Thus, \"a suit for prospective injunctive relief provides a narrow. but well-established, exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.\" Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). See a\\sc, Hason v. Medical Board of California, 279 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (\"The Ex Parte Young doctrine provides that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief brought against state officers \"in their official capacities, to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law.\"). COSS asserts that \"the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs claim against [it] in federal Court\" because \"Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court to retroactively grant him Ca\\Fresh benefits for a short three month period two years ago.\" ECF No. 42 at 9. Plaintiff responds that \"[c]ontrnry to the Director's assetiion, [he] is not here requesting 'retroactive monetary relief,\"' which would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 4 7 at 14. \"Rather, the relief that [Plaintiff] requests is forward-looking in that it requires the Director to revc1\u00b7se his [prior] decision 1 Because the Cou1i concludes that federal question jurisdiction exists, it need not address Plaintiff's argument in the alternative that supplemental jurisdiction exists. See ECF No. 47 at 9. 13 \"' t: :l 0 ,\u00a3 u c:: ~ \"' .~ u b 4-, ':2 0 Cl ~ V v; 'C V ~ v; 5 V) -0 E V V ~ -\u00b7-~ C t: :::, 0 z 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 3:15-cv-03592-JST Document 52 Filed 06\/30\/16 Page 14 of 15 and make a new determination .ibout [Plaintiffs] eligibility in light of the Court's conclusion on the merits.\" Id. The Cout1 agrees with Plaintiff Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(\u00b1), if the court grants a writ of mandate, \"it may order the reconsideration of the case in light of the court's opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law.\" Plaintiff requests just this: that the Court order CDSS to \"make a new determination about [Plaintiffs] eligibility [for SNAP benefits between March 2014 and May 2014] in light ofthc Court's conclusion on the merits.\" ECF No. 47 at 14. Because Plaintiff seeks \"prospective injunctive relief,\" lhe Eleventh Amendment does not bar his claim against COSS, C. The Merits of Plaintiff's Claim for a Writ of Mandate Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.S(a) & (b), a writ ofmandatc may be issued \"for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order\" if \"the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction\" or \"there was [a] prejudicial abuse of discretion.\" \"Abnse of discretion is established if the rnspondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is nol supported by the findings, or lhe findings arc not supported by the evidence\" CaL Code Civ. Pro~ 1094.S(b) The Aclminislrnlive Law Judge determined that Plaintiff was ineligible for CalFresh because \"SSI\/SSP recipients in California are ineligible to receive CalFresh benefits,\" In so ruling, the Administrative Law Judge relied on the challenged regulation, 7 CF.R. ~ 273.20. ln Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that this Court should issue a writ or mandate to the CDSS because the CDSS' \"decisions upholding the termination of[PlaintiffJ from the CalFresh program and the determinntion that he received an overissuance from March through May 2014 are contrary to law,\" that is contrary to 7 U.S.C ( 20 I 5(g), ECF No. 43 at 19. ln COSS' Motion for Summary Judgment, COSS responds that a writ of mandate may not be issued because \"at the time the [Administrative Law Judges'] decisions issued, the federal regulation applied and the [Administrative Law Judges] were required to rule in accordance with the regulation.\" ECF No, 42 at l 6. This response is not persuasive. As Plaintiff correctly argues 14 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 3 15-cv-03592-JST Document 52 Filed 06\/30\/16 Page 15 of 15 in his Reply Brief, \"[t]he fact that the administrative law judge followed the federal regulation does not make the decision legally correct.\" ECF No. 50 at 9. The Court has ruled that the federal regulation on which the administrative law judge relied was, itsel( contrary to 7 U.S.C. section 2015(g). CDSS does not cite any authority for the proposition that a writ of mandate should not be issued where an administrative agency issues a ruling premised on a regulation, which regulation was subsequently determined to be inconsistent with the underlying statute. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Administrative Law Judge's ruling that Plaintiff was not eligible for Ca!Fresh benefits from March 2014 through May 2014 (and therefore owed Humboldt County reimbursement for the overissuance Plaintiff received for those months) was contrary to the law. The Court will therefore issue a writ of mandate to the CDSS and order the CDSS to re-evaluate Plaintiffs claim consistent with this order. CONCLUSION The Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the USDA 's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court also denies Defendant Will Lightbourne's Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 30, 2016 ' ~---'\"'--,-'\"\\;,I!\\\"\"\"'--\"-' , ~~ JONS.TIGRa nited States District Judge - 15 "
