Consent Decrees/Decisions

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” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -1- STIPULATED JUDGMENT GARY W. RHOADES, SB # 166149 LEGAL SERVICES OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 1370 West Street Redding, CA 96001 Telephone: (530) 241-3565 Facsimile: (530) 241-3982 GARY F. SMITH, SB #137534 LEGAL SERVICE OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 517 12 Streetth Sacramento CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 551-2110 Attorneys for Petitioners IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO NORMA KEHRER, Case No: 99 CS 02320 Petitioner, STIPULATED JUDGMENT AND ORDER vs. Hearing Date: RITA SAENZ, DIRECTOR, Hearing Time: DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Department: 1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA Respondents. \/ RECITAL 1. Petitioner, Norma Kehrer, filed this petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the Department of Social Services’ hearing decision No. 9215369, and to challenge the alleged policy of Respondents, Rita Saenz and the Department of Social Services. Petitioner is represented by Gary Rhoades and Gary Smith of Legal Services of Northern California. Respondent is represented by Margarita Altamirano, Deputy Attorney General. 2. The parties freely enter into this Stipulation in order to resolve this action without further 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -2- STIPULATED JUDGMENT litigation and without admission by either party of fault or liability. AGREEMENT The Petitioner and the Respondents hereby agree and stipulate to the following terms: 1. Respondent will immediately repeal current MPP section 44-314.62; 2. In place of MPP 44-314.62, Respondent will immediately promulgate a new regulation which mirrors the language of subdivision (e) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450.04, and also defines child support payments for a Maximum Family Grant ( MFG ) child to include cash child support payments from the absent parent whether paid through the District Attorney’s office or directly to the MFG child or the custodial parent\/caregiver, and derivative benefits from the Social Security Administration or other government program due to the absent parent’s disability or retirement, which satisfy the absent parent’s child support obligation; 3. Respondent will immediately set aside of the Decision in Hearing No. 9215369, and issue of a new decision that orders Shasta County to restore the Assistance Unit’s ( AU ) benefits to the level in effect on July 30, 1998, if the AU is otherwise eligible for benefits, and will order payment of any retroactive benefits to the AU that it lost as a result of the Decision. 5. Each party shall bear its own attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 6. Judgment may be entered pursuant to this agreement in favor of petitioner and against respondent. Both parties request that the court retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the terms of the judgment. DATED: _______________________________________________ RITA SAENZ, Director, Department of Social Services, State of California DATED: _______________________________________________ MARGARITA ALTAMIRANO, Attorney for Respondent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -3- STIPULATED JUDGMENT DATED: _______________________________________________ NORMA KEHRER, Petitioner DATED: GARY W. RHOADES, Attorney for Petitioner O R D E R GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: __________________________________ LLOYD CONNELLY C:\\Documents and Settings\\Steven Goldberg\\Local Settings\\Temp\\Kehrer_stip_judg.wpd Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 ”

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” J. 1 DOUGLAS E. LUMISH (Bar No. 183863) [email protected] 2 BENJAMIN LISS (Bar No. 292420) [email protected] \u00b7 3 LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 140 Scott Drive 4 Menlo Park, CA 94025 Telephone: (650) 328-4600 5 Facsimile: (650) 463-2600 . 6 BENJAMIN PULLIAM\u00b7 (Bar No. 294628) [email protected] 7 LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000 8 San Francisco, CA 94111-6538 Telephone: (415) 391-0600 9 Facsimile: (415) 395-8095 10 HOPE NAKAMURA (BarNo. 126901) EMILY MELAHN (Bar No. 295836) 11 LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN MATEO COUNTY 12 330 Twin Dolphin Dr., Suite 123 Redwood City,\u00b7 California 94065 13 Telephone: (650) 558-0915 Facsimile.: (650)517-8973 14 Attorneys for Petitioner 15 RONALD C. BROOKS 16 F I L E D Superior Court of California County of San Francisco \u00b7 APR 2 3 2015 BY:~L~~F ~~RT Deputy Clerk 17 18 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANC’rSCO 19 ) RONALD C. BROOKS, 20 21 22 v. Petitioner, WILL LIGHTBOURNE, Director, California 23 Department of Social Services; CALIFORNIADEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 24. SERViCES, . 25 26 27 28 Respondents. CASE NO. CPF-14-513757 JAIL [PR:9J’IQSI!!D] ORDER DIRECTING ISSUANCE WRIT OFADMINISTRA TIVE MANDAMUS PURSUANT TO COJ)E CIV. PROC. 1094.5 . ‘ . Date: April23, 2015 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 302 J..IADnl n llAHN Judge: Hon. EPa~~ Reservation: 121914-01 Action Filed: July 14,2014 {PROf’68E~ ‘ORDER 1 Petitioner Ronald Brooks’ Petition for a Writ of Administrative Mandamus was set ford hearing 2 on April23, 2015, at 9:30a.m., in Department 302 of the above-entitled court. 3 Having considered the petition, the administrative record lodged\u00b7 with this Court, the 4 memoranda in support of and opposition to the petition, and the oral arguments presented at the 5 hearing on this motion: 6 The court GRANTS the petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. 7 While the notice provisions of W & I code section 11450.04 aie ambiguous and can fairly 8 be construed to support the positions advocated by both sides, the deference accorded to an 9 agency’s interpretation. \u00b7of statutory language, the context of the statutory language, and 10 furtherance of the purposes of section 11450.04 all indicate that the interpretation advocated by.\u00b7 11 respondents-that notice given to Diaz suffices as notice to petitioner-is the more r~asonable 12 one. This is particularly true since, per petitioner’s interpretation, had he received proper notic,e, 13 his son could permissibly be designated an MFG as to petitioner’s AU, yet there is no reasonable 14 way for notice to have been provided to petitioner other than by giving notice to petitioner. 15 The hearsay rule in the Administrative Procedure Act (Govt. Code section 11513(d)) 16 relied on by petitioner does not apply to the hearing held in this case due to W & I code sections 17 10953 and 10955 (see also Govt. Code section 11501 ). However, per W & I code section 10955 18 and MPP section 22-.050, the hearing was governed by the requirements that \”all testimony sht}l,l 19 be submitted under oath or affirmation\” and \”evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort .of . \”.-t 20 evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, .. :: 21 Applying the independent judgment standard of review, there was insufficient evidence to 22 support the finding of the ALJ-adopted by and necessary to the Department’s decision dep.yif1g 23 petitioner’s request for benefits for his son-that the r~quired notice was given to Diaz about the 24 MFG rules. This is because the only even conceivably probative evidence about notice to Diaz 25 of the MFG rules were the unsworn statements of Mr. Gomez that Diaz’s file showed that such 26 notice was given. \u00b7Mr. Gomez stated that he reviewed Diaz’s file, yet he chose not to introducie 27 any portion of that. file into evidence and refused to di~close it to \u00b7petitioner. (See MPP section 28 22-049 (petitioner was entitled to”Examine all documentsprior to and during the hearing.”).) [P~POse>] ORqER .. ;. (\\ 1 Regardless of the merits of Mr. Gomez’s assertion of confidentiality of the Diaz file, the absen6ci ‘ 2 of any evidence from that file disCloses that the ~’evidence\” that was provided by Mr. Gomez fell 3 below \”the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct 4 of serious affairs.\” 5 NOW THEREFORE the Department of Social Services is ordered to reverse its decision 6 of July 17, 2013 and remove the MFG designation from petitioner’s son for alltime periods, past 7 and present; while he is in the custody of petitioner and provide benefits withheld from petitioner 8 because of the MFG designation of his son. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED. ~? Dated: April)'(, 2015 Hofl:. Bmest II. GeiGsmith Judge of the Superior Court lf~V). \/~rc?fct l<~~~ '\u00b7 .. \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 [~.POSEB] ORDER 2 "

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” 1 14-1328-cv Briggs v. Bremby 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 4 August Term, 2014 5 6 (Argued: March 3, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2015) 7 8 Docket No. 14-1328-cv 9 10 11 JAMES BRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS 12 SIMILARLY SITUATED, 13 14 Plaintiff-Appellee, 15 16 v. 17 18 RODERICK BREMBY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE 19 STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 20 21 Defendant-Appellant. 22 23 24 Before: CALABRESI, HALL, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges. 25 26 Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a class of food stamp applicants, arguing that the 27 Food Stamp Act requires the Connecticut Department of Social Services to provide food 28 stamp benefits to all eligible households within 30 or 7 days of application (depending on 29 the household’s level of economic need). The District Court granted Plaintiff classwide relief 30 through a preliminary injunction, and Defendant now appeals, arguing that there is no 31 private right of action to enforce the time limits of the Food Stamp Act under 42 U.S.C. 32 1983. Defendant further argues that federal regulations permit the Connecticut Department 33 of Social Services to take more time to process food stamp applications, thereby excusing it 34 from the seeming requirements of the statute. We conclude that (1) food stamp applicants 35 can sue under 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits for provision of food stamps, and 36 (2) federal regulations do not excuse Defendant from providing food stamps within the 37 statutory time limits. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 38 MARC COHAN, National Center for Law and 39 Economic Justice, New York, NY (Mary R. Mannix and 40 Greg Bass, National Center for Economic Justice, and 41 Giovanna Shay, Lucy Potter, and Cecil Thomas, Greater 42 Hartford Legal Aid, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 43 2 1 HUGH BARBER, Assistant Attorney General 2 (Rosemary M. McGovern, Assistant Attorney General, 3 on the brief), for George Jepsen, Attorney General of 4 Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellant. 5 6 7 8 CALABRESI, Circuit Judge: 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiff James Briggs brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the 11 Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services ( DSS ) to enforce the 12 Food Stamp Act’s time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and 13 (9) provide that participating states shall give such benefits within 30 days of application to 14 eligible households, and within 7 days of application to especially needy households that 15 qualify for expedited benefits. Plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the 16 District of Connecticut to enforce these time limits, and moved to certify a class of similarly 17 situated plaintiffs. 18 The District Court (Bryant, J.) certified a class consisting of all past, current, and 19 future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely 20 manner. The District Court also found that there was credible evidence that there is 21 ongoing, persistent systemic failure to comply with the strict unambiguous mandates 22 imposed by the [Food Stamp Act], and entered a preliminary injunction requiring the DSS 23 to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. Briggs v. Bremby, 2012 WL 24 6026167 at *18-19 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012). Defendant now appeals, arguing a) that the 25 Food Stamp Act does not give Plaintiff a right to the timely receipt of food stamps and, 26 therefore, that Plaintiff cannot seek to enforce these time limits under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and 27 3 b) that, in any event, federal regulations excuse the DSS from abiding by the seeming 1 statutory deadlines for providing food stamp benefits. 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 Where allegations of error in a preliminary injunction involve questions of law, our 4 review is de novo. Am. Express Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998). 5 A. Plaintiff can maintain a private lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to enforce the 6 statutory time limits in 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9) 7 8 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) states: 9 The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (3) that the State 10 agency shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant 11 household by way of verification of income . . . . household size (in any case 12 such size is questionable), and such other eligibility factors as the Secretary 13 determines to be necessary . . . . so as to complete certification of and provide 14 an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household 15 not later than thirty days following its filing of an application[.] 16 17 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(9) states: 18 The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (9) that the State 19 agency shall (A) provide benefits no later than 7 days after the date of 20 application to any household which– (i) (I) has gross income that is less than 21 $150 per month; or (II) is a destitute migrant or a seasonal farmworker 22 household in accordance with the regulations governing such households in 23 effect July 1, 1982; and (ii) has liquid resources that do not exceed $100[.] 24 25 In Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the Supreme Court established a three-26 part test for determining whether a federal law creates a right that can presumptively be 27 enforced by private suit through 1983: 1) Congress must have intended that the provision 28 in question benefit the plaintiff, 2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly 29 protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain 30 judicial competence, and 3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation 31 4 on the States. Id. at 340-41 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court has 1 further clarified that it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may 2 be enforced under 1983, and that nothing short of an unambiguously conferred right 3 will support a cause of action under 1983. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 4 (2002). If these requirements are met, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the 5 statutory right can be enforced through 1983. Id. at 341. 6 The two statutory time limits at issue in this case clearly meet the second and third 7 prongs of the Blessing test. They establish a right that is neither vague nor amorphous (both 8 provisions require the allotment of food stamps within a definite number of days), and they 9 impose binding obligations on the States (both provisions use the mandatory shall ). 10 Whether Congress intended these provisions to benefit food stamp applicants, as the first 11 Blessing prong requires, justifies a bit more discussion. 12 Plaintiff argues that the time limits were intended to benefit food stamp applicants by 13 ensuring the prompt provision of food stamps. Defendant contends instead that the time 14 limits were meant only to guide the States in how to marshal their resources when 15 administering food stamp programs. Three Supreme Court decisions inform our analysis of 16 whether these statutory provisions are sufficiently focused on benefitting the relevant 17 plaintiffs to be individually enforceable under 1983. 18 First, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 19 (1987), the Court held that a rent ceiling provision of the Public Housing Act empowered 20 tenants to sue under 1983 to collect for past overcharges. The relevant provision, 42 21 U.S.C. 1437a, imposed the following rent ceiling requirement on local housing authorities: 22 Dwelling units assisted under this chapter shall be rented only to families 23 who are lower income families at the time of their initial occupancy of such 24 5 units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family 1 shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter . . . the highest 2 of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar: 3 (1) 30 per centum of the family’s monthly adjusted income; 4 (2) 10 per centum of the family’s monthly income; or 5 (3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public 6 agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family’s 7 actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the 8 family’s housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated. 9 10 Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 This rent ceiling provision was part of a detailed statutory scheme that established 12 requirements for state and local housing authorities. But despite the fact that the statute was 13 directed at government agencies, the Court in Wright held that the rent ceiling provision was 14 enacted to benefit tenants. See Wright at 430. In drawing this conclusion, the Court focused 15 on the fact that the provision was calibrated to the economic needs of individual families, 16 determining each family’s rent based on a percentage of their monthly income. According to 17 the Court, this constituted powerful evidence that the provision was intended to benefit the 18 families, and not merely to direct the allocation of government resources. See Id. at 430 19 ( The [rent ceiling provision] could not be clearer: . . . tenants could be charged as rent no 20 more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing 21 on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable. ). 22 Subsequently, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), the Court 23 found a private right of action under 1983 to enforce a reimbursement provision of the 24 Medicaid Act. Wilder involved a statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A), that 25 required state Medicaid plans to provide reasonable and adequate rates of reimbursement 26 for health care providers treating needy individuals. In relevant part, 1396a(a)(13)(A) 27 stated the following: 28 6 [A] State plan for medical assistance must . . . . provide . . . for payment 1 . . . of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an 2 intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded provided under the plan 3 through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and 4 standards developed by the State . . .) which the State finds, and makes 5 assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet 6 the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated 7 facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable 8 State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards . . . . 9 10 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502-03 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 This provision was explicitly directed at government actors. It referred to 12 requirements of the State plan and the procedures and policies developed by the State. 13 Nonetheless, the Court found that its terms were individually enforceable through private 14 lawsuits brought by health care providers under 1983. The Court did so in part because the 15 language indicated a clear intent to benefit these providers. Id. at 510 ( There can be little 16 doubt that health care providers are the intended beneficiaries of the [reimbursement 17 provision]. The provision establishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is 18 phrased in terms benefiting health care providers . . . . ). Wilder thus demonstrates that a 19 statute imposing a requirement on a State plan for administering a social welfare program 20 may nevertheless in appropriate circumstances give rise to a right enforceable under 1983, 21 for instance if it includes a specific mandate intended to give rights to a particular group. 22 Finally, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the Court held that a 23 provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ( FERPA ) could not be 24 individually enforced through 1983. The relevant provision, 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b)(1), 25 stated: 26 No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any 27 educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting 28 the release of education records (or personally identifiable information 29 7 contained therein . . . ) of students without the written consent of their parents 1 to any individual, agency, or organization. 2 3 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 The Court distinguished this provision from those in Wright and Wilder, noting three 5 of its features. First, the statutory language at issue in Gonzaga is focused on the educational 6 agencies being regulated rather than on the interests of students or parents. That is to say, 7 the provision lacks the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite 8 congressional intent to create new rights. Id. at 287. Second, the provision regulates only 9 the general policy or practice of educational agencies and institutions regarding 10 disclosure, rather than focusing on specific instances of disclosure. Third, the provision 11 serves primarily to direct the distribution of federal resources. Id. at 287-91. Based on these 12 factors, the Court concluded that the provision was not intended to confer individual rights 13 upon students or parents, but was instead intended to impose a general rule for the use of 14 funds under FERPA. See also Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 445 F.3d 136, 15 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the Gonzaga Court had used these three factors to distinguish 16 privately enforceable rights from vaguer benefits or interests ). 17 Wright and Wilder both strongly counsel in favor of finding the time limits of 7 18 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9) privately enforceable under 1983. Like the provisions in 19 Wright and Wilder, the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are drafted in a way that focuses on the 20 needs of the individual beneficiaries. They require that households’ eligibility be determined 21 promptly, and that allotments be provided retroactive to the period of application. They 22 are also calibrated to household income eligible households are to be provided food stamp 23 benefits within 30 days, but especially needy ones are to receive such benefits within 7 days. 24 8 And, while the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are written as requirements for a State plan of 1 operation, the Court in Wilder concluded that such a formulation can be fully consistent 2 with a legislative intent to confer enforceable rights upon the relevant plaintiffs. Wilder, 496 3 U.S. at 523. Indeed, it is commonplace that laws designed to protect individual rights are 4 formulated as restrictions on government action. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I ( Congress 5 shall make no law . . . ). 6 Nor does Gonzaga undercut the applicability of Wright and Wilder to the case before 7 us. None of the three factors that the Supreme Court used to distinguish the statute in 8 Gonzaga from those in Wright and Wilder apply to the provisions here. Unlike the funding 9 provision involved in Gonzaga, the Food Stamp Act’s time limits (1) contain language that is 10 focused on the interests of the applicant households and calibrated to their economic needs, 11 (2) create a specific requirement that must be followed for every food stamp applicant, 12 rather than a generalized policy or practice, and (3) do not merely direct the distribution 13 of funds. These factors establish that Congress has conferred individual rights upon food 14 stamp applicants in clear and unambiguous terms, and Gonzaga is thus distinguishable. 15 The law of our circuit concerning the private enforceability of time limits in social 16 welfare statutes is, moreover, in full accord with our reading of these three Supreme Court 17 cases. See, e.g., Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 247, 254, 256-57 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding 18 that private plaintiffs can sue under 1983 to enforce a Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. 19 1396a(a)(3), which requires that a State plan must provide an opportunity for a fair 20 hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under 21 the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness, and concluding, also, 22 9 that such plaintiffs can enforce a regulation providing that such a hearing will occur 1 ordinarily within 90 days of a hearing request). 2 Accordingly, we find that 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9) satisfy the Blessing test, and 3 therefore create a rebuttable presumption that the time limits in those sections are privately 4 enforceable under 1983. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341. This presumption can, however, be 5 overcome if Congress precluded recourse to 1983 either expressly, or impliedly, by 6 creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 7 enforcement under 1983. Id. 8 Briggs’s assertion that Congress intended to confer individual rights to timely 9 determination of food stamp eligibility is undermined, Defendant argues, by Congress’s 10 authorization of administrative enforcement of the Food Stamp Act’s time limits. In 11 particular, 7 U.S.C. 2020(g) empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate State 12 noncompliance, withhold federal funds, and refer a noncompliant State to the Attorney 13 General to seek an injunction. Defendant asserts that Congress’s grant of those enforcement 14 powers to the Secretary demonstrates that Congress did not intend to permit parallel 15 enforcement by individuals in federal and state courts. Notably, the Supreme Court 16 concluded in Gonzaga that Congress did not mean to confer individual rights under FERPA, 17 in part because that statute created a comprehensive and centralized agency hearing 18 procedure to deal with individual complaints. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289-90. In stark 19 contrast with FERPA, however, the Food Stamp Act contains no similar agency 20 adjudication process or enforcement structure that could take the place of private lawsuits. 21 Rather, the statute before us is analogous to those in Wright and Wilder. The statutes in both 22 of those cases gave the appropriate federal agencies the power to exercise oversight and 23 10 withhold funds, but that authority was held to be consistent with a private right to sue under 1 1983 because the statutes at issue did not construct frameworks for resolving individuals’ 2 complaints. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 427-28; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521-23. 3 We conclude that Congress did not impliedly preclude private enforcement of the 4 Food Stamp Act’s time limits by granting enforcement powers to the Secretary of 5 Agriculture.1 And we therefore hold that the time limits for allocating food stamps provided 6 in 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9) are privately enforceable through lawsuits brought under 7 1983.2 8 B. Federal regulations do not excuse the DSS from processing food stamp 9 applications within the statutory time limits 10 11 Defendant argues that the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court 12 conflicts with a number of federal regulations. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. 273.2(h) (establishing 13 procedures for situations where the State agency is at fault for not allocating food stamps 14 within 30 days of an application, and for situations where the applicant household is at fault 15 for not completing the eligibility determination process within 30 days); 7 C.F.R. 16 273.2(i)(3)(iv) (providing that if the initial screening for expedited (7-day) food stamp 17 eligibility fails to identify that a household is eligible, then the State agency is only required 18 to process the application within 7 days of the date it discovers that the household is eligible 19 1 If more were needed, we note that this conclusion is amply supported by the legislative history of the Food Stamp Act. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 398 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2327 ( The administrative remedies against the state contained in section 11(f) and elsewhere should not be construed as abrogating in any way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements. ). 2 This holding puts us in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, which have both held that analogous statutory time limits in prior iterations of the Food Stamp Act were individually enforceable. See Gonzalez v. Pingree, 821 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1987); Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 11 for expedited service). Defendant interprets these regulations as excusing the DSS from 1 having to follow the Food Stamp Act’s time limits. 2 In support of its reading of these regulations, Defendant argues that 7 U.S.C. 3 2020(e)(3) requires only that the DSS complete the certification of eligible households 4 within 30 days, and that eligibility need only be determined promptly. To make this 5 point, Defendant contrasts two statutory phrases. The first provides that the State agency 6 shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibility of each applicant household. The second 7 requires that the State agency must complete certification of and provide an allotment 8 retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household not later than thirty days 9 following its filing of an application. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3). Defendant contends that while 10 the second phrase imposes a specific 30-day time limit as to eligible households, the DSS 11 need only determine the eligibility of non-eligible applicant households promptly 12 (rather than within any set time period). 13 The obvious problem with this interpretation is that there would be no way for the 14 DSS to complete certification and provide an allotment of food stamps to all eligible 15 households within 30 days of the filing of an application, as 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) expressly 16 requires, if the DSS did not first determine not only promptly, but well within 30 days 17 which households are eligible and which are not. We therefore agree with the District 18 Court that both the eligibility determinations and the allotments must be made within 30 19 days. And, accordingly, there is no basis for Defendant’s interpretation of these regulations. 20 The regulations simply provide additional procedures in case something goes wrong 21 and a statutory deadline is missed. Regulations which anticipate that a State agency will 22 sometimes fail to meet statutory deadlines, and which provide food stamp applicants with 23 12 fallback procedures to deal with such situations, cannot be read to repeal those deadlines. 1 Such regulations supplement 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3) and (9); they do not override them. 2 Indeed, if the regulations did purport to repeal or limit the statutory time limits, they would 3 likely be ultra vires, for no agency regulation can overturn a clear statutory mandate. 4 5 III. CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 7 ”

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” 3 2 1 4 5 6 HEALTH ADVOCATES, ,A Law Parmership Aaron J. Leibovic, Esq. #80304 Gariann Morguelan, Esq. #152742 13412 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 300 Sherman Oaks, California 91423-3965 Telephone: (818) 995-9500 Attorneys for Petitioner, ROSALEEN RANIIREZ SUPERIOR COURT FOR TI- TE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 10 18 16 17 15 14 13 12 11 CASE NO.; BS 036508 JUDGMENT ROSALEEN RAMIREZ, A Minor, By and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Hermelinda Luis Antonio, Mother, Petitioner, vs. S. KIMBERLY BELSHE, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, State of California; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, State of California, Respondents. 19 The Petition for Writ of Mandate in the above-captioned matter was heard on June 26, 20 1996 at 9:30 a.m., before the Honorable Judge Diane Wayne in Department 86 of the Los 21 Angeles Superior Court. Having heard the petition it is so ordered as follows: 22 The Petition for Writ of Mandate was granted pursuant to CCP 1085. Petitioner 23 demonstrated that respondent’s reliance upon the directives contained in all County Letters 93 -84 24 and 94-99 (\”Letters\”) was arbitrary, capricious and not in conformity with the law. The directives contained in Letters 93.84 and 94-99 are invalid \”underground regulations\” which were not adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, Government Code 11340 et seq. (\”APA\”). 28 The Petition for Writ of Mandate is also granted pursuant to CCP 1094.5. The court 2S 26 27 xei gnu y iVA zs:in Did 96\/8T\/OT found that respondent’s abused their discretion in denying petitioner’s authorized representative full access to petitioner’s case file. Respondents are ordered to: (1) Refrain from implementing, executing or effecting the directives contained in All County Welfare Director Letters 93-84 and 94- 99, which serve to limit, restrict or otherwise diminish the power of scope of attorney’s acting as authorized representative for Medi- Cal claimants and to allow attorneys’ access to client’s records as authorized by Welfare & Institutions Code 10850.2, Manual of Policies and Procedures 19-005 and 19-006, and rule or regulations subsequently adopted by respondents pursuant to the APA, and as otherwise provided by state law; and (2) Adopt all future regulations relating to the power or scope of attorney representation of Medi-Cal claimant’s in accordance with the requirements of APA. (3) Grant access to petitioner’s AR to her files. 03 1996 DATED: OIANE WAY JUDGE DIANE WAYNE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 – 2 – \”ethifh g 303.1. sne v —tvaftTot IHd 96\/9T\/OT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL OR HAND DELIVERY (CCP 1013a) I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the ate 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 13412 Ventura Boulevard, Suit 300, Sherman Oaks, California. 91423.3965. On July 23, 1996. I served the foregoing document described as JUDGMENT on all other parties to this action by placing a true copy of the above document enclosed in a settle envelope addressed as follows: Daniel E. Lindgren, Attorney General – Rabin T. Gertler, Deputy Attorney General – 300 Soutl Spring Street, Suite 5212 – Las Angeles, CA 90013 (Attorney for State of California) (x) BY MAIL – I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be place in the United States mail at Sherman Oaks, California 0 BY HAND DELIVERY – I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to th offices of the addressee. Executed on July 23, 1996 at Sherman Oaks, California. I declare under penalty of perjury under the Law of the State of California that the abov is true and correct. 28 xsi sne V XVd eSToT :66\/iT\/OT -T70.021 Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 ”

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” .-:-,\u00b7 :..\ufffd i’ I 1 LEGAL SERVICES OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA iln JODIB BERGER, State Bar No. 124144 O 2 j 1810 Capitol Street \u00b7 ;I.l c.o Vallejo, CA 94590-5721 \u00b7 25 3 Telephone: (707) 643-0054 x 302 \ufffd :;: Facsimile: (707) 643-0144 J4 \ufffd 4 :J :::> .JAY AREA LEGAL AID \ufffd \ufffd Amy P. Lee, State Bar No. 203604 i Q:. \ufffd Robert Capistrano, State Bar No. 70482 () 1 A 405 14th Street, 11th Floor tJ Oakland, CA 94612 7 Telephone: (510) 663-4744 t’ Facsimile: (510) 663-4740 \ufffd1 \ufffd Additior..a! Counsel Z.ist on ne..-r:t page i\ufffd ENDORSED \u00b7 FILt=O San Franol oo C\ufffduntySuperlor Court DEC – 8 2006 GORDON PARK .. LI, Clerk BY: LINDA K, E PV Depyty5j,r1(\” ho … , INTHESUPERIORCOURT OFTIIBSTATEOFCALIFORNIA -rt\u00b7 … f;j–1\u00b7- -\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7. \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7 – \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7 – — \u00b7 — \u00b7\u00b7 – IN-AND-FQR:-\u00b1-HE-GOUNT\u00a5-Q.F-SAN-FRAN\ufffdISCO -\u00b7- … -\u00b7\u00b7 l.!!2 7 G;j13 BE VU, SUK KIT WONG, and -GURGEN t) HOVHANNISYAN >-14 LLJ v. z1s a:! 16 0 J= 17 <( 18 19' 20. 21 23 24 25 TAMERON :MITCHEll..AND LARRY BOLTON, Chief Deputy Directors, Department of Social Services, State of_ California, and DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA Respondents. Case No. CPF-04-504362 SE'ITLEMENT AGREEMENT AND[PBQP08El)JORDER '-<- 1 \\Q\/ Settlement Agreement and \ufffd] Order Vu et al. v. Mitchen et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 1 NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONO:MlC JUSTICE MARCCOHAN\u00b7 2 MARY R. MANNIX 275 Seventh Ave., Suite 1506 3 New York, NY 10001-6708 Telephone: (212) 633-6967 4 Facsimile: (212) 633-6371 COALffiON OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 6 \u00b7 Grace Galligher, State Bar No. 106687 1901 Alhambra Blvd, Second Floor 7 Sacraqiento, CA 95816. Telephone: (916) 736-0616 8 Facsimile: (916) 736-2645 \u00b7 9 Attorneys for Petitioners 10 . --\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7\u00b71-1\u00b7- \u00b7-\u00b7 -\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7- ' -- \u00b7 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 J 23 24 25 ...... - ...... \u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7 Settlement Agreemen\ufffd arid EP10\ufffd Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7 \u00b7-\u00b7--- --\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 ....... ,, _____ ,, \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 -\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7 -\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7- 1 This SE'ITLE:tv.1ENTAGREEMENT (Agreement) is entered into by and between Be Vu, Suk 2 Kit Wong, and Gurgen Hovhannisyan, hereinafter referred to as PE'ITI'IONERS, and Clifford 3 Allenby, in his official capacity as interim Director of the Department of Social Services, State of 4 California (successor to Tameron Mitchell and Larry Bolton, Chief Deputy Directors) and 5 Department of Social Services, State of California, herein referred to collectively as 6 RESPONDENTS. 7 8 RECITALS WHEREAS, on July 15, 2004, PETITIONERS file\ufffd a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 9 ordering RESPONDENTS to 1) estimate the number oflow-income single-language minority 10 _ households, both participating and not participating in the Food Stamp program, for each project -- - \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 -11 -\u00b7 --area \u00b7and\u00b7 certification-office-in-Galifomia,--as-required-by-federal--Food Stam.p-law-and--- \u00b7\u00b7-- . - -- .. 12 implementing regulations, 7 U.S.C\ufffd 2020 (c), (e)(l), (e){2)(A) and 7 C.F.R. 272.4 (b)(6);\u00b7 13 2) translate all Food Statnp pro\ufffd materials into all languages spoken by at least 100 single- 14 language minority low-income households served by the same certification office, as required by 15 f\ufffd Food Stamp law and implementing regulations, 7 U.S.C. 2020 (c), (e)(l), (e)(2)(A); 16 7 C.F.R. . 272.4 (b){2)(iii), (b)(3)(i); 272.5 (b)(4); and 3) cease implementation ofMPP 17 63-202.2 and to prQmulgate a new regulation that comports with fe<;leral Food Stamp bilingr.1al 18 requirements; 19 WHEREAS, PETmONERS and RESPONDENTS desire to resolve their dispute according 20 to the terms set forth in this Agreement; 21 \/\/\/\/\/\/I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I If I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 22 \ufffdII I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 23 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ 24 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \/ 25 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 3\ufffd \u00b7 Settlement Agreement an 7,osed]' Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 1 2 AGREEMENT FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, including the promises set forth in this 3 SETTLE:MENT, PETmONERS and RESPONDENTS agree to the following terms: _4 5 6 Definitions 1. \"Agreement\" means this SettlemeJ.'.lt Agreement. 2. \"Circumstances beyond the agency's control\" means events or occurrences that the 7 Department of Social Services has no power to change or affect, that the Department could not 8 have changed or affected had it engaged in reasonable preparation, and that fiustrate, delay, or 9 impede the Department's ability.to meet the time frames for translation in i'f,Js 15, 16, 17, and 18. 10 3. \"Civil Rights Compliance Review Process\" means the reviews conducted by California -- --- -\u00b7 ---H..-- --Department-ef Sooial--SeFVices-Ci:vi-1-Rights-Bureau-af-county-welfare-\u00b7 departments -pursuant-to-- __ _ 12 MPP 21-201.3. 4. ''Eight (8) additional languages\" means: Arabic, Armenian, Cambodian, Farsi, Hmong, 14 Korean, Lao, and Tagalog. 15 5. ''Estimate\" means the estimate of the number of low-income single-language minority 16 households referred to in 7 C.F.R. 272A (b}(6). 17 . . 6. ''Foo\ufffd _Stamp forms and materials\" and ''Food Stamp forms ,, mean Food Stamp program 18 information and certification materials as referred to in 7 C.F .R. 272.4 (b ). In this Agreement, 19 ''Food Stamp forms'' has the same meaning.as ''Food Stamp forms and materials.\" 20 7. ''Food \ufffdtamp Program\" refers to the program \u00b7created by the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. \u00b7 21 2020 et seq. and its implementing regulations, 7 C.F.R. Part 271 et seq. 22 8. \"Four ( 4) existing languages\" means Chinese, Russian, Spanish, and Vietnamese. 23 9. \"Low-income single-language minority households\" refers to households as provided in 24 7 C.F.R. 271.2 and 272.4 (b)(l). 25 10. \"New or revised forms\" means new Food Stamp forms or materials or revisions to Food 4 Settlement Agreement and [P: o\ufffd] Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-S04362 1 Stamp forms or materials listed on Attachment A that are developed after June 30, 2006. 2 11. ''Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court\" means five (5) business days after 3 the date on \ufffdhich Petitioners send Respondents' counsel the Notice of Entry of Judgment. 4 12. \"State Fair Hearing Issue Codes\" means the numeric codes assigned by the California 5 Department of Social Senrices (CDSS) Fair Hearing Division to specific substantive or 6 procedural issues involved in the state fair hearings and used for purposes of tracking and filing 7 decisions by issue. 8 13. \"Survey of Ope\ufffdons and Access\" means the Annual County Food Stamp Program 9 11 Smvey of Operations and Access that the Respondents transmit to the counti\ufffd for completion 10 each year . . . - . ---\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7+1 . ---14\ufffd--!\ufffdT-welve{-12\u2794 languages!!..means-the-\ufffd-$our-(4)-existing-languages'\ufffd-an.d--thel.\ufffdight-(8).--- --\u00b7\u00b7- _ -\ufffd- __ _ 12 additional languages.\" 13 14 Translation of Food Stamp \ufffdorms and materials 15. After the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court, RESPONDENTS will 15 translate the Food Stamp program forms and materials identified in Attachment A into the eight 16 (8) additional languages. RESPONDENTS will complete the translations in the fol\ufffdowing 17, manner: 18 a. Forms designated in Attachment A as ''High Priority'' will be translated into the 8 19 additional languages within six (6) months from the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the 20 Court. 21 b. Forms designated in Attachment A as \"Moderate Priority'' or ''Lowest Priority'' will be 22 II translated into the 8 additional languages within twelve (12) months from the Notice of Approval 23 of this Agreement by the_ Court. 24 16. RESPONDENTS' current policy is to translate Food Stamp forms into the four (4) 25 existing languages. After Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Co\ufffd, RESPONDENTS Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 - -- -- \u00b7- - - ---- -- ------ _________ ., __ ____________ - --------- ----- \u00b7-------- -\u00b7- -- ----- - - - ---- - - \u00b7\u00b7-- -- -\u00b7\u00b7- - -- 1 will translate into any or all of the four ( 4) existing languages, Food Stamp forms listed on 2 Attachment A that have not yet been translated into each. of the four (4) existing languages. 3 These forms include: . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 H DP A 353 - Nptice to Aid to Families with Dependent Children and\/or Food Stamp Administrative Disqualification Hearing DFA 435 - County allegation of intentional program violation\/statement of position DPA 478 - Disqualification consent agreement food stamp program ------ --1-1\u00b7- - \u00b7 - ... -- \u00b7 -- \u00b7--- ,, ___ - --\u00b7 \u00b7---\u00b7 -- - --\u00b7 -- --- \u00b7- \u00b7-\" \u00b7- . . ----\u00b7 \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-- \u00b7-- -- .. ... .. \u00b7- -- . -\u00b7- \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7- \u00b7---\u00b7- _,, .. ,_ \u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7- \u00b7 - --\u00b7 \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 - \u00b7-- \u00b7-\u00b7 --\ufffd \u00b7--\u00b7\u00b7 - \u00b7 \u00b7 - \u00b7 ' . 12 13 14 15 FS. 13 - Notice to all food stamp members who must pay child support NA 1215 - Food stamp notice of change (termination) 16 RESPONDENTS will translate these forms within the following time frames according to their 1 7 designated priority sta\ufffd on Atta\ufffdhment A. High Priority forms will be tr\ufffdlated within six (6) 18 months from the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by \ufffde Court. \"Moderate\" or ''Lowest 19 Priority\" forms will be translated_ within twelve (12) months from Notice of Approval of this 20 Agreement by the Court. 21 I 17. RESPONDENTS\u00b7s\ufffd ensure that new and revised Food Stamp f\ufffd and materials 22 II developed during the term of this Agreement shall be translated into the twelve (12) languages as 23 follows: 24 \u00b7a RESPONDENTS will designate each new or revised form and materials as ''High 25 Priority,\" hModerate Priority,n or \"Lowest Priority,\" and add each new item to the next Reporting Settlement Agreement and 9,oposcdi Order Vu et al v. Mitchell et al.\u00bb Case No. CPF-04-S04362 1 Matrix list described in ,r22, with identification of the effective date of each document. 2 b. RESPONDENTS will complete translation of new or revised fonns and materials within 3 the following time frames for each priority group: \"High Priority\" forms will be completed 4 within six months of the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court or three months 5 after the effective date of the new or revised form., whichever is later. \"Moderate Priority'' and 6 ''Lowest Priority'' \ufffdorms will be translated within twelve (12) months of\ufffde Notice of Approval 7 of this Agreement by the Court or three months after th\ufffd effective date. of the new or revised 8 form, whichever is - later. 9 18 . If any estimate prepared during the term of this Agreement pursuant to 1 30 indicates that 10 Food Stamp forms must be translated into any language(s) other than the twelve (12) languages, -- ---1-1-- --\u00b7as--:reqwred-by-7-'Q\"-;S.G.- \ufffd02Q-(o-),(e)(l),-(-e)(-20(A-),-and-7--G.F.R.-- --2-12-.4-\u20acb)(-2-)Eili);-\ufffd)(-3)(i};------ ........ ------ 12 272.5 (b )( 4), RESPONDENJ'S shall translate all Food Stamp forms and _materials into that 13 language(s) as follows: 14 a. During the tenn of this Agreement, the RESPONDENTS shall translate into the new 15 language(s) the Food Stamp forms and materials identified on the most recently issued Reporting 16 Matrix (Attachment B). Forms designated on the Reporting Matrix as \"High Prior.ity'' will be 17 translated into the new language(s) within six (6) months from the issuance of the estimate. 1 8 Forms designated on the Reporting Matrix . as ''Moderate Priority'' or \"Lowest Priority'' will be 19 translated into the new language(s) within twelve (12) months from issuance of the estimate. 20 19. RESPONDENTS will translate Food Stamp forms within the time frames provided in 21 ff 15(a),(b); 16; l 7(b); 1 8(a). In any instance in which RESPONDENTS claim that they are 22 unabie to meet the time frames for completing translations because of circumstances beyond the 23 agency's control, RESPONDENTS will take the following steps: 24 a. As soon as RESPONDENTS have reason to believe they are unable to meet the time 25 frames for completing translation, but no later than the expiration of the particular tjme \ufffdame for 7 Settlement Agreement and [J>mpn:tLi}Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 1 translation of the forms, RESPONDENTS will send a report to PETITIONERS’ counsel that . . 2 identifies: 1) each Food Stamp form that will not be translated into a specific language within . 3 the required time frame; 2) the reason for the RESPONDENTS’ inability to meet the deadline for 4 translation; 3) an explanation ofhow this constitutes .\”circumstances beyond the agency’s 5 \u00b7 control;\” 4) when they learned of the problem; and 5) the steps- they are taldng or will take to 6 complete the \ufffdlation( s ). 7 _b. Upon submitting the report in ifl9a, RESPONDENTS shall have an additio\ufffd 90 days 8 from the expiration \ufffdf the original time frame in which to complete the required translation(s) 9 \u00b7i unless PETIDONERS dispute RESPONDENTS’ assertion of good cause. If PETITIONERS 1 0 dispute RESPONDENTS assertion of good cause, they shall notify RESPONDENTS within . -\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7–\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7+1 \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 -fourteen-(-1-4)-days-ef-reoeiving-R:ESP()NDBN-fS!-report–and-the\u00b7-pames -shall-meet-promptly-to– — \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7- \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7- \u00b7 … 12 attempt to reconcile their differences. If the parties are not able to reconcile their differences, 13 PETITIONERS may seek relief from the c\ufffdurt. 14 20. If, based on a current language estimate conducted pursuant to ,r 30, RESPONDENfS 15 conclude that they are no longer required by federal Food Stamp law and regulation to translate 16 Food Stamp forms and materials into specific language(s), they shall notify PETITIONERS’ 17 counsel of that conclusion, the basis for the conclusion, and the date on-which they will no longer 1 8 translate Food Stamp forms into the specific language(s). RESPONDENTS will continue _to 19 make available to and require counties to use forms already translated, as long as those forms 20 remain in effect and unrevised. 21 21 . On a monthly basis, the Respondents shall notify the counties electronically and, if they 22 ii choose, via maj] of the form(s) translated during the month. The notice to counties shall identify \u00b7 23 the form(s) and language(s) into which the form(s) have been translated. The notice shall include 24 a statement instructing the counties to use the translated form(s) immediately upon receipt of the 25 notice of translation and shall include the CDSS website address where the translated forms may 8 b,< Settlement Agreement and (:Ptoposcd] Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 . \u00b7- - - .. . - --- - - - \u00b7\u00b7 .. -- \u00b7 -- \u00b7\u00b7 . . .. . . . 1 be obtained. Respondents shall provide the PETITIONERS' counsel with a copy of this notice 2 each month at the time they provide the monthly Reporting Matrix described in , 22. 3 4 Reporting on Translation Progress 22. Within ten (10) business days of the Notice of Approv\ufffd of this Agreement by the Court, 5 RESPONDENTS shall prepare and submit to PETITIONERS the Reporting Matrix list 6 (Attachment B) that they will use to monitor and report on the translation progress of the 7 materials listed in Attachment A and any new forms and materials described in 1 17. This 8 Reporting Matrix shall also be used to report the translation progress for forms and materials if 9 RESPONDENTS ' estimate pursuant to 1 30 requires that forms \ufffde translated into languages 10 other than the twelve (12) language(s). The Reporting Matrix shall be similar in content and \u00b7- -- ---- \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7H\u00b7- -form-to\u00b7-A:ttachm.ent-B\u00b7\u00b7and-shall-include\u00b7\u00b7the-following-information\ufffd----\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7--\u00b7--- ---- --- \u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7 -\u00b7\u00b7 -----\u00b7 ---\u00b7- -\u00b7-- \u00b7-\u00b7----\u00b7- \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 __ _ 12 . . a A listing of each Food Stamp form identified in Attachment A by form number and title 13 and any new or revised fo\ufffds developed pursuant to ,r 17 by form number and title; 14 b. A designation with respect to each fo\ufffd of whether it is \"High Priority,\" ''Medium \u00b7 15 Priority,\" or \"Lowest Priority''; . . 16 c. For new or revised forms, an indication tjiat it is a new or revised fonn, its effective date 1 7 and a High, Medium, or Lowest Priority designation. RESPONDENTS will determine priority 18 designation based on :frequency of usage with respect to revised forms. With respect to new . 19 forms, RESPONDENTS will determine the priority designation based on the importance of the 20 form to the household's receipt or retention of benefits; 21 d For each form that is deactivated or no longer in use, an indication to this effect and the 22 date of the deactivation; 23 e. An indication of the date on which RESPONDENTS will cease translating forms into a 24 specific language, it: based on a current language estimate conducted pursuant to ,r 30, 25 RESPONDENTS decide not to do _further translations because they are no longer required by Settlement Agreement and\ufffdrder Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-S04362 1 Food Stamp law and regulations. 2 f. For each form the due date for translation into each language pursuant to ,i,I 1 5(a),(b); 16; 3 17(b); 18(a); 4 g. For each form which RESPONDENTS must translate pursuant to ,r,r 15-1 8, the following 5 information will be provided in each monthly report: 6 7 8 and 9 i. Whether the form is available for ongoing use in each language; ii. For forms that have been sent for translation, the date the form was sent for translation; iii. For forms transiated after Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court, an 1 O indication that the form h\ufffds been translated into a particular language and the date by which. \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7--\u00b7-1-l- -oounties -must-use-the-uanslated-form..---\u00b7 \u00b7 -----\u00b7- \u00b7----------- ---------\u00b7---------\u00b7--\u00b7-\u00b7- ---------\u00b7\u00b7-- \u00b7 -\u00b7-- __ _ __ . ___________ _ I 12 23\ufffd Commencing on the fifteenth of the second month following the month of Notice of 13 Approval of this Agreement by the Court and thereafter on the fifteenth of each month, 14 RESPONDENTS shall provide PETITIONERS' counsel with the Reporting Matrix referred to in 15 1 22 that contains the information described in ,r _22 with respect to the preceding month. 16 17 Instructions to County Departments of Social Services 24. Within 60 days after the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court, 18 RESPONDENTS shall issue an All County Letter (ACL) or All County Information Notice 19 (ACIN) that includes the following : 20 a. \ufffd explanation of the RESPONDENTS' plans to translate Food Stamp forms and 21 materials into the 8 additional languages; 24 25 b. The Food Stamp translation obligations; c. An attached copy of this Agreement signed by the Court; d. A copy of the Report Matrix referred to in 1 22; e. That counties shall immediately use a translated form once RESPO'l'l1JE\u00b0N1S have Settlement Agreement and.fPrep Order Vu ct al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No:CPF--04-504362 10 \ufffd : ' 1 \u00b7 provided the translated form to the counties; 2 f. Specify RESPONDENTS' procedure for making newly translated fonns available to the 3 counties; 4 g. An explanation of the procedures governing the approval and use of substituted forms 5 when CDSS has translated the form; 6 h. That translated. forms shall be used despite any limitations that automated systems may 7 impose on the use of translated fomi.s; and 8 . i. That RESPONDENTS will monitor counties' use of translated fonns through the Civil 9 Rights compliance review process, Annual Food Stamp Program Survey, and state fair hearing 1 O codes, as described below, and any other additional means they choose . . . . - \u00b7-- --\u00b7\u00b7\u00b71-1 - -- ---2-5-;-W-ithin-30-days-after-the-Notice-of-Appreval--of-tbis-Agfeement-by-the-Gourt,-but-no -later-- -\u00b7-- \u00b7 -\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7- 12 than the date on wbi\ufffdh the draft ACL or AC1N is distributed to the counties for review or 1\u00b73 comment, RESPONDENTS shall provide a _draft of the ACL or ACJN referred to in ,I 24 to 14 PETITIONERS' counsel for comment. PETITIONERS' counsel shall forward any written 15 comments regarding the draft instructions to RESPONDENTS' attorney within 15 days of their 16 receipt of the draft instructions. . 17 1 8 Monitoring County Departme\ufffdts of Social Services' Use of Translated Forms 26. During the term of this Agreement RESPONDENTS will use the Civil Rights 19 Compliance Review proces\ufffd to monitor the counties' use of translated forms as follows: 20 RESPONDENTS' civil rights compliance review process will includ.e a determination, 21 utilizing the most current version of the Reporting Matrix, whether county departments of social 22 seiyices are using the appropriate translated forms. 23 27. During the term of this Agreement, RESPO\ufffdENfS will use the annual County Food \u00b7 24 S\ufffdp Program Survey of Operations and Access to monitor counties' use of translated forms: 25 For the Survey of Operations and Access for the Fiscal Year July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006\ufffd 11 \ufffd Settlement Agreement and fP,ep Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 1 and subsequent surveys conducted during the term of this Agreement, RESPONDENTS will 2 include question 2 of the survey form transmitted by All County Information Notice No. I-30-05 3 (July 6, 2005) (Attachment C), modified to include Spanish in the list of languages. 4 28. During the term of this Agreement, RESPONDENTS will monitor counties' use of S translated forms through the state fair hearing process as follows: 6 a. Within 30 days of the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court, 7 RESPONDENTS will amend the state fair hearing issue codes to identify issues related to\u00b7 8 translation of forms. RESPONDENTS will issue instructions to the Administrative Law Judges 9 regarding the use of these codes. \u00b7Toe instructions shall provide that the case shall be coded as 1 O having a ''translation of fo\ufffds\" issue code whenever the claimant or the Administrative Law \u00b7 -\u00b7--\u00b7- \u00b7\u00b7 +I-- -Judge-identifies-the-issue-of-forms-or-materials-being-provided-in\u00b7\u00b7a \u00b7-language-other--than\u00b7the-- --\u00b7-- -- \u00b7--\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7-- 12 claimant's primary language. These instructions shall be effective upon issuance. 13 \u00b7 RESPONDENTS shall provide PETITIONERS' counsel a copy of these instructions upon their 14 issuance. 1 5 29. During the term of this Agreement, RESPONDENTS shall provide PETITIONERS' 16 counsel with a copy of the results of the above monitoring processes as follows: 17 a. RESPONDENTS will provid\ufffd PETffiONERS' counsel with the tabulation and RnB:lysis of 18 the survey results from the County Food Stamp Program Survey of Operations and Access at the 19 same time as the results are transmitted to the counties. 20 b. RESPONDENTS will provid\ufffd PETITIONERS' co\ufffdsel with the original civil rights 21 compliance review reports within 30 days of their completion. 22 c. RESPONDENTS will provide PETITIONERS' counsel data indicating the total number II 23 I of state Food Stamp fair hearings and the number of state Food Stamp fair hearings assigned the 24 code{s) indicating a translation issue. RESPONDENTS will provide the data to PETITIONERS' 25 counsel twice a year for the periods January through June and July through December within 30 1 days after the end of each period. 2 3 Estimating the number of low-income single-language minority households 30. RESPONDENTS shall develop an estimate of the number of low-income single- 4 language minority households, pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 272.4 (b)(6) as follows: 5 a. Within 60 days of the Notice of Approval {?f this Agreement by the Court, 6 RESPONDENTS shall provide PETIDONERS' \ufffdllllsel with their initial estimate methodology 7 and allow PETITIONERS ten (10) business days to comment. RESPONDENTS shall :finalize 8 their initial estimate methodology wi\ufffd 60 days of receiving PETITIONERS' comments. 9 b. Within 90 days after :finalizing the initial year's methodology, RESPONDENTS shall 1 O complete their estimate of the number oflow-income single-language minority households. -\u00b7 -- -\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7 -1-l- -lJpon-its-oompletio11;-RESPQNDmr.rS!...sball-pro\u00a5ide-PET-!IlONRRS!-counsel--with-the.estimate.- ____ . _ \u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7 12 c. RESPONDENTS shall update the estimate annually from the date of the initial estimate. \u00b7 1 3 RESPONDENTS may change the methodology used, but shall notify PETITIONERS' counsel 14 during the term of this Agreement of any changes in the method CDSS intends to use in making 15 the estimate and allow PETffiO\ufffd' counsel ten (10) business days to comment before any 16 changes to the methodology are :finalized. Upon completion of the annual estimate, 17 . RESPONDENTS shall provide PETITIONERS' counsel with the estim,ate. 1 8 1 9 General Provisions 31 . The parties agree that this Petition shall be dismissed with prejudice, except that 20 PETITIONERS' claims with respect to their Second Cause of Action regarding the 21 \u00b7 \ufffdSPONDENTS' obligations under federal Food Stamp law to translate forms and materials for 22 l the work component of the CaiWORKs \ufffdd General Assistance programs in which Food Stamp 23 rt?Cipients must participate are dismissed without prejudice. 24 32. RESPONDENTS agree that PEfflIONERS are entitled to attomeys' fees and costs 25 pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1095 and 1021 .5 . 13 ;\ufffd Settlem\ufffdnt Agreement and tp,e;;\ufffdOrder Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 ' I 1 33 . Within 45 days after .the Notice of Approval of this Agreement by the Court, National 2 Center for Law and Economic Justice (formerly Welfare Law Center) and Coalition of California 3 Welfare Rights Organizations shall sttbmit their request for attorneys' fees to RESPONDENTS. 4 If, within 120 days of Notice of Entry of Judgment, the parties cannot agree on attorneys' fees, 5 the matter shall be submitted to the Court for determination, unless the Court extends the time 6 . for the parties to resolve the fees issue. If PETITIONERS submit their request for attorneys' fees 7 to the Court, RESPONDENTS shall not challenge PETITIONERS' entitlement to att\ufffdmeys' \u00b7 8 fees, but only the amount of the request. 9 34. ff PETITIONERS seek reimbursement for costs, they shall file a memorandum. of costs 1 0 pursuant to California Rules of Court section 870. -\u00b7\u00b7----\u00b7 --1-1-- ---- -\ufffdS.--This-\u00b7Settlement-Agr:eement-shall-be--govemed-by-the-laws-ef-the-\ufffdtate-of-Galifomia--and--- --\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7:---\u00b7-\u00b7-\u00b7- 12 Federal Food Stamp laws and regulations. Any proceeding regarding enforcement of this 1 3 Settlement Agreement shall be brought in th\ufffd County of San Francis_co. 14 36. The persons signing this Agreement represent that they have the authority to enter into 15 this Agreement on behalf of the respectiv:e parties that they represent and that this Agreement 16 shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of the Parties, their successors, and assigns. 17 \u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7 37. This Agreement has been drafted by all parties. In tlie event a court \ufffds required to 18 intetpret this Agreement, no party shall have the right to argue that the other is responsible for 19 any ambiguity in the language of the Agreement, and any uncertainty or ambiguity shall not be 20 interpreted against any one party. 21 38. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Settlement Agreement, RESPONDENTS reserve 22 1 the right to impiement, change, or otherwise alter or amend the procedures and requirem\ufffdts of. 23 this Settlement Agreement if required by intervening changes in federal statute,. regulation, or . 24 written federal instruction inconsistent with this Settlement Agreement. RESPONDENTS shall 25 provide counsel for PEmIONERS-with written notification, by certified mail or by hand . 14 \ufffd\ufffd Settlement Agreement and [f?:L rder Vu et al. v. Mitchel] et al., Case No. CPF-04-504362 I delivery with written aclmowledgment of receipt, of a required change at least thirty (30) days 2 prior to the commencement of implementation, unless RESPONDENTS are required to 3 implement such a required change in less than thirty (30) days. If RESPONDENTS are required 4 to implement a required change in less than thirty (30) days, RESPONDENTS shall provide 5 notice to PETITIONERS' counsel no\u00b7 later than seven (7) working days after learning of a 6 required change. PETITIONERS shall have the right to challenge whether the change is required 7 by federal statute, regulations, or written instructions. 8 39. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Settlement Agreement 9 1 for a petiod of 30 months from the date of the court's approval of this Agreement, except as . 1 0 follows: - \u00b7- - \u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 --1-1- -\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7 a.----If-an-estimate-aonducted-during-the-30\ufffdmonth-temi-of-this -Agr,eemen.t-r.equixes-that-F-oocL-- .. __ __ __ \u00b7- -\ufffd . --\u00b7-\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 12 Stamp forms be translated into additional language( s ), the Court shall retain jurisdiction until the 13 RESPONDENTS complete the translation of Food Stamp forms in effect on the date the estimate 14 was finalized. The Court shall retain jurisdiction only to enforce the Respondent's translation 15 obligation under ,r 18 with respect to the additional language(s) and the RESPONDENTS' 16 obligation to report monthly to PETITTONERS on translation progress with respect to the 17 additional language(s) pursuant to fl 22 and 23. 1 8 b. If the RESPONDENTS obtain an extension of the time frame for completing the required 19 translations, pursuant to 1 19, the term of this Agreement shall be extended for a period of time 20 equal to any extension(s) of the deadline for completing translations. 21 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ 22 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I i I I I i I I I I I I I i I I i I i i i I I I i I I 23 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I. I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 24 \/ l l \/ ! I I I J \/\/ I \/ \/ \/\/ \/ I \/ I \/ I I \/ I I I \/ I I I \/ \/ I \/ I \/ \/ \/ \/ I I \/ \/ I \/ I \/ \/\/ \u00b0 25 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I f I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I ' l l . . j I 1 1N WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT as of 2 the date set forth adjacent to each of their respective signatures. 3 4 5 6 7 8 DATED : 9 1 0 ATTORNEYS FOR PEMIONERS Legal Services ofNorthem Califon-.ria -- -- -& -DA:-'FBB:----1-\ufffdJbib.'--.. - -\u00b7\u00b7 ---\u00b7 - -\ufffd-_,-- --4--f..\u00a5,=-l'-+----1-\ufffd\ufffd\ufffd--- ----------, ----\u00b7-- ---- \u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7- \u00b7\u00b7-- 12 13 14 DATED: 1co\/s1frt, MARY R MANNIX 15 National Center for Law and Economic Justice 16 17 DATED: \\ l lq lo\ufffd 18 GI.L'lotP,'--'J.J -ALLI Coalition \u00b7 of Califomi\ufffd elfare Rights Organizations 19 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ 20 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \u00b7 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ 21 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ ! I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \/ _ \/ I I I I 22 \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ I I I I .I. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I 23 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \/ 24 \/ \/ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I f I I I I I I I I I I I I I I \/ \/ 25 \/ \/ \/ 1 \u00b7 1 ( I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I J I \/ \/ 16 Settlement Agreement and \ufffd Order Vu et al. v. Mitchell et al., Case No. CPF\ufffd04-504362 1 2 3 AITORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 4 DATED: 5 _,,., JL\ufffd_l_ CE B. BOLTON Deputy Director, Legal Division California Department of Social Services 6 8 DATED: \/j \/1 \/0 6 J l \ufffd\/- \ufffd 10 - -\u00b7 -\u00b7 --------11- 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CHERYL INER Deputy At:tomey General for BILL LOCKYER Attorney General of the State of California \u00b7. . - . . . - - -\u00b7-\u00b7 --\u00b7\u00b7-\u00b7-- - - ---- -- -\u00b7--- \ufffd =- \u00b7 -\"'-=- - --\u00b7-\u00b7\"''' Having read the Settlement Agreement, it is so ordered. Ut.L U 4 2006 DATED: _____ _ Judge of the Superior Court "

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” …. .. .>.- 2 619 North Street ..- \”:’ \” < : \", O e . ali fornia 90017 67 \/ -. .;.,...,. t . NITED STATES DISTPICT CO T herself and all others similarly \"\"\" .' ;:': 'L[ STIPULATION FOR VS. 1 '.e '{ DOrA S ALA, Secrehary ,'.i. Y. ';\": & \";'v . \"' ' 15 H an\u00b0f theservices,Department o[ Health and ) \"'., . ,., :' . ,-: - s @ 18 The parties to the above-captioned action, by and through -' \"Y \": ...,.. .,,,. 19 their respec iv counsel, hereby agree and stipulate as follows: 20 1. By_ entering int this Stipulation, the degendan \"\" ::: 21 Secretary of Health and Human Services expressly does not concede \" ' \": \":\" 22 liability for any claims raised by the plaintiff or the plaintiff .'\"\" -\" C . .....:-; . 24 2. e\" f nal administrative decision o the Secretarg dated ; - 5 25 October 29, 1992, upholding the denial of plaintiff's May 1990 \" + } ' :' \" * 26 application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, shall be ' \"' \" '': 27 vacated. :( ' [' \": { : .:.\/ ... 2 Security Income benefits shall be granted. Retroactive. SSI \" \"\": . ' 3 benefits shall be awarded to -plaintiff pursuant to said '\" : - ::' : \"} 4 application, with an effective beginning date of Ja uar i, 1991. 5 Said retroactive benefits Shall be paid to plaintiff, as otherwise q.[ 6 eligible, for each and every month beginning January i, 1991 : ..< ,.: .-; :J 7 through and including October, 1992. Said payments shall be ,. - j 8 calcul ted without regard to the value of any \"excess real \/ [- : .,...:.: %. . i09 herei .pr\u00b0perty\" which was referenced in the administrative, proceedings \"< \": \"-, ii 4. The reli f set forth in Paragraphs 6 and 7 herein below -. .. 12 shall constitute a full and final settlement of all other claims 13 raised in this action. 14 5. This settlement agreement expressly reserves the right of 15 any person whose SSI benefits have been or will be denied, 16 terminated or reduced, as a result of an alleged failure of the 17 Secretary to provide prompt and adequate notice of.the conditional 18 benefits reimbursement agreement requirements to bri g 'ian 19 individual om laint seeking increased and\/or retroactive SSI 20 benefits, pursuant to the normal procedure for obtaining judicial 21 review of final administrative decisions of the Secretary, as 22 prescribed in 42 U.S.C. 405(g). 23 6. The Secretary shall issue a transmittal updating SSA's 24 Program Operations Manhal System (POMS) by the end of February 25 1994, with a revision of the \"SSI SPOTLIGHT ON GETTING SSI WHILE 26 YOU TRY TO SELL EXCESS RESOURCES,\" which will contain language that 27 covers the points set forth in the item issued under paragraph 7 28 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 La ' lo 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 2O 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 \"-. _-\/: :ii- i\". which describes said \"Spotlight\". Prior to final issuance of the Spotlight, the Secretary shall submit the draft revisions to plaintiffs' counsel for comment. An instruction will accompany the revised \"Spotlight\" indicating that SSA's Field personnel should photocopy the POMS version of the \"Spotlight\" and distribute it to all individuals who might be eligible for SSI benefits under the conditional payment provision. In addition, the revised \"SpotYight\" shall immediately replace the unrevised version of the \"Spotlight.\" The \"Spotlight\" subsequently shall be translated into Spanish ind all other languages for which the \"Spotlight\" series is madeavailable Copies of the revised \"Spotlight\"and the POMS t ansmittal shall be served on plaintiff's counsel wi h- a certification that this provision of this paragraph has been satisfied. 7. The Secretary shall, within 30 days of the date on which judgment in this case is entered, issue a notice to all Social Security field offices containing the language attached hereto in Exhibit A. A copy of his notice shall be served on plaintiff's counsel with.a ertification that the provisions of this paragraph have been satisfied. 8. Judgment pursuant to the terms of this Stipulation shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff, Gretchen Taylor, and against the Secretary and the matter remanded to the Secretary for implementation of the terms of the stipulation. LEGAL SERVICES OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER GARY F.' MITH !\" .A tor, 'eys for Plaintiffs\"' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 .c . 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 2O 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DATED: \/\/\/\" DATED: I-I --q By: By: CHARLES J. STEVENS United States Attorney EDMUND F . BRENNKN Assistant U. S. Attorney ELIZABETH PRICE '\/ Special Assistant U. S. Attorney Attorneys for Defendant 1 ATTACHMENT A 2 REMINDER CONCERNING CONDITIONAL BENEFITS 3 4 AS a result of litigation filed in the Eastern District of California, we are issuing this reminder concerning the requirement 5 to explain conditional benefits to all individuals who may be eligible for them. The provision and its implications must be 6 explained to any individual whose: 7 * benefits are about to be denied or suspended due solely to excess nonliquid resources; and 8 liquid resources do not exceed 3 times the monthly feder l 9 benefit rate (FBR). benefits should also be explained to any Conditicnal individual whose liquid resources only exceed 3 times the FBR by a small ii amount or individuals who could benefit from the provision if aware of it including individuals who ask about conditional benefits but 12 have not filed an application. 13 POMS SI 01150.203B.I. requires that if an individual may be eligible if excess nonliquid resources were disposed-of, but 14 declines to take advantage of the conditional benefits provision when explained to him or her, the fact that the explanation was 15 given and the individual's refusal, must be documented in writing and signed by the individual before his benefit claim is denied due 16 to excess nonliquid resources. 17 When explaining the conditional benefits provision, be sure to explain the requirement to sign a written agreement (FORM SSA-8060- 18 U3) with SSA and that the conditional benefits period can only begin when SSA accepts the agreement. 19 We also are revlslng the \"SSI SPOTLIGHT ON GETTING SSI WHILE YOU 20 TRY TO SELL EXCESS RESOURCES\" in the near future by inserting language emphasizing to the individual that: 21 Conditional benefits cannot begin until you sign a written 22 \"conditional benefits agreement\" and Social Security accepts the agreement. 23 The agreement is available at your local social Security 24 office ask for more information. 25 Although claimants must be advised of the conditional benefits provisions prior to issuance of a denial notice, in addition any 26 claimants whose applications are denied based upon excess non- liquid resources must receive a notice in the form set forth at 27 POMS SI 01150.210.B.I, which again advises them of their right to 28 5 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ii 12 13 14 15 16 17 2O 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 sign and suDmi a conditional benefi%s agreements. Yhe curren automated motice used for denials d e o e\u00d7ce s resources contains this advice. Make sure you include i in any manual no ices you prepare. Re: Gretchen Taylor v. Shalala (E.D. CA No. CIV-S-93-0033 GEB :_. -.:... Dear Gary: :! i.'; Attached you will find copies of the notice that was sent to .,-.. 'c\" all Social Security field offices and the revised \"SSI Spotlight on GettingSSI-While You-Try to Sell Excess Resources.\" The \"Spot.l!g t' was issued in February.. The notice was sent out on May 25. The wording of the notice contains a few changes from that which you have seen previously. These changes are not substantive and were made primarily to attain editorial consistency with the previously-issued \"Spotlight.\" If you have any question , please feel free to contact me at (410) 965-3169. . behefits are about to be denied or. suspended due solely to' :.., '.>..:.’ excess nonliquid .resources an \” liquid resources do not exceed 3 times the monthly. Federal benefit rate (FBR). -\”.. Conditional b nefits should also be explained to any individual .. hose liquid resources only exceed 3 times the FBR by a small. amount or individuals who could benefit from the provision i aware of it includin& individuals who ask about conditional benefits but have not filed an application. POMS SI 01150.203B.I. requires that if an individual.may be., eligible if excess nonliquid resources were disposed of, but : \” ‘::\” \”‘\”\”- declines to take advantage of the conditional benefits provisien when explained to him\/her, the fact that the explanation was given and the individual’s refusal, must be documented in \u00a2riting and signed by the individualbefo\u00a3= his\/her benefit.i;C aimlis’ denied due to excess nonliquid resources. B. PROCEDURE When explaining the conditional benefits provision be sure to explain the requirement to sign a\” ritten agreement\”\”(FOP M SSA- 8060-U3) with SSA and that the condftional be6efits\”p ri0dcan only begin when SSA ccepts the agreement.. NOTE: You have received a revised \”SSI SPOTLIGHT ON GETTING SSI WHILE YOU TRY TO SELL EXCESS RESOURCES\” emphasizing to the individual that: Your benefits cannot begin until after you sign a \”conditional benefits agreement\” and Social Security accepts the agreement. The agreement form is available at your local Social Security office ask for more deCails. Bnd offic sk.for :.\”:: :\”-; .- The agreement form is available at your Io 1 Social S uri more What m happens after 11 real and\/or pe onal prope ? …,,.: ….. . You may continue to get SSI payments. See your Io 1 Social S uri office to find o if your :; .,,,. . SSI payments will continue after the s le. ., You will also have to y ba any SSI payments up to the value of the excess resource ich ., , ; ,, you r eived while t ing to sell e pro . … ,) .: : : THIS INFORMATION IS GENERAL; TO FIND OUT IF IT APPLIES TO YOU OR FOR MORE ‘.. ;.- ;. ., .;,. INFORMATION, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL SOCIAL SECURI OFFICE. TO SELL EXCESS RESOURCES -.-.. Can get SSI If have e ess resourceS? To get SSI, your countable resources must not be worth morc than $2,000 for an individual (or $3,000 for a couple). Can get SSI if h ve more than that? …,.. -…;. Yes; you may, but you must sell some of your countable resources. While you try to sell them, you may be able to get SSI. What kinds of things can sell? You can sell the following types of things: Real property, such as land or a house that you don’t live in; or Personal property, such as jewelry or a stamp collection. How does this work? While you are trying to sell real property, you can receive SSI payments for up to 9 months. While you re trying to sell personal property, you can receive SSI for up to 3 months. And we may pay you even longer. ”

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” SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DATE: 04\/07\/08 DEPT. 85 HONORABLE JAMES C . CHALFANT JUDGE A. FAJARDO DEPUTY CLERK HONORABLE #3 J. DE LUNA, C.A. JUDGE PRO TEM Deputy Sheriff NONE 9:30 am BS104207 Plaintiff Counsel WENDY CAMACHO vs CLIFF ALLENBY ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: VANESSA LEE Western Center on Law & Poverty 3701 Wilshire Blvd., Ste 208 Los Angeles, Ca 90010 GREGORY CRIBBS Deputy Attorney General 300 s. Spring St., Ste 1702 Los Angeles, Ca 90013 YOLAND ARIAS Defendant Counsel Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 5228 Whittier Blvd. Los Angeles, Ca 90022 Page 2 of 2 ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR NO APPEARANCES DEPT. 85 Reporter MINUTES ENTERED 04\/07\/08 COUNTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DATE, 04\/07\/08 DEPT. 85 HONORABLE JAMES C. CHALFANT JUDGE A. FAJARDO DEPUTY CLERK HONORABLE #3 JUDGE PRO TEM ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR J. DE LUNA, C.A. 9:30 am BS104207 WENDY CAMACHO vs CLIFF ALLENBY ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Deputy Sheriff NONE Plaintiff Counsel Defendant Counsel NO APPEARANCES ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: JUDGMENT AND WRIT Pursuant to the \”Judgment for Petitioner\” having been signed and filed this date, the above stated OSC is discharged and placed off calendar. CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\/ NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT I, the below named Executive Officer\/Clerk of the above-entitled court, do hereby certify that I am not a party to the cause herein, and that this date I served Notice of Entry of Judgment of 4\/7\/08 upon each party or counsel named below by depositing in the United States mail at the courthouse in Los Angeles, California, one copy of the original entered herein in a separate sealed envelope for each, addressed as shown below with the postage thereon fully prepaid. Date: 4\/7\/08 John A. Clarke, Executive Officer\/Clerk By: Page 1 of 2 DEPT. 85 Reporter MINUTES ENTERED 04\/07\/08 COUNTY CLERK 1 WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY, lNC. VANESSA LEE, SBN 216219 2 DORA LUNA, SBN 187970 3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 208 3 Los Angeles, CA 90010 4 Telephone: (213)487-7211 Facsunile: (213) 487-0242 [email protected] LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES 6 YOLANDA ARIAS, SBN 130025 5228 Whittier Boulevard 7 Los Angeles, California 90022 8 Telephone: (213) 640-3923 Facsimile: (213) 640-3911 [email protected] 9 ORIGINAL FILED APR O 7 2008 LOS ANGELE& SUPERIOR COURT 10 11 12 1N THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 13 WENDY CAMACHO, 14 Petitioner, 15 v. 16 CLIFF ALLENBY, Director, California 17 Department of Social Services, and DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 18 19 20 Respondents \ufffd Case No.: BS104207 ) [Pft!Clf8!!flBJ JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONER Date: April 7, 2008 .Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept: 85 Judge: James C. Chalfant Petition Filed: July 17, 2006 21 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 22 23 1. 2. Judgment is hereby granted for petitioner; A peremptory writ of mandate shall issue, commanding respondents John Wagner 24 and California Department of Social Services, their successors in office, agents, and employees, 25 and all those acting at their direction or in combination with them, or subject to their authority 26 and control: 27 a. To issue an All-County Letter no later than 90 days after service of 28 judgment and peremptory writ of mandate upon respondents, directing counties: ,,, g1 !Hl)JUDGMENTFORPETITIONER (CAMACHO V. ALLEN BY – BS l 04207) 1 1. To reimburse Ca!WORKs recipients for all supportive services 2 necessary for participation in SIPs approved under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3 11325.23, including any expenses, for which they have an eligible, unreimbursed, out-of-pocket 4 cost, incurred prior to the signing of a welfare-to-work plan ne’,pd.. —- St!Pllii;;ti,\ufffd:;;;:-;Ord\ufffd\ufffd;;:;i\ufffdtt;;;:;;\ufffd\ufffd;;;;\ufffd;jj;jij;ijo;;=ct,;;:——-11 Stipulation for Order Awarding Attorney’s Fee,; [P p33 di Order Camacho v. Allenby judgment final [04-07-2008] WtW SIP case Camacho v. Allenbyh stip & order–Judge Chalfant signed 10-7-08 WtW SIP case ”