Welfare Complaint Library

pdf Lilley v. County of Alameda – Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 2015-09-29

In Welfare Complaint Library 2349 downloads

Download (pdf, 628 KB)

Lilley v. County of Alameda – Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 2015-09-29.pdf

” Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page1 of 15 1 LAUREN HANSEN (SBN 268417) PATTI PRUNHUBER (SBN 277439) 2 MICHAEL RAWSON (SBN 95868) THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW PROJECT 3 449 15th Street, Suite 301 Oakland, CA 94612 4 Telephone: (510) 891-9794 Fax: (510) 891-9727 5 Email: [email protected] 6 STEPHANIE HAFFNER (SBN 194192) ROBERT D. NEWMAN (SBN 86534) 7 WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY 449 15th Street, Suite 301 8 Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (213) 235-2617 9 Fax: (510) 251-0600 Email: [email protected] 10 PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 11 THOMAS V. LORAN III (SBN 95255) ELAINE LEE (SBN 293452) 12 STACIE 0. KINSER (SBN 300529) PHILIP SHECTER (SBN 300661) 13 Four Embarcadero Center, 2211d Floor San Francisco, CA 94111 14 Telephone: (415) 983-1000 Fax: (415) 983-1200 15 Email: thomas.loran@pillsburylaw .com 16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 18 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 19 DONALD RAY LILLEY, JARVIS Case No.: 20 JOHNSON, and DANIEL MALLORY, individually and on CLASS ACTION 21 behalf of all others similarly situated, 22 23 Plaintiffs, vs. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA; BOARD 24 OF SUPERVISORS OF ALAMEDA COUNTY; ALAMEDA COUNTY 25 SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY; and LORI COX, in her official capacity as 26 Director of the Alameda County Social Services Agency, 27 28 Defendants. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page2 of 15 1 2 1. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Donald Ray Lilley, Jarvis Johnson, and Daniel Mallory bring this 3 action individually and on behalf of a class of persons (the \”Class\” or the \”Plaintiff Class\”) 4 consisting of all current and future applicants for regular and expedited CalFresh (Food 5 Stamp) benefits from defendant Alameda County (\”Alameda County\” or the \”County\”). 6 This suit challenges Alameda County’s widespread failure to timely detennine eligibility 7 for CalFresh (Food Stamp) benefits. The ongoing and persistent failure and\/or refusal of 8 the named Defendants to ensure, on a county-wide basis, the processing of CalFresh 9 applications within the time limits mandated by federal and state law has resulted and 10 continues to result in substantial delays in providing CalFresh benefits to thousands oflow- 11 income households in Alameda County critically in need of this assistance to help them 12 feed themselves and their families and provide them with adequate food and nutrition. 13 Indeed, the County’s failure to comply with federal and state mandated timelines has 14 resulted in a backlog of 10,657 pending applications as of July 2015. As a result, needy 15 Alameda County residents are facing undernutrition and hunger, homelessness, and serious 16 health risks. 17 2. CalFresh applications must be processed, and benefits issued to those 18 eligible, as soon as possible, but no later than 30 days after the date a person submits an 19 application. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(3); 7 C.P.R. 273.2(a), (g)(1), (3); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 20 18911(a). Applicants in emergency situations with very low-income and few resources 21 may qualify for expedited food stamps. 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(9); 7 C.P.R. 273.2(i); MPP 22 63-301.51. 1 The County must issue these benefits to eligible persons within three 23 calendar days. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 18914(b) (implementing 7 C.P.R. 273.2(i)); 24 MPP 63-301.531(a)). 25 26 27 28 \”MPP\” refers to the California Depmiment of Social Services’ Manual of Policies and Procedures containing the CalFresh regulations. The MPP or Manual is found at: http:\/\/www.dss.cahwnet.gov\/ord\/PG303.htm (last visited September 24, 2015). – 2- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page3 of 15 1 3. In violation of these mandates, Alameda County is processing regular and 2 emergency applications well beyond the respective 30-day and tlu\u00b7ee-day time limits. In 3 July 2015, the most recent month for which data are publicly available, 24.7% of all regular 4 (30-day) CalFresh applications were decided late due to County delay. Meanwhile, 5 applications for emergency assistance are processed late at least 13% of the time and 6 County policies ensure that the actual rate of late payment of emergency benefits is far 7 greater. 8 4. Plaintiff Donald Ray Lilley has been waiting for 52 days for the County to 9 process his application and without the CalFresh benefits, is not getting enough food to eat. 10 In desperate need of food, on September 21, 2015, Plaintiff Jarvis J olmson filed a request 11 for expedited service on his CalFresh application. Eight calendar days later, the County has 12 not yet issued a decision or benefits. This delay is five days longer than the California- and 13 federal-mandated timeframe. Plaintiff Daniel Mallory’s application for expedited food 14 stamps has been lingering unprocessed for 25 days and the County still has not issued him 15 benefits. All tlu\u00b7ee Plaintiffs are eligible for food stamps, and in all three circumstances, the 16 County unlawfully delayed the processing of their applications and issuance of benefits. 17 5. The County has a longstanding policy, pattern, practice, and custom of 18 failing and refusing to timely process CalFresh applications. Plaintiffs therefore seek 19 declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and, in 20 accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), on behalf of the Class of similarly 21 situated CalFresh applicants, to remedy Defendants’ violations of their rights under federal 22 and state law and to enjoin Defendants’ failure and\/or refusal to process CalFresh 23 applications, and to provide CalFresh benefits to eligible applicants, on a timely basis. 24 25 26 6. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 27 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1367. Plaintiffs’ action for declaratory and injunctive relief is 28 authorized by 28 U.S. C. 1343, 2201, and 2202 and by Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and 65. – 3 – CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-69 54-0649. vI Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page4 of 15 1 7. Plaintiffs’ claim for violations of California state law concems the same 2 actions and omissions that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim under federal law such that the 3 California state law claim is part of the same case or controversy. This Court therefore has 4 supplemental jurisdiction over the Califomia state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. 5 6 7 8. VENUE AND INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) because a substantial part 8 of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this District, and 9 because all Defendants named herein reside in, maintain offices in, or are responsible for 10 enforcing the laws relevant to this litigation in this District. 11 9. In accord with Local Rule 3-2 and Local Rule 3-5, this civil action should be 12 assigned to the San Francisco Division or to the Oakland Division of this Court because a 13 substantial part of the events or omissions which give rise to the claims herein have 14 occutTed and are occurring in Alameda County. 15 16 17 10. RIGHT OF ACTION Title 42 of the United States Code, 1983 confers a right of action to 18 enforce the federal statutes cited herein. California Code of Civil Procedure 1085 confers 19 a right of action to enforce the California state statutes cited herein. 20 21 22 11. PARTIES Plaintiff Donald Ray Lilley is a resident of the City of Livermore, in the 23 County of Alameda and brings this action both individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff 24 Class. 25 12. Plaintiff Jarvis J olmson is a resident of the City of Oakland, in the County of 26 Alameda and brings this action both individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class. 27 13. Plaintiff Daniel Mallory is a resident of the City of Berkeley, in the County 28 of Alameda and brings this action both individually and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class. -4- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page5 of 15 1 14. Alameda County is a political body of the State of California and, pursuant 2 to federal and state law, is required to oversee and monitor the Social Services Agency. 3 15. Defendant Board of Supervisors of Alameda County (the \”Board of 4 Supervisors\”) is the legislative body charged by law with managing the County 5 govenm1ent. 6 16. Defendant Alameda County Social Services Agency (the \”Agency\”) is the 7 local public agency responsible for administering Alameda County’s CalFresh program 8 within the County, including ensuring timely processing of CalFresh applications. 9 17. Defendant Lori Cox is the Director of the Agency. Plaintiffs sue Ms. Cox in – 10 her official capacity only. Ms. Cox is responsible for the enforcement, operation, and 11 execution of laws pertaining to the Agency’s administration of the CalFresh program, 12 including the timely processing of CalFresh applications. 13 18. At all relevant times, all four of the named Defendants were, are, and have 14 been acting in concert with respect to the administration of the CalFresh program such that 15 each such Defendant is, was, and has been at all relevant times acting as the agent of each 16 of the other Defendants with reference to the matters alleged herein. To obtain complete 17 relief and to avoid the need for the filing of a multiplicity of legal actions, Plaintiffs and the 18 Class have sued all four of the named Defendants herein for declaratory and injunctive 19 relief. 20 21 22 19. FACTS PERTAINING TO EACH NAMED PLAINTIFF Plaintiff Donald Ray Lilley is disabled and has a cunent application pending 23 for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). He cunently receives General Assistance 24 benefits. After paying rent, he does not have enough money left to pay for food with his 25 meager public assistance grant. While waiting for food stamps, there have been days when 26 he does not have enough to eat and he has experienced health problems due to poor 27 nutrition. Mr. Lilley applied for CalFresh benefits on August 7, 2015. The County sent 28 – 5- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page6 of 15 1 him just one notice, informing him that his caseworker has changed. As of the date of 2 filing of this complaint, the County has not issued him the benefits to which he is entitled. 3 20. Plaintiff Jarvis Johnson is a 53-year old man with disabilities. He receives 4 General Assistance benefits of $336 per month. After paying for rent and utilities, he has 5 $10 to survive on per month. Desperately needing additional assistance, he applied for 6 CalFresh benefits on September 10, 2015. After learning he was eligible for expedited 7 benefits, Mr. Jolmson requested expedited Food Stamps from the County on September 21, 8 2015. More than one week later, the County still has not issued Mr. Jolmson benefits. 9 21. Plaintiff Daniel Mallory is unemployed; after losing a job for which he is 1 0 owed unpaid wages. Without any income to pay for food, he applied for expedited 11 CalFresh with the County on September 3, 2015. Despite providing identification and 12 indicating that his housing costs exceed his income and resources combined, the County has 13 not issued him expedited food stamps. Twenty-five days later, he is still waiting for 14 expedited CalFresh assistance. 15 16 17 22. CLASS DEFINITION AND CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS Plaintiffs Donald Ray Lilley, Jarvis Johnson, and Daniel Mallory seek to 18 represent the Class consisting of current and future applicants for CalFresh (Food Stamp) 19 benefits from Alameda County. As such, this action is maintainable as a class action 20 pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21 23. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are met in that the Class is so numerous 22 that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to data reported by the County to 23 the California Department of Social Services (\”CDSS\”), the number of new applicants for 24 CalFresh benefits has exceeded 3,900 in each month of 2015. The County’s most recent 25 reported data show that as of the end of July 2015, 10,657 applications are pending with no 26 decision rendered. The Class is also fluctuating, in that as they apply for benefits, new 27 people regularly will qualify to be members of the Class. 28 – 6 – CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page7 of 15 1 24. In accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 23(a), members of the Class share common issues of law and fact, including whether 3 Alameda County has a policy, pattem, practice, and custom of failing and\/or refusing to 4 process regular and expedited CalFresh (Food Stamp) applications within statutorily 5 mandated time periods and whether any such policy, pattem, practice, or custom violates 6 federal or state law. 7 25. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class they 8 represent (within the meaning of paragraph (3) of Rule 23(a)). Plaintiff Donald Ray Lilley 9 applied for food stamps and has experienced a lengthy and unlawful delay by the County in 1 0 the processing of his application and issuance of benefits. Plaintiffs Jarvis Johnson and 11 Daniel Mallory applied for and are eligible for expedited food stamps, and both have 12 experienced the County’s failure to timely process their applications, going without the 13 prompt emergency assistance to which they are entitled. 14 26. In accordance with paragraph (4) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), Plaintiffs will 15 fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs know of no conflict of 16 interest between any of themselves and the Class or any Class members and are likewise 17 unaware of any conflict of interest between or among any of the Class members. 18 27. Plaintiffs are represented by experienced counsel who will adequately 19 represent the interests of the Class. 20 28. Defendants have acted, and continue to do so, on grounds generally 21 applicable to the Class that Plaintiffs represent, thereby rendering appropriate injunctive 22 and declaratory relief for the Class as a whole in accordance with paragraph (2) of Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 23(b). 24 25 26 29. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND The federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (\”SNAP\”), formerly 27 known as the Food Stamp Program, was initiated in 1964 pursuant to the Food Stamp Act 28 – 7- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.v I Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page8 of 15 1 (the Act).2 The express purpose of SNAP is to \”safeguard the health and well-being ofthe 2 Nation’s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.\” 3 7 U.S.C. 2011. SNAP provides federally-funded benefits to eligible low-income 4 households to help them purchase food. Id. 2011 et seq. 5 30. SNAP is administered nationally by the United States Department of 6 Agriculture (\”USDA\”), which is responsible for issuing regulations consistent with the Act. 7 Id. 2013(a), (c). States that patiicipate in the program designate a state agency to 8 administer the program at the state level. Id. 2012(t). State agencies must administer the 9 program in compliance with the Act and its implementing regulations. Id. 2020(e). 10 31. In California, CDSS is the designated state agency responsible for 11 administering SNAP. California has delegated the operation of its food stamp program to 12 county governments, and each county welfare depmiment must administer the Food Stamp 13 program, in accordance with CDSS rules and regulations. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 14 10604-10605, 18902. California has named its SNAP program \”CalFresh.\” 15 32. To be financially eligible for CalFresh, a household, defined as a group of 16 people who purchase and prepare food together, must have income below 100% of the federal 17 poverty level after deductions that account for housing, dependent care, and medical expenses, 18 among other exclusions and deductions. 7 U.S.C. 2014(c)(1). As of2015, that figure for a 19 family of three is $20,090 per year or $1,675 per month. Id.; 80 Fed.Reg. 3236-37 (Jan. 22, 20 2015). Eligible households that do not have a member who is over age 60 or who is 21 considered disabled must also have income, prior to deductions, less than 200% of the federal 22 poverty level. 7 U.S.C. 2014(a), (c)(2); 7 C.F.R. 273.2(j)(2)(C); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 23 18901.5; All County Letter (ACL) 14-56 (August 22, 2014) at page 2. This amount is 24 currently $40,180 per year or $3,349 monthly for a family of tlu\u00b7ee. See 80 Fed. Reg. 25 3236-37. 26 27 28 2 On June 18, 2008, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act by renaming the Food and Nutrition Act of2008. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 4001. – 8 – CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page9 of 15 1 33. Pursuant to federal law, counties must process food stamp applications and 2 issue benefits to those eligible no later than 30 days after the date of application. 7 U.S.C. 3 2020(e)(3); 7 C.P.R. 273.2(a), (g)(l), (3). 4 34. Under federal law, expedited food stamps benefits must be provided no later 5 than seven days following the date of application when eligible applicants have extremely 6 low income and resources or cannot meet their monthly housing expense. 7 U.S.C. 7 2020(e)(9); 7 C.P.R. 273.2(i)(1), (i)(3)(i). Federal law pem1its a state to adopt a sh01ier 8 time frame, and Califomia has done so-benefits must be issued to households eligible for 9 expedited service within three calendar days of application. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code- 10 18914(b ); Califomia Depatiment of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures 11 (MPP) 63-300.1. 12 35. State law futiher mandates that aid to the \”needy and distressed\” must be 13 provided \”promptly and humanely.\” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 10000. 14 15 16 17 STATEMENT OF FACTS County Non-Compliance with Regular CalFresh Processing Timeframes 36. CDSS requires each county in the State of Califomia to report its CalFresh 18 application statistics on a monthly basis. According to data reported by Alameda County, 19 on average 19.4% of its applications were processed late due to County delay in the past 20 year. In the most recent month for which data is available, July 2015, of the applications 21 approved, approximately 21.5% were approved late due to County delay. Of those 22 applications denied, approximately 30.5% were denied after the 30 day deadline due to 23 County delay. 24 37. The following table shows the degree of late processing over the most recent 25 twelve months for which data is available: 26 Ill 27 Ill 28 – 9- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4814-6954-0649.vl Case3:15-cv-04475 Document1 Filed09\/29\/15 Page10 of 15 1 Table 1 2 CDSS DF A 296- Alameda Data for Regular Processing of CalFresh Applications3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 I\u00b7′ , …. \u00b7’\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 .\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 ., . \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7” \u00b7 \u00b7 \u00b7’\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 \u00b7,\u00b7 .. \u00b7\u00b7 ‘ < { 1Vl~n't11 .. , .... c~ \u00b7.\u00b7 .. \u00b7 I' ,.\u00b7. \u00b7\u00b7 .. \u00b7.\u00b7\u00b7 .... ,. August 2014 September 2014 October 2014 November 2014 December 2014 January 2015 February 2015 March 2015 April2015 May2015 June 2015 July 2015 12 Month A verage8 Number of Processed Applications4 3,739 3,738 4,061 3,026 3,246 3,385 3,134 3,944 3,788 3,806 4,310 4,722 3,742 Nu.lnberofL~te .\u00b7 I Perc~llta2:e of.\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7 Number of . .. .. ;\\.nurovecl L#t~:I)~nied : Total Late . \u00b7 \u00b7\u00b7ApplicationsSo Applications

pdf Lopez v. Wagner, auto restoration of CalFresh after end of IPV penalty period

In Welfare Complaint Library 3044 downloads

Download (doc, 95 KB)

Lopez-Petition_FINAL_10-19-10.doc

” DORIS NG, CSB NO. 169544 AMY P. LEE, CSB NO. 203604 BAY AREA LEGAL AID 1735 Telegraph Ave. Oakland, CA 94612 Telephone: (510) 663-4744 Facsimile: (510) 663-4740 Email: [email protected] [email protected] RICHARD A. ROTHSCHILD, CSB NO. 67356 ANTIONETTE DOZIER, CSB NO. 244437 WESTERN CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY 3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 208 Los Angeles, CA 90010 Telephone: (213) 487-7211 Facsimile: (213) 487-0242 Email: [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Petitioner MORAYMA LOPEZ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA MORAYMA LOPEZ, Petitioner, v. JOHN A. WAGNER, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMANT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondents. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE (CODE CIV. PROC. 1085, 1094.5, AND WELF. & INST. CODE 10962) INTRODUCTION 1. The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) is the federally-mandated state agency responsible for the Food Stamp Program. CDSS, through the individual county welfare departments and their agents, is tasked with providing Food Stamp benefits to clients eligible to receive them. As part of its responsibilities, CDSS must ensure that counties issue timely benefits and review the information provided in all applications and recertifications to ensure that applicants and recipients are provided all the benefits that they are entitled to receive. See Welf. & Inst. Code 10500, 11004. 2. CDSS, however, fails to meet its responsibilities towards those who have been found ineligible to participate in the program for a period of time after committing an intentional program violation (IPV). This case challenges CDSS’s failure to ensure that counties add previously disqualified family members to the Food Stamp household the month after the ineligibility period ends. Petitioner Lopez was eligible for Food Stamp benefits after her IPV ended, but her benefits never resumed. Over the course of four years, Petitioner Lopez submitted five applications requesting Food Stamp benefits for both herself and her children. Although she received food stamps for her children, she did not receive any benefits for herself during those four years. Ms. Lopez never received a Notice of Action indicating that she was denied benefits or an explanation as to the reason for her exclusion. 3. Through this action, Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandate ordering CDSS to administer California’s Food Stamp Program in accordance with the mandates of law. Petitioner Lopez also seeks a writ of administrative mandate overturning Respondent Wagner’s decision that her recertifications were not requests for restoration of aid. PARTIES Petitioner Morayma Lopez 4. Morayma Lopez is a 32-year-old resident of Alameda County ( County ) and a single mother of five children. Ms. Lopez is disabled due to mental health conditions, for which she has been receiving treatment since approximately 2002. Ms. Lopez was entitled to food stamp benefits from July 2004 to May 2008. Currently, she receives food stamp benefits for herself and her five children. Respondents 5. Respondent John A. Wagner is the Director of Respondent CDSS. He is sued in his official capacity. Respondent Wagner’s duties include the enforcement, operation, and execution of laws pertaining to the administration of the Food Stamp Program. Respondent Wagner’s responsibilities also include enforcing state laws and regulations to ensure that various county welfare departments (CWDs) execute the regulations in a uniform and consistent manner. Welf. & Inst. Code 10553. 6. Respondent CDSS is the single state agency responsible for overseeing the administration of California’s Food Stamp Program, and for ensuring that each county complies with state laws and regulations relating to the Food Stamp Program. In particular, Respondent CDSS is responsible for guaranteeing the timely and accurate issuance of benefits. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600; see also Welf. & Inst. Code 10603. \/\/\/ \/\/\/ APPLICABLE LAW Food Stamp Program 7. The Supplemental Nutrition Food Stamp Program is a federal nutrition program that helps eligible low-income people purchase the food they need for good health. The program’s stated purpose is to promote the general welfare and to safeguard the health and well being of the Nation’s population by raising the levels of nutrition among low-income households. 7 U.S.C. 2011, 7 C.F.R. 271.1(a). The California Legislature has mandated that California operate a statewide program to enable low-income households to receive Food Stamps under the federal Food Stamp Program. Welf. & Inst. Code 18900. To that end, the Legislature has mandated that when a person submits an application for aid, the county has a duty to review the information provided carefully to ensure that the applicant is provided all the benefits that she or he is entitled to receive. See Welf. & Inst. Code 10500, 11004. California must provide public benefits to eligible recipients promptly and humanely. Welf. & Inst. Code 10000. CDSS Responsibilities 8. In California, the Food Stamp Program is developed and supervised by CDSS. See generally, Welf. & Inst. Code 18900 et seq., specifically, 18901.5, 18901.8 & 18902. CDSS develops Food Stamp regulations and issues rules and letters related to the program. Welf. & Inst. Code 18901.8 & 18902. Although each CWD is responsible for carrying out the local administrative responsibilities set forth in Food Stamp Chapter of the Welfare and Institutions Code, local administration is subject to the supervision of [CDSS] and to rules and regulations adopted by [CDSS]. Welf. & Inst. Code 18902. The Director of CDSS is responsible for bringing actions to ensure the counties’ compliance. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600 & 10605. Duty To Timely Issue Benefits 9. Subject to certain exceptions, Food Stamps are delivered once a month, and at most every 40 days. CDSS Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) 63-602.4 et seq. Any delay in the delivery of benefits beyond statutory and regulatory deadlines is a violation of this statutory mandate. Welf. & Inst. Code 11004; MPP 63-601.11. After a household is determined to be eligible to receive Food Stamp benefits, the CWD must certify the household to receive benefits for a specific period of time. MPP 63-504.1. To continue to receive Food Stamp benefits thereafter, recipients must reapply for the program. The Recertification Process 10. As part of the recertification process, the county must provide a recipient with notice that his or her certification period is about to expire. Notice must be served by the end of the month preceding the termination month. MPP 63-504.251. After receiving the notice, the recipient must file a recertification application no fewer than 15 days before the expiration of the certification period listed in the notice. MPP 63-504.61(c). As part of the recertification process, the recipient must also submit a Statement of Facts. MPP 63-604.61. The CWD must complete the application process and approve or deny a timely application for recertification prior to the end of the household’s current certification period. MPP 63-504.61. If CWD fails to provide benefits in a timely manner to an eligible household that filed a timely application for recertification, then the CWD has committed an administrative error, and the household is entitled to restoration of lost benefits if, as a result of such error, the household was unable to participate for the month following the expiration of the certification period. MPP 63-504.61(j) Restoration of Benefits 11. Individuals who have committed an intentional program violation are ineligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program for a specified period of time. 7 C.F.R. 273.16 (b), MPP 20-300 et seq., 63-805.1. The rest of the household, however, remains eligible to receive benefits. 7 C.F.R. 273.16 (b)(11); MPP 20-300.35. 12. The previously excluded member who was disqualified for an intentional program violation must be added back to the food stamp household the month after the disqualification period ends. 7 C.F.R. 273.21; MPP 63-504.353(b)(1). State regulations, however, are silent as to how a person requests to be added back to the household’s grant after the disqualification period ends if the county does not automatically make the change. 13. The CWD must restore a household’s benefits if the benefits were lost due to administrative error. MPP 63-802.111. According to MPP 63-802.12, a household’s right to recoup wrongfully withheld benefits is triggered when: (a) the welfare department receives a request for restoration from the household; or (b) the welfare department is notified or otherwise discovers that a loss to a household has occurred. Benefits will be restored for only 12 months prior to the earlier date of either event listed above. MPP 63-802.12. If CWD determines that there was a loss, it will automatically restore benefits. MPP 63-802.3. Benefits will not be restored, however, if (a) through the normal course of business CWD discovers that a loss occurred more than 12 months prior to the date of discovery, or (b) that the loss occurred more than 12 months before the CWD was notified in writing or orally of a possible loss to a household. MPP 63-802.3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 14. In 2003, Morayma Lopez was receiving Food Stamp benefits for herself and three children. On June 17, 2003, she received a Notice of Action informing her that she was disqualified from receiving food stamp benefits for one year from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004 due to an IPV. She continued to receive benefits, however, for her children. The disqualification period ended on June 30, 2004. When the disqualification period ended, the County did not reinstate Ms. Lopez’s food stamp benefits. She did not receive a Notice of Action indicating that the IPV period ended or an explanation of steps she needed to take to have her food stamps restored. 15. On or about October 6, 2004, Ms. Lopez submitted a food stamp recertification for benefits for her four children and herself. She received benefits for her children, but none for herself. She received no Notice of Action informing her that she was denied benefits or explanation for her exclusion. Thereafter, she continued to submit annual recertification applications for food stamp benefits for herself and her children. She submitted annual written reapplications for herself and her children on or about June 16, 2005, May 17, 2006, February 20, 2007, February 14, 2008, and finally, on November 18, 2008. Each time after completing the recertification\/application process, Ms. Lopez was awarded food stamp benefits for her children, but not for herself. She never received any Notice of Action that she was denied food stamps. Ms. Lopez did not receive food stamps from July 2004 through May 2008\u2014nearly four years. 16. Ms. Lopez filed a hearing request with Respondent on June 30, 2009. Before the hearing, the County conceded that Ms. Lopez was eligible for food stamps from July 2004 forward, and that due to its own administrative errors she was never been added back to the food stamps household. However, the County agreed only to restore her food stamps to the prior 12 months, back to June 2008. Ms. Lopez proceeded with her appeal for the restoration of her food stamp benefits from July 2004 to May 2008, but did not prevail. See ALJ Decision dated 10\/22\/09, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 17. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledged that the County made long-standing errors in Ms. Lopez’s case by failing to add her back to the food stamp household at the end of her ineligibility period. The Administrative Law Judge went on to note that, [t]here is no question that equitably [Ms. Lopez] was harmed by the county’s inaction in that for four years she did not receive food stamp benefits that she was otherwise entitled to receive. Id. Despite the obvious errors and Petitioner’s entitlement to benefits, the Administrative Law Judge sustained the County’s denial of Ms. Lopez’s request for restoration of benefits for the period of July 2004 to May 2008. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was adopted by Respondent Wagner on October 22, 2009. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Writ of Mandate Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 for Violation of CDSS Manual of Policies and Procedures Section 63-504 (Failure to Add Previously Ineligible Members to the Household after an IPV ends.)) 18. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs. 19. Respondents have a clear and present duty to administer the Food Stamp Program in accordance with state law. 20. Respondent CDSS is the single state agency responsible for administering the Food Stamp Program. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600 & 10605. 21. Respondents have a duty to ensure that the individual counties, as Respondents’ agents, comply with the laws and regulations pertaining to all public benefits programs administered by CDSS. Welf. & Inst. Code 10605(a). 22. Federal law provides that CDSS shall add a previously excluded member who was disqualified for an intentional program violation . . . to the household the month after the disqualification period ends. 7 C.F.R. 273.21(f)(1)(iv). 23. CWDs must add previously disqualified individuals to the food stamp household the month after the period of ineligibility due to an IPV ends. MPP 63-504.353(b)(1). 24. On information and belief, Respondents, through their agents, fail to add previously disqualified individuals to the food stamp household the month after the disqualification period ends. 25. Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 enjoining Respondents’ refusal to ensure that individual counties comply with the laws and regulations pertaining to all public benefits programs administered by CDSS. Specifically, Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate instructing CDSS to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10605(a) and actively ensure that individual counties add previously disqualified family members to the Food Stamp household the month after the disqualification period ends. 26. At all times relevant to this action, Respondents have had the ability to fulfill their duties under the law. 27. Written demand was made upon the Respondents to perform their duties. In contravention of the laws and the demand made upon them Respondents have failed and refused to perform their duties mandated by law. A true and correct copy of the written demand made upon Respondents is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 28. Petitioner is beneficially interested in Respondents’ performance of their duties. 29. Petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Unless the Court grants the relief requested, Respondents will continue to fail and refuse to perform their legal duties, to the immediate and ongoing harm of the Petitioner. 30. No money damages or other legal remedies can adequately compensate Petitioner for the hardship caused by Respondents’ failure and refusal to perform their legal duties. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Writ of Mandate Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 for Violation of Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 10500 and 11004 (Failure to Review Applications for All Benefits)) 31. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs. 32. Respondents have a clear and present duty to administer the Food Stamp Program in accordance with state law, and to ensure that individuals who apply for and are eligible for Food Stamp benefits receive those benefits. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600 & 10605. 33. Respondents have a duty to ensure that the individual counties, as Respondents’ agents, comply with the laws and regulations pertaining to all public benefits programs administered by CDSS. Welf. & Inst. Code 10605(a). 34. Respondents have a clear, present and ministerial duty to ensure that when counties receive applications for aid, the county reviews the information provided carefully to ensure that the applicant is provided all the benefits that she or he is entitled to receive. See Welf. & Inst. Code 10500, 11004. 35. On information and belief, Respondents, through their agents, fail to review applications by previously disqualified household members for all the aid that they may be entitled to during the recertification process. 36. Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 enjoining Respondents’ refusal to ensure that individual counties comply with the laws and regulations pertaining to all public benefits programs administered by CDSS. Specifically, Petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate instructing CDSS to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10500 and actively ensure that individual counties review each application that a previously disqualified person submits for aid for all benefits that she or he is entitled to receive. 37. At all times relevant to this action, Respondents have had the ability to fulfill their duties under the law. 38. Written demand was made upon the Respondents to perform their duties. In contravention of the laws and the demand made upon them Respondents have failed and refused to perform their duties mandated by law. A true and correct copy of the written demand made upon Respondents is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 39. Petitioner is beneficially interested in Respondents’ performance of their duties. 40. Petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Unless the Court grants the relief requested, Respondents will continue to fail and refuse to perform their legal duties, to the immediate and ongoing harm of the Petitioner. 41. No money damages or other legal remedies can adequately compensate Petitioner for the hardship caused by Respondents’ failure and refusal to perform their legal duties. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Writ of Mandate Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 and Welfare & Institutions Code Section 10962) 42. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs. 43. Respondent Wagner abused his discretion by (1) failing to restore Ms. Lopez’s food stamp benefits from July 2004 to May 2008, and (2) ignoring Ms. Lopez’s repeated applications for aid and requests for restoration of aid. Respondent also abused his discretion by failing to consider Ms. Lopez’s multiple recertifications\/applications as requests for restoration of aid because Respondent CDSS does not have a policy or procedure for a previously disqualified person to request restoration of benefits. 44. The abuse of discretion is prejudicial to Petitioner in that (1) she was entitled to benefits but never received them, and (2) she had no other way of requesting restoration of aid. 45. Petitioner has exhausted all of her administrative remedies. The writ of mandate requested herein is Ms. Lopez’s sole and exclusive remedy for review of Respondent Wagner’s decision, and there are no alternative remedies at law. RELIEF REQUESTED WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: 46. Issue a writ of administrative mandate overturning Respondent Wagner’s decision that Ms. Lopez’s recertifications\/applications were not requests for restoration of aid and reversing Respondent Wagner’s denial of benefits Ms. Lopez’s for the period of July 2004 to May 2008. 47. Issue a writ of mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 directing Respondent CDSS to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10605(a) and actively ensure that individual counties add previously disqualified family members to the Food Stamp household the month after the disqualification period ends. 48. Issue a writ of mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 directing Respondent CDSS to comply with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10500 and actively ensure that individual counties review each application that a disqualified person submits for aid for all benefits that the applicant may be entitled to receive. 49. Grant Petitioner reasonable costs of suit. 50. Grant reasonable attorneys’ fees to Petitioner’s counsel Western Center on Law and Poverty and Bay Area Legal Aid. 51. Issue other relief that is just and proper. DATED: October 19, 2010 WESTERN CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY [image: image1.png] By:_______________________________________ ANTIONETTE DOZIER Attorneys for Petitioner MORAYMA LOPEZ VERIFICATION I, Morayma Lopez, state that I have reviewed the foregoing Petition and that I certify that the factual allegations contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge. I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made therein are true and correct except those made on information and belief, and as to those statements, I believe them to be true. Executed at Oakland, California on October 21, 2010. ________________________________ Morayma Lopez, Petitioner [REMINDER RE EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE] Exhibit A See ALJ Decision dated 10\/22\/09, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Exhibit B A true and correct copy of the written demand made upon Respondents is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. PAGE 1 ______________________________________________________________________________________ PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE ”

pdf Moncrief v. DPSS-Sheryl Spiller – LRS Medi-Cal Lawsuit

In Welfare Complaint Library 2021 downloads

Download (pdf, 3.40 MB)

Moncrief v. DPSS & Sheryl Spiller.pdf

” ”

pdf Ortega v. Johnson Replacement of SNAP/CalFresh benefits

In Welfare Complaint Library 434 downloads

Download (pdf)

Ortega v. Johnson – Replacement of SNAP:CalFresh benefits.pdf

{“error”:”PDF Processor error: Empty attachment file. Is the file publicly available? Server error: fopen(https:\/\/www.ccwro.org\/~documents\/route%3A\/download\/2500): failed to open stream: HTTP request failed! HTTP\/1.1 404 Not Found “}

pdf Robbins v. Kent – Petition for Writ of Mandate, 9-19-17 – Medi-Cal medical exemption request law suit

In Welfare Complaint Library 1916 downloads

Download (pdf, 425 KB)

Robbins v. Kent – Petition for Writ of Mandate, 9-19-17.pdf

” 2 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION 1. The right to notice and an opportunity to be heard is fundamental to due process. A Medi-Cal beneficiary’s due process rights are protected by the U.S. and California constitutions, and by federal and state statute and regulation. 2. This lawsuit concerns Medi-Cal beneficiaries who have been denied full and fair administrative hearings. Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries with complex medical conditions have submitted medical exemption requests (MERs) to be exempt from involuntary enrollment in a Medi-Cal managed care plan so that they can remain with their existing health care providers. These beneficiaries have timely appealed the denial of their MERs by Respondent California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS). 3. Petitioners are three low-income Medi-Cal beneficiaries who live in Los Angeles County, California. Each Petitioner has a rare medical condition\u2014Nicolaides- Baraitser Syndrome, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, or L-2-hydroxyglutaric aciduria\u2014that is worsening over time. Petitioners have been receiving care from the same doctors for many years. They are at risk of losing access to this care. Their doctors accept fee-for-service Medi- Cal but do not contract with Medi-Cal managed care plans. 4. Petitioners must apply for MERs to request that DHCS allow them to remain exempt from having to enroll into a Medi-Cal managed care plan and remain in the care of their long-term providers. DHCS denied Petitioners’ MERs and Petitioners sought review of their denials in the administrative fair hearing process. 5. In the administrative hearing process challenging DHCS’ denial of MERs, Respondents have routinely failed to conduct pre-hearing informal resolution, submitted legally inadequate statements of position, communicated ex parte with the administrative law judge (ALJ) to submit additional evidence without informing Petitioners or giving Petitioners an opportunity to respond, and not allowed Petitioners access to their case file or all of the evidence relied on in the hearing decision. 6. Petitioners seek a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure 1085 to 3 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 enforce DHCS’ ministerial duty to conduct fair hearings for appeals of MER denials in accordance with state hearing laws and regulations and with the due process provisions of the California Constitution, art. 1, 7, 15. Petitioners Inna Kantor and Al-Muzzamil Lodin additionally sue as taxpayers under Code of Civil Procedure 526a for injunctive and declaratory relief as to these same violations of the law by DHCS and its Director. PARTIES 7. Petitioner Brendon Robbins is a Medi-Cal beneficiary who resides in Los Angeles County. He is 17 years old and under the care of his mother, Lisa Robbins. Brendon is one of fewer than 150 individuals in the world with a documented case of Nicolaides-Baraitser Syndrome, which has resulted in profound intellectual disability and, most recently, rapidly progressing ocular disease. The prognosis for his conditions remains largely unknown. Pediatric specialists at the Wright Foundation Pediatric Ophthalmology Clinic and UCLA Health, none of whom are a part of a Medi-Cal managed care plan, administer his care. In October 2016, Brendon sought an exemption from enrollment in a Medi-Cal managed care plan. Brendon appealed the initial denial of his MER in an administrative hearing held on January 11, 2017. In his case, DHCS neglected to contact him for pre-hearing informal resolution, failed to address specific medical facts in its hearing statement of position, and submitted an additional hearing statement after the hearing concluded without informing him or giving him an opportunity to respond. DHCS upheld the MER denial in a hearing decision on March 2 but granted him an exemption in May 2017 upon receiving a demand letter from Brendon’s attorney. Brendon’s MER will expire on May 31, 2018. Brendon has a direct beneficial interest in Respondents’ performance of their legal duties alleged below. Brendon also has a beneficial interest as a citizen since this lawsuit involves question of public right and seeks to enforce public duties. 8. Petitioner Inna Kantor resides in Los Angeles County. She is 63 years old. Her only income is Supplemental Security Income (SSI). As an SSI recipient, she automatically receives Medi-Cal. Ms. Kantor has an aggressive form of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and 4 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 osteoporosis and, consequently, advanced disease of her joints. She has been receiving treatment for these conditions and multiple co-morbidities at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center for the past 25 years. Ms. Kantor applied for a MER in October 2016 to stay in the care of her doctors of the past 25 years who do not contract with a managed care plan. Ms. Kantor appealed the initial MER denial in an administrative hearing held on January 12, 2017. In her case, DHCS neglected to contact her for pre-hearing informal resolution, failed to address specific medical facts in its hearing statement of position, and submitted an additional hearing statement after the hearing concluded without informing her or giving her an opportunity to respond. DHCS upheld the MER denial in a hearing decision on March 2, but granted her an exemption in May 2017 upon receiving a demand letter from Ms. Kantor’s attorney. Ms. Kantor’s MER will expire on May 31, 2018. Ms. Kantor has a direct beneficial interest in Respondents’ performance of their legal duties alleged below. Ms. Kantor also has a beneficial interest as a citizen since this lawsuit involves question of public right and seeks to enforce public duties. 9. Petitioner Al-Muzzamil Lodin is a Medi-Cal beneficiary. He is 33 years old. His only income is SSI. As an SSI recipient, he automatically receives Medi-Cal. Mr. Lodin has a rare genetic disease, autosomal recessive L-2-hydroxyglutaric aciduria, that has advanced to date to cause dystonia or involuntary muscle contractions throughout the left side of his body. While there is no known cure to the disease, Mr. Lodin’s physicians at UCLA Health and Cedars-Sinai Medical Center are attempting to treat the symptoms of the disease and prevent the progression of the disease. Both UCLA Health and Cedars-Sinai are not part of a Medi-Cal managed care plan. In July 2016, Mr. Lodin sought an exemption from enrollment in a Medi- Cal plan. Mr. Lodin appealed the denial of his MER in an administrative hearing held on August 31, 2016. DHCS upheld the denial in a hearing decision on September 21. Mr. Lodin requested a rehearing and DHCS denied the request on October 13. In his case, DHCS neglected to contact him for pre-hearing informal resolution, failed to address specific medical facts in its hearing statement of position, submitted an additional statement of position after the 5 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 hearing concluded without informing him or giving him an opportunity to respond, and denied his rehearing request without explaining the reasons and legal basis for the decision. Upon receiving a demand letter from Mr. Lodin’s attorney, DHCS granted the MER in August 2017. His MER will expire on August 31, 2018. Mr. Lodin has a direct beneficial interest in Respondents’ performance of their legal duties alleged below. Mr. Lodin also has a beneficial interest as a citizen since this lawsuit involves question of public right and seeks to enforce public duties. 10. Respondent DHCS is the single state agency responsible for administering the Medi-Cal program in California and ensuring that the Medi-Cal program is operated in conformity with all state and federal laws. 11. Respondent Jennifer Kent is the current Director of DHCS and is sued only in her official capacity. Director Kent is responsible for the lawful administration of the Medi-Cal program. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. Venue is proper in this Court because Petitioners reside in Los Angeles County, where they have been injured by DHCS’ actions. Code Civil Proc. (C.C.P.) 393(b). 13. Petitioners have a clear, present, and beneficial right to DHCS’ accurate review of their MERs and the lawful administration of their Medi-Cal benefits. 14. Petitioners have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. 15. Petitioners are entitled to seek judicial review of Respondents’ actions and omissions in breach of their ministerial duties, as alleged in this petition, under section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Overview of Medi-Cal Statutes and Regulations 16. Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program designed to furnish health care to the poor. 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. California’s Medicaid program is known as Medi- Cal. Welf. & Inst. 14000 et seq. 6 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17. Respondent DHCS is the single state agency responsible for ensuring Medi-Cal complies with all relevant laws and regulations. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(5); 42 C.F.R. 431.10; Welf. & Inst. Code 14100.1. 18. DHCS must provide Medi-Cal beneficiaries with medically necessary services covered by Medicaid and any services California agreed to cover in its state plan. 42 C.F.R. 440.210 .230; Welf. & Inst.Code 14100.1. All Medi-Cal beneficiaries are entitled to receive certain mandatory services, including physician services, prescription drugs, and more. 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a); Welf. & Inst. Code 14131 et seq. 19. Medi-Cal benefits, like all public social services, must be provided promptly and humanely such that each beneficiary is able to access all of the aid to which she is entitled. Welf. & Inst. Code 10000, 10500. Enrollment in Medi-Cal Managed Care 20. The Medi-Cal program provides health care to beneficiaries either on a fee-for- service or a managed care basis. 21. With fee-for-service Medi-Cal, the beneficiary seeks care from any provider who is participating in the Medi-Cal program, willing to treat the beneficiary, and willing to accept reimbursement at a set amount from DHCS for the medical services provided. See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code 14016.5 (explaining the requirements and availability of Medi-Cal treatment services in managed care health plans and fee-for-service providers). 22. With managed care Medi-Cal, DHCS contracts with health plans to provide health care coverage to Medi-Cal beneficiaries within a managed care system. In an attempt to control costs, DHCS gives the managed care plans a per capita reimbursement based on the number of Medi-Cal beneficiaries enrolled in that plan, regardless of the cost of medical services the plan actually provides to a person. See Welf. & Inst. Code 14087.3, 14089. 23. Over time, DHCS has required mandatory enrollment in managed care plans for more and more categories of Medi-Cal beneficiaries. See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. 14087.3 (allowing DHCS to enter into contracts for the provision of care to Medi-Cal beneficiaries); 7 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Welf. & Inst. Code 14182 (requiring Seniors and Persons with Disabilities to enroll in managed care). Medical Exemption Requests (MERs) 24. The managed care system cannot provide adequate care for all Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Recognizing the limitations of managed care, DHCS allows for exemptions from mandatory enrollment in managed care for qualifying beneficiaries. See 22 C.C.R. 53887, 53923.5. To obtain such an exemption, a beneficiary’s treating physician must submit to DHCS a request for the beneficiary to retain fee-for-service Medi-Cal. Id. 53887(a), 53923.5(b). The request is made through the completion of HCO Form 7101, which includes instructions on suggested medical documentation and information to submit in support of the MER. Id. 53887(b). The Medi-Cal beneficiary or the provider submitting the request may attach medical evidence to support granting the MER. 25. Before evaluating a Medi-Cal beneficiary’s medical entitlement to a MER, DHCS determines whether the treating physician who submitted the beneficiary’s MER is affiliated with a Medi-Cal managed care plan in the beneficiary’s county. 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(2)(B); see id. 53923.5(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(A). DHCS will deny a MER submitted by a physician who contracts with any Medi-Cal managed care plan in the beneficiary’s county of residence. See id. 53887(a)(2)(B). 26. Once this threshold issue is determined, DHCS must then evaluate the beneficiary’s medical conditions. Id. 53887(a)(2). The beneficiary is entitled to exemption from managed care enrollment if she has a complex medical condition for which she is undergoing treatment. 22 C.C.R. 53887, 53923.5(b)(2). A complex medical condition includes a complex and\/or progressive disorder . . . that requires ongoing medical supervision and\/or has been approved for or is receiving complex medical treatment for the disorder, the administration which cannot be interrupted. Id. 53887(a)(2)(A)(7). 27. A beneficiary whose MER has been granted will remain in fee-for-service Medi-Cal for up to 12 months at a time and until the medical condition has stabilized to a 8 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 level that would enable the individual to change physicians and begin receiving care from a plan provider without deleterious medical effects. Id. 53887(a)(3). 28. Regulation requires that stability is determined by the applicant’s treating physician in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. Id. 53887(a)(3) (emphasis added). Notice and Hearing Requirements 29. Under the California Constitution, a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Cal. Const. art. I, 7, 15. 30. Medi-Cal beneficiaries must be accorded an opportunity for a state hearing when they are dissatisfied with any action relating to their receipt of public social services. Welf. & Inst. Code 10950; 22 C.C.R. 50951. 31. Medi-Cal fair hearings must meet the due process standards set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 42 C.F.R. 431.205(d). 32. Beneficiaries are entitled to a notice and fair hearing when DHCS denies their MERs. 42 C.F.R. 438.56(f); 22 C.C.R. 53889(d), 53926 (e). The notice of action to beneficiaries must state, at a minimum, the action to be taken, the reasons for the action, the regulations supporting the action, and an explanation of the circumstances under which aid is continued if a hearing is requested. 42 C.F.R. 431.210; 22 C.C.R. 50179, 51014.1(c). 33. DHCS has delegated the administration of Medi-Cal fair hearings to the California Department of Social Services. Welf & Inst. Code 10966, 10950(f); 22 C.C.R. 50953(c). Decisions rendered by the ALJs must be treated, for all purposes, as the decision of the [DHCS] director. Welf & Inst. Code 10966(b). 34. Prior to the hearing, DHCS must review the case to determine the issues, including the existing evidence in the case file and the relevant statutes, regulations and policies. Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) 22- 073.22. 35. Issues at the hearing are limited to those that are reasonably related to the hearing request or issues mutually agreed upon by the parties. MPP 22-049.5; see also id. http:\/\/www.westlaw.com\/Link\/Document\/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1970134198&pubNum=0000780&originatingDoc=N6D9D7CC0E21F11E6B41DDB4EF22BB850&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Category) 9 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 22-050.11 (a judge shall identify the issues before taking evidence at a hearing). If the rights of either party will be prejudiced by the consideration of a reasonably related issue raised at the hearing, the hearing must be continued or the record held open so that the party may prepare his case. MPP 22-049.51 36. Prior to the fair hearing, DHCS must contact the beneficiary to clarify the issues on appeal and resolve any disagreements and misunderstandings. MPP 22-073.23. Through this process, known as pre-hearing informal resolution, the DHCS representative must attempt to resolve the case at the lowest possible administrative level, thereby avoiding unnecessary hearing. MPP 22-073.23 -.231; see also Gov’t Code 100506.4(g)(8). 37. If the DHCS representative cannot resolve the case through informal resolution, she must prepare a written statement of position that summarizes the facts of the case and set forth the regulatory justification of the Department’s action. MPP 22-073.251. 38. DHCS must provide the statement of position to a beneficiary at least two working days before the hearing. Welf. & Inst. Code 10952.5(a); see also New Law: Providing Statements of Position to Claimants Before a State Hearing, All County Letter No. 17-21 (Feb. 16, 2017) (explaining passage of A.B. 2346, effective January 1, 2017, requiring DHCS to provide a statement of position prior to a hearing and amending the MPP that previously excluded DHCS from this requirement). 39. At the hearing, the DHCS representative must assume full responsibility for presenting the Department’s case, including summarizing the Department’s position, having the case record available at the hearing, and responding to questions from the beneficiary or the ALJ. MPP 22-073.3 .37. Evidence in the Administrative Hearing 40. When defending a MER denial, DHCS has the burden of going forward in the hearing to support its determination of why the MER should be denied. MPP 22-073.36. DHCS may verify whether a MER applicant’s treating physician participates in a Medi-Cal managed care plan. 22 C.C.R. 53887(c). DHCS may also verify the complexity, validity, 10 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 and status of the [MER applicant’s] medical condition and treatment plan. Id. 41. Both before and during the hearing process, a Medi-Cal beneficiary must be allowed to examine the content of her case file, electronic account, and all documents and records to be used by the state at the hearing. 42 C.F.R. 431.242(a); see MPP 22-049.75. A Medi-Cal beneficiary must also be given the opportunity to [q]uestion or refute any testimony or evidence including opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 42 C.F.R. 431.242(e); MPP 22-049.71-72, 22-049.76, 22-049.78 (claimant has the right to examine parties and witnesses, question opposing witness and parties, and rebut the state’s evidence). 42. On or around May 16, 2017, DHCS began informing beneficiaries whose MERs have been denied how to receive copies of their MER documentation. These instructions direct beneficiaries to visit one of two online links to download and complete a general form to access their entire MER file: http:\/\/www.dhcs.ca.gov\/formsandpubs\/forms\/Forms\/privacyoffice\/DHCS_6236.pdf or http:\/\/www.dhcs.ca.gov\/formsandpubs\/forms\/Forms\/privacyoffice\/DHCS_6237.pdf. DHCS instructs beneficiaries to turn in the form by emailing [email protected] or by mailing it to the address listed on the form. The instructions do not describe the contents of the MER documentation or how they may assist beneficiaries in preparing their arguments for hearing. DHCS does not provide any other way besides these website links to obtain this information and gives no option for persons who do not have internet access. Prior to May 16, DHCS did not inform beneficiaries how to access their case files and records at all. 43. The administrative hearing decision must be based exclusively on the evidence and other material introduced at the hearing . . . and shall specify the reasons for the decisions and identify the supporting evidence and regulations. MPP 22-061.5. If the evidence necessary to determine the case is not available at the hearing, the ALJ can continue the hearing or hold the record open. MPP 22-053.21. The ALJ can also continue the hearing or hold the record open if considering a reasonably related issue would prejudice the parties. http:\/\/www.dhcs.ca.gov\/formsandpubs\/forms\/Forms\/privacyoffice\/DHCS_6236.pdf http:\/\/www.dhcs.ca.gov\/formsandpubs\/forms\/Forms\/privacyoffice\/DHCS_6237.pdf mailto:[email protected] 11 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MPP 22-049.51. The ALJ can reopen a closed hearing record for additional information if all parties are notified of the reason for the reopening. MPP 22-059.12. ALJs must make satisfactory evidentiary findings and assess the probative value of admitted evidence. MPP 22-050.3. 44. While the hearing is pending, there must be no ex parte communication between DHCS and the ALJ without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the communication. Gov’t Code 11430.10(a). All documents submitted by either the claimant or the county shall be made available to both parties. MPP 22-049.81. If an ALJ receives an ex parte communication from DHCS, the ALJ must make that communication part of the hearing record, notify all parties of that addition to the record, and allow the parties to respond within 10 days after receipt of the communication. Gov’t Code 11430.50. Rehearing 45. A Medi-Cal beneficiary may request a rehearing to contest an administrative order. Welf. & Inst. Code. 10960. A rehearing should be granted when any of the grounds under Welfare and Institutions Code 10960(b) are met, including when [t]he adopted decision does not address all of the claims or issues raised by the parties or [f]or any other reason necessary to prevent the abuse of discretion or an error of law, or for any other reason consistent with 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Welf. & Inst. Code 10960(b)(4), (8). 46. DHCS must explain the reasons and legal basis for granting or denying the request for rehearing. Welf. & Inst. Code 10960(c). STATEMENT OF FACTS 47. Petitioners file this writ to challenge DHCS’ systemic violation of beneficiaries’ due process rights in the adjudication of hearings to reconsider MER denials. 48. Respondents are conducting a fair hearing process in MER cases that violates beneficiaries’ rights to due process. 49. Respondents do not contact beneficiaries prior to the MER hearing to engage in 12 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 informal resolution as required by the MPP. Petitioners are unable to examine their own case file and cannot review the notes or evidence Respondents used in reviewing and denying their MERs . 50. Respondents submit a statement of position in advance of the MER fair hearings drafted with the same standard boilerplate language, with no reference to beneficiaries’ particular medical conditions and with no factual analysis of why their complex, chronic conditions do not qualify for exemptions. For example, the statements of position Respondents submitted in Petitioners Brendon Robbins, Inna Kantor, and Al-Muzzamil Lodin’s respective cases are identical, word-for-word, except for one sentence that was omitted in Ms. Kantor’s case. The Facts, Position, and Conclusion Sections of DHCS’ statements of positions\u2014where DHCS should have discussed and analyzed the evidence about each Petitioner’s individual medical conditions and evidence\u2014are the same for all three Petitioners and make no mention of any individual identifying facts, evidence, or evaluation. 51. In each of Petitioner’s cases, DHCS claimed [t]he Medical Monitoring Unit had no medical documentation to verify the complexity, validity, and status of the medical condition and treatment plan in order to determine that the medical condition is unstable and that there would be deleterious medical effects if the individual was to begin receiving care under a plan provider. At no point in the statements of position does DHCS name or describe the medical conditions that Petitioners have or describe the treatment plans laid out in their medical records and physician letters. At the end of the above-mentioned statements of position, DHCS requested an opportunity to make a new determination of the claimant’s case: If additional medical information is provided at or before the hearing the DHCS requests the hearing be held open so additional medical information can be reviewed and make a determination regarding the exemption from plan enrollment. 52. In statements of positions for other Medi-Cal beneficiaries, DHCS has requested that it be allowed to make a new determination on a claimant’s case but that the claimant should be prohibited from submitting additional information after the hearing: 13 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 If additional medical information is provided AT OR BEFORE the hearing the DHCS requests the hearing by held open so additional medical information can be reviewed and a new determination made regarding the exemption from plan enrollment. The record should NOT be held open for additional information to be submitted after the hearing. (Emphasis in the original.) 53. Respondents generally do not appear in person at the MER fair hearings. Petitioners allege on information and belief that DHCS has appeared in person at only one hearing during the last two years when one of its physician reviewers testified at a hearing on July 27, 2017, upon request by the beneficiary. Because DHCS does not appear in person to represent the Department’s findings and position at these hearings, beneficiaries are deprived the opportunity to confront and cross-examine Respondents about the reasons for the denial of their MERs. 54. When a Medi-Cal beneficiary submits additional evidence before or at the MER hearing, DHCS then submits an addendum to their original statement of position to the ALJ after the hearing has concluded. This addendum often presents additional facts or analysis not contained in DHCS’ original statement of position. In many cases, the post-hearing addendum is the first time in the case that DHCS presents its medical reviewer’s factual findings and analysis. 55. Because Medi-Cal beneficiaries do not see the addendum until after the hearing, if at all, this practice operates as a second hearing conducted outside the presence of the beneficiaries, without the opportunity to be heard. 56. At no point during the hearing process does DHCS provide the identity or qualifications of the medical reviewers or why that reviewer’s medical opinion should outweigh that of the beneficiary’s treating physician. 57. On information and belief, Petitioners allege that DHCS engages in ex parte communications by submitting the addendum, as neither DHCS nor the ALJ notifies the 14 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 beneficiary of the existence of the addendum or its contents. As a result, the affected beneficiaries have no opportunity to examine DHCS about its final position or to respond to the addendum. 58. Following unfavorable hearing decisions, beneficiaries have requested rehearings on the grounds enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code 10960(b). Respondents deny such rehearing requests with the following standard response: We have determined that your request for rehearing does not meet any of the regulatory criteria in order to approve a rehearing and must be denied in accordance with the California Welfare and Institution[s] Code Section 10960 (a) (b). The adopted decision is consistent with the law, is supported by the evidence in the record, is supported by the findings, addresses all of the claims and issues supported by the hearing record, and the information provided in the request could not change the adopted decision of the original hearing. Respondents fail to offer any reasons for the denial of their hearing requests as applied to beneficiaries’ individualized facts. 59. Despite Respondents’ failure to reveal evidence to beneficiaries throughout the hearing process, Respondents are denying beneficiaries’ MERs in the majority of state fair hearing cases. In a similar practice, Respondents are denying beneficiaries’ requests for rehearings. 60. Respondents have set an adjudicatory system that is partial to DHCS’ own interests and in which beneficiaries are bound to fail. On information and belief, Respondents’ MER fair hearings violations are a systemic policy and practice and are not limited to Petitioners’ individual cases. Petitioner Brendon Robbins 61. Petitioner Brendon Robbins is a Medi-Cal beneficiary. He has Nicolaides- Baraitser Syndrome, an extremely rare genetic condition. There are fewer than 150 cases documented in the world. 15 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 62. At 17 years old, Brendon has the mental capacity of a four-year-old child. He has profound intellectual disability, expressive language impairments limiting his vocalizations to chirp-like sounds, inconsistent toileting skills, constipation, and recurring emotional outbursts and tantrums including biting his arms. He has a history of seizures and has had recent eye fluttering and seizure-like movements, which are of special concern because his genetic condition predisposes him to seizures. 63. Brendon’s most critical medical need is treatment of rapidly progressing ocular disease. Because Brendon is unable to communicate verbally, he uses visual cues to receive information and to communicate. Losing his eyesight would be catastrophic as it would not only deprive him of to his ability to communicate his needs but of his ability to communicate altogether. 64. Brendon’s behavioral problems tied to Nicolaides-Baraitser syndrome require his eye examinations to be conducted under general anesthesia. In September 2013, Dr. Luke Deitz, a pediatric ophthalmologist specializing in retinal conditions, undertook Brendon’s care after Brendon’s prior ophthalmologist determined he could no longer care for Brendon because of his behavior during examination and the rapid progression of his eye condition. 65. In November 2015, Brendon’s neurologist at UCLA Health recommended he be treated at the university’s Child and Adult Neurodevelopmental Clinic ( the Clinic ) [g]iven his complex etiology, risk of epilepsy, and behavioral issues. The Clinic, as part of a research university, specializes in treating youth and young adults with autism, rare genetic conditions, and developmental delay. It provides multidisciplinary care teams targeted at children and adolescents. Brendon’s care team there includes a neurologist, geneticist, and psychiatrist. 66. Brendon is the only known case of Nicolaides-Baraitser syndrome in Los Angeles County. The only known physicians in Los Angeles County experienced with treating someone with Nicolaides-Baraitser syndrome are the ones treating him now, including the physicians at UCLA Health and Dr. Deitz, his ophthalmologist. 16 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 67. Both Dr. Deitz and the Clinic treat Medi-Cal patients only on a fee-for-service basis. 68. Dr. Dietz submitted a MER for Brendon on or around October 6, 2016, along with notes from Brendon’s last four appointments that noted his vision has been getting worse and he is completely resistant to in-office examination, with evidence of worsening activity. 69. DHCS denied the MER on grounds that his condition(s) appear(s) to be stable. (Parentheses in the original.) Brendon timely appealed the denial and had a hearing on January 11, 2017. 70. No representative of DHCS contacted Brendon’s mother or his authorized representative about pre-hearing informal resolution of his case. 71. Brendon appeared in person at the hearing with his mother and authorized representative. DHCS did not appear in person and instead only submitted a written statement of position that made no mention of his condition, symptoms, or treating physician’s assessments of his stability. 72. DHCS’ statement of position was the only basis of their decision that it disclosed to Brendon prior to the hearing. DHCS did not inform Brendon of the right to examine his MER file, which would have included DHCS’ medical review upon which it relied to deny the MER. 73. DHCS included as an attachment to its statement of position the medical evidence Brendon’s doctor had submitted with his original MER application. DHCS did not, however, address any of that evidence in the facts, position, or conclusion of its statement of position. Instead, DHCS claimed in its statement of position that Brendon’s provider failed to return an HCO-7101 documenting any high risk of complex medical condition that has not been stabilized and [t]herefore , there is no deleterious health affects [sic] to the beneficiary if they begin receiving care from a plan provider. 17 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 74. At the hearing, Brendon submitted a statement of position along with additional medical records from Dr. Deitz, the Clinic, and UCLA Health as well as a letter from his high school teacher and research articles explaining the rarity and complexity of Nicolaides- Baraitser Syndrome. Brendon’s mother testified at the hearing, too. 75. According to the hearing decision, 30 days after the hearing, on February 10, 2017, DHCS submitted a supplemental statement ( Addendum ) to refute the evidence Brendon submitted at the hearing. The Addendum was substantially different from the original statement of position. For the first time, DHCS presented its medical consultant’s opinions. The medical consultant asserted that Brendon was stable based on the following: According to the most recent notes, the patient had been off seizure medications since 2008, with no seizures since, and the decrease in his vision was similarly noted in 2015, where it was treated with a changed [sic] in his glasses prescription. Since it was present in 2015, it doesn’t appear his decrease in vision is particularly unstable. He appears stable for transfer to MCP . . . . 76. Neither Brendon nor his authorized representative received notice or a copy of the Addendum and thus did not have an opportunity to respond. Without verifying that DHCS shared a copy of the Addendum with Brendon or his authorized representative, the ALJ stated in her hearing decision that [t]he record was left open until February 21, 2017, for the Claimant’s attorney to provide any updated medical records after receiving the DHCS response; however, no additional response was received from the claimant’s attorney. 77. Because Respondents did not appear at the hearing, and instead presented a supplemental statement after the hearing without disclosing the identities of its medical reviewers, Brendon did not have a meaningful opportunity to review or challenge the qualifications, opinions, or bases of opinion of the DHCS reviewer who denied his MER. 78. On March 2, 2017, DHCS issued its final decision in Brendon’s case upholding the denial of Brendon’s MER. After additional analysis, DHCS admitted that Brendon’s condition was complex as required for an exemption. However, DHCS insisted, and the ALJ concurred, that his conditions were stable and required plan enrollment. 18 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 79. The final decision did not provide an analysis of the competing evidence contained in the record that supported Brendon’s claim of instability and deleterious medical effects. 80. DHCS’ statement of position and final decision also failed to disclose the identity or qualifications, including areas of specialty care, practice, or expertise, of the medical consultant who recommended the MER denial. The decision, statement of position, and quoted section of the Addendum all failed to address or even refer to the requirement in 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3), which provides that a MER should be granted until the beneficiary’s medical condition has stabilized to a level that would allow him to switch to a plan provider without deleterious medical effects, as determined by a beneficiary’s treating physician in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. 81. Brendon sought a reversal of the final hearing decision in a demand letter sent by his attorney to Director Kent on May 11, 2017. Upon reviewing the letter, DHCS granted Brendon’s MER for 12 months until May 31, 2018. 82. Near the expiration of his MER, Brendon must apply for another MER to continue care with Dr. Deitz and the CAN Clinic. Based on his prior denial and hearing experience, Brendon believes DHCS will deny the MER on the same grounds and conduct the hearing in the same manner without due process. Petitioner Inna Kantor 83. Petitioner Inna Kantor is a Medi-Cal beneficiary who is permanently disabled. She has lifelong disabilities from aggressive juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and osteoporosis and, consequently, advanced disease of her joints and limited mobility. She also has hip and knee replacements, glaucoma and cataract formation in both eyes, hepatitis B, spinal compression fracture, hypothyroidism, fibromyalgia, and depression. Additionally, Ms. Kantor has chronic atrophic gastritis, pernicious anemia, and iron deficiency. She received cataract surgery in her left eye on March 16, 2017, cataract surgery in her right eye on April 24, 2017, and a left hip total arthroplasty revision on May 17, 2017. 19 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 84. Ms. Kantor has established a coordinated care team at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, where she has received all major medical care and surgical procedures for the past 25 years. In 2016 alone, she attended appointments with specialists in endocrinology, rheumatology, hepatology, hematology, orthopedic surgery, internal medicine, ophthalmology, and laboratory testing and scanning. 85. Cedars-Sinai treats Medi-Cal patients only on a fee-for-service basis. 86. Ms. Kantor’s primary care physician, Dr. Peggy Miles, submitted a MER on or around October 5, 2016. The MER application included four physicians’ letters\u2014three from her physicians at Cedars-Sinai and one letter from her ophthalmologist in private practice\u2014and records from her last seven appointments. Ms. Kantor’s rheumatologist noted [i]nterruption of this close relationship [with her physicians at Cedars-Sinai] could negatively impact her care and negatively [a]ffect her psychologically. Concern is that if she does not have this coordinated complex care, her disease processes will continue to progress leaving the patient with even less functional capacity than she already has. She already has progressive pain and loss of functionality over the years and has had to increase the hours of her home attendants to complete her activities of daily living. It is for these reasons that I strongly encourage you to continue providing Inna Kantor reasonable accommodation at Cedars-Sinai and allow her to keep regular Medi-Cal at yearly intervals. 87. DHCS denied the MER on grounds that her condition(s) appear(s) to be stable. (Parentheses in original.) Ms. Kantor timely appealed the denial and had a hearing on January 12, 2017. 88. No representative of DHCS contacted Ms. Kantor or her authorized representative about pre-hearing informal resolution of her case. 89. Ms. Kantor appeared in person at the hearing with a friend and her authorized representative. DHCS did not appear and instead only submitted a written statement of position that made no mention of her condition, symptoms, or treating physician’s assessments of her stability. 20 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 90. DHCS’ statement of position was the only basis of their decision that it disclosed to Ms. Kantor prior to the hearing. DHCS did not inform Ms. Kantor of the right to examine her MER file, which would have included DHCS’ medical review upon which it relied to deny the MER. 91. DHCS did not acknowledge or evaluate the physician letters or medical records that Ms. Kantor had already summited with her original MER application. Instead DHCS stated that Ms. Kantor’s provider failed to return an HCO-7101 documenting any high risk of complex medical condition that has not been stabilized and [t]herefore, there is no deleterious health affects [sic] to the beneficiary if they begin receiving care from a plan provider. 92. At the hearing, Ms. Kantor provided a statement of position along with medical records of visits to Cedars-Sinai from January 2016 to November 2016 and, again, the four physician letters. At the hearing, Ms. Kantor and her friend also both testified about her daily difficulties and declining health. 93. Eighteen days after the hearing was held, on January 30, DHCS submitted a supplemental statement ( Addendum ). Although Ms. Kantor had submitted much of her documentation well before the hearing, the post-hearing Addendum sought to refute Ms. Kantor’s evidence for the first time. The Addendum contained the DHCS medical consultant’s review based on the medical records from January 2016 to September 2016. The medical consultant described Ms. Kantor as stable because the consultant claimed not to have observed changes in Ms. Kantor’s conditions: her most recent notes are similar to the rest of the notes from the year. 94. Neither Ms. Kantor nor her authorized representative received any notice or a copy of the Addendum and thus did not have an opportunity to respond. Without verification that DHCS shared a copy of the Addendum with Ms. Kantor or her authorized representative, the ALJ’s decision stated that [t]he record was left open until February 10, 2017, for the 21 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Claimant’s attorney to provide any updated medical records after receiving the DHCS response; however, no additional response was received from the Claimant’s attorney. 95. Because Respondents did not appear at the hearing, and instead presented a supplemental statement after the hearing without disclosing the identities of its medical reviewers, Ms. Kantor did not have a meaningful opportunity to review or challenge the qualifications, opinions, or bases of opinion of the DHCS reviewer who denied her MER. 96. DHCS issued the final hearing decision on March 2, 2016 upholding the denial of Ms. Kantor’s MER. From DHCS’ post-hearing analysis of Ms. Kantor’s medical evidence, the ALJ and DHCS determined Ms. Kantor’s juvenile rheumatoid arthritis and osteoporosis were as stable as medications can provide. DHCS made a determination on only two of Ms. Kantor’s 12 medical conditions. 97. Neither the addendum nor the decision addressed the medical evaluations provided by her physicians. In particular, DHCS did not refute the medical opinion of Ms. Kantor’s rheumatologists that her disease processes will continue to progress leaving the patient with even less functional capacity than she already has. 98. DHCS’ statement of position and final decision also failed to disclose the identity or qualifications, including areas of specialty care, practice, or expertise, of the medical consultant who recommended the MER denial. The decision, statement of position, and quoted section of the Addendum all failed to reference or even refer to the requirement in 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3), which provides that a MER should be granted until the beneficiary’s medical condition has stabilized to a level that would allow her to switch to a plan provider without deleterious medical effects, as determined by a beneficiary’s treating physician in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. 99. Ms. Kantor sought a reversal of the final hearing decision in a demand letter sent by her attorney to Director Kent on May 11, 2017. Upon reviewing the letter, DHCS granted Ms. Kantor a MER for 12 months until May 31, 2018. 22 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 100. Near the expiration of her MER, Ms. Kantor must apply for another MER to continue care at Cedars Sinai. Based on her prior denial and hearing experience, Ms. Braddock believes DHCS will deny the MER on the same grounds and conduct the hearing in the same manner without due process. Petitioner Al-Muzzamil Lodin 101. Petitioner Al-Muzzamil Lodin is a Medi-Cal beneficiary. He has advanced autosomal recessive L-2-hydroxyglutaric aciduria, an extremely rare genetic disease that is associated with progressive brain damage. As a result of this condition, Mr. Lodin has involuntary spasms and abnormal posture of the neck and arms, following many years of restlessness and excessive movements of the body. These conditions include blepharospasm (involuntary blinking or spasm of the eyelids), muscle spasticity, orofacial dyskinesia (involuntary repetitive movements of the mouth and face), and torticollis of the neck. He also has seizure disorder, developmental delay, difficulty swallowing, a chronic cough, and constipation. Today, Mr. Lodin’s most active problem is worsening dystonia, a movement disorder in which his muscles contract uncontrollably. The dystonia is expressed as a severe neck distortion to his left side with his left hand rotated and wrist flexed upward. Mr. Lodin’s posture now leans permanently to the left. 102. There is no known cure to Mr. Lodin’s disease. He has been under the care of UCLA specialists for about 20 years. He came under the care of other neurologists at Cedars- Sinai Medical Center in 2013 to receive Botox treatment, which UCLA could not provide. 103. UCLA Health and Cedars-Sinai treat Medi-Cal patients on only a fee-for- service basis. 104. Mr. Lodin’s physician at Cedars-Sinai submitted a MER on or around July 7, 2016. The MER application included medical records from his last five visits to Cedars-Sinai. The medical records showed Mr. Lodin was under active treatment for his dystonia, which had been refractory to medications but his physicians were still adjusting the dosages and type of Botox he was receiving to attempt control of the dystonia. 23 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 105. DHCS denied the MER on grounds that his condition(s) appear(s) to be stable. (Parentheses in original.) Mr. Lodin timely appealed the denial and had a hearing on August 31, 2016. 106. No representative of DHCS contacted Mr. Lodin or his authorized representative about pre-hearing informal resolution of his case. 107. Mr. Lodin appeared in person at the hearing with his mother as his authorized representative. DHCS did not appear in person and instead submitted a written statement of position. 108. DHCS did not mail a statement of position to Mr. Lodin prior to his hearing. Mr. Lodin learned of DHCS’ arguments for the first time when the ALJ read DHCS’ statement at the hearing. 109. DHCS did not inform Mr. Lodin on the right to examine his MER file, which would have included DHCS’ medical review upon which it relied to deny the MER. 110. DHCS claimed in its statement of position that Mr. Lodin’s provider failed to return an HCO-7101 documenting any high risk of complex medical condition that has not been stabilized and [t]herefore, there is no deleterious health affects [sic] to the beneficiary if they begin receiving care from a plan provider. Although Mr. Lodin submitted medical evidence along with his original MER application, the DHCS statement of position made no mention of the contents of the records or even his medical conditions. 111. At the hearing, Mr. Lodin submitted a statement of position along with medical records from April 2015 to August 2016. Mr. Lodin’s mother testified about her son’s deteriorating medical conditions and how he would suffer if he lost care at UCLA Health and Cedars-Sinai. Mr. Lodin, himself, also appeared at the hearing in front of the ALJ in an apparent state of physical distress from dystonia and involuntary muscle movements. 112. At the hearing, Mr. Lodin also provided a letter from his neurologist at Cedars- Sinai. The physician noted: If Mr. Lodin is not treated in a setting with a group of experts, it is likely he would deteriorate to a level of functionality unmanageable for his caretakers. I am 24 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 strongly recommending that you allow this patient to continue with our Neurology Clinic at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, in order to continue the workup, initiate appropriate care, and monitor response to treatment and disease progression. It is imperative for him to continue follow-up care to maintain continuity of care. Continuity of care will help to limit disease progression and disease related complications. 113. Fifteen days after the hearing, on September 15, 2016, DHCS submitted a supplemental statement ( Addendum ) to refute both Mr. Lodin’s provided statement of position and evidence at the hearing and evidence that had already been provided with the MER. The medical reviewer found that [a]lthough his condition is complex and certainly progressive, requiring treatment by specialists, there is no evidence that his disease is currently acutely unstable such that it would be dangerous to transfer him to a managed care plan where he could be treated by similar specialists. DHCS does not address his treating physician’s August 29, 2016 letter, which stated that Mr. Lodin’s condition would deteriorate if he did not remain with his clinical providers. DHCS also did not mention the severity of Mr. Lodin’s dystonia and, instead, characterized it merely as a movement disorder. 114. Neither Mr. Lodin nor his authorized representative received the Addendum. DHCS’ final decision did not include any indication or determination whether DHCS shared a copy of the Addendum with Mr. Lodin and his authorized representative or gave him an opportunity to respond. 115. Because Respondents did not appear at the hearing, and instead presented a supplemental statement after the hearing without disclosing the identities of its medical reviewers, Mr. Lodin did not have a meaningful opportunity to review or challenge the qualifications, opinions, or bases of opinion of the DHCS reviewer who denied his MER. 116. DHCS issued the final decision of the hearing on September 21, 2016, upholding the denial of Mr. Lodins’ MER. From DHCS’ post-hearing analysis of Mr. Lodin’s medical evidence in the record, the ALJ and DHCS determined Mr. Lodin’s genetic disorder, though complex, was stable. 25 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 117. The final decision did not provide an analysis of Mr. Lodin’s statement of position or testimony from his authorized representative. It also did not provide an analysis of competing interpretations of his medical conditions and medical records. Rather, the decision omitted significant portions of Mr. Lodin’s physicians’ letters. Additionally, the decision did not make findings on Mr. Lodin’s dystonia, the most debilitating symptom of his disease. The decision referenced the dystonia, not by name, but merely as a movement disorder or other complication of his primary disease. 118. DHCS’ statement of position and final decision also failed to disclose the identity or qualifications, including or areas of specialty care, practice, or expertise, including or areas of specialty care, practice, or expertise, of the medical consultant who recommended the MER denial. The decision, statement of position, and quoted section of the Addendum all failed to address or even refer to the requirement in 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3), which provides that a MER should be granted until the beneficiary’s medical condition has stabilized to a level that would allow him to switch to a plan provider without deleterious medical effects, as determined by a beneficiary’s treating physician in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. 119. Mr. Lodin requested a rehearing by writing on or around September 29, 2016, on grounds that DHCS improperly evaluated his evidence and improperly applied the MER standard under 22 C.C.R. 53887. He explained he has a rare, complex condition that is deteriorating over time and his health is worsening. Mr. Lodin also explained he was undergoing treatment at UCLA Health and Cedars-Sinai, which were providing him with Botox injections and evaluations for sinus surgery and deep brain stimulation surgery. 120. DHCS denied the rehearing in a letter dated October 13, 2016, which read: The adopted decision is consistent with the law, is supported by the evidence in the record, is supported by the findings, addresses all of the claims and issues supported by the hearing record, and the information provided in the request could not change the adopted decision of the original hearing. DHCS did not provide any other explanation about its decision to deny the rehearing request and did not address any reasons specific to Mr. Lodin’s case. 26 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 121. DHCS enrolled Mr. Lodin into a Medi-Cal managed care plan on December 1, 2016. For nine months thereafter, the community neurologists available to Mr. Lodin through his managed care plan were unable to provide Mr. Lodin with the care necessary for his conditions. Mr. Lodin sought appointments with three plan neurologists. The first two neurologists declined to accept Mr. Lodin as a patient. One of these two neurologists admitted to being unfamiliar with his condition, having never treated a patient with L-2-hydroxyglutaric aciduria. Mr. Lodin stopped receiving Botox treatment for his dystonia as soon as he transferred to plan neurologists. Left untreated with these providers, Mr. Lodin’s dystonia rapidly worsened during the time he was in managed care, leaving him incapacitated in bed for many hours during the day and unable to move around freely on his own as he used to be able to do. The third neurologist, the only plan physician willing to treat Mr. Lodin, wanted to just monitor his symptoms rather than treat them or prevent further deterioration. 122. Mr. Lodin sought a reversal of the final hearing decision in a demand letter sent by his attorney to Director Kent on August 8, 2017. Upon reviewing the letter, DHCS granted Brendon’s MER for 12 months until August 21, 2018. 123. Near the expiration of his MER, Mr. Lodin must apply for another one to continue his treatment and care with his physicians. Based on his prior denial and hearing, Mr. Lodin believes DHCS will deny the MER on the same grounds and conduct the hearing in the same manner without due process. CAUSES OF ACTION First Cause of Action Writ of Mandate Under Code Civil Proc. 1085 Against All Respondents (Violation of Fair Hearing Laws & Regulations) 124. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 27 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 125. Respondents have a ministerial duty to provide Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries an opportunity for a fair and impartial hearing concerning their requests for exemption from managed care pursuant to 22 C.C.R. 50179, 51014.1(c). 126. Respondents’ conduct in Petitioners’ cases and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ cases deprive beneficiaries of a fair hearing. Namely, Respondents have improperly administered MER hearings in violation of Welfare & Institutions Code 10950 et seq., Government Code 11430.10 and 11430.50, and the regulations on state fair hearings (MPP) by: (a) failing to conduct a pre-hearing review of the evidence and engage in informal resolution prior to the hearing; (b) failing to adequately inform Petitioners and Medi-Cal beneficiaries how to access their case files and records, thereby preventing them from fully accessing their case files and records; (c) submitting statements of position that fail to present any of the individual beneficiary’s facts or summarize Respondents’ position specific to those facts; (d) appearing at the hearing only by statements of position, thereby denying beneficiaries and the administrative law judges the opportunity to question Respondents, challenge their evidence, and assess the probative value of Respondents’ evidence; (e) failing to disclose the identities and qualifications of their medical reviewers who direct the denial of MERs, thereby forcing final decisions that fail to assess the probative value of medical evidence submitted by Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries; (f) denying Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries the opportunity to review and respond to the evidence against them, specifically 28 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DHCS’ medical assessment of their eligibility for a MER and additional statements transmitted to ALJs after a hearing is conducted; (g) engaging in ex parte communications which include, but is not limited to, communicating with the ALJ after the hearing but before the decision without notifying Petitioners or other Medi-Cal beneficiaries of the communication or its content; and (h) issuing final hearing decisions improperly relying on DHCS’ conclusory and unsubstantiated statements about Petitioners’ and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ medical conditions. 127. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the outcome of this proceeding and has no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law except by way of this a writ of mandate. 128. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under state law on how MER hearings should be conducted. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate state law. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under state law. Second Cause of Action Writ of Mandate Under Code Civil Proc. 1085 Against All Respondents (Denial of Due Process of Law) 129. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 130. Respondents have a ministerial duty to afford Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries seeking exemption from managed care due process of law in the administration of their MER appeal hearings. Respondents have improperly administered MER hearings in violation of the Due Process Cause of the California Constitution Article I, 7 and 15, by conducting the hearing process in such a way that Respondents prevent Petitioners and other 29 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Medi-Cal beneficiaries from having a meaningful opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence against their MER claim. Respondents also violate due process through post-hearing conduct and communications with the ALJ after the hearing and outside of the presence of the beneficiary, without adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. 131. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the outcome of this proceeding and have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law except by way of this writ of mandate. 132. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under the California Constitution. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate the California Constitution. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under the California Constitution. Third Cause of Action Writ of Mandate Under Code Civil Proc. 1085 Against All Respondents (Violation of Welf. & Inst. Code 14182 and 22 C.C.R. 53887, 53923.5) 133. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 134. Respondents must provide a process by which Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries with complex medical conditions can be exempted from mandatory managed care enrollment. Welf. & Inst. Code 14182. The standard to grant a MER depends on whether the beneficiary’s complex medical condition is not stable enough to transfer to a managed care physician without deleterious medical effects. 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3), 53923.5(b)(2)(B) & (c). Per regulation, risk of deleterious medical effects is based on the beneficiary’s treating physician’s determination. 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3). 135. Respondents breached their ministerial duty in Petitioners’ cases because Respondents failed to use the correct standard required by 22 C.C.R. 53887(a)(3), which relies on Petitioners’ treating physicians’ determination of medical stability. 30 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 136. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the outcome of this proceeding and have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law except by way of this writ of mandate. 137. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under state law governing MERs. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate state law. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under state law. Fourth Cause of Action Writ of Mandate Under Code Civil Proc. 1085 Against All Respondents (Failure to Humanely Administer Benefits to Which Beneficiaries Are Entitled) 138. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 139. Respondents have failed to administer the Medi-Cal program promptly and humanely in a way that complies with the law. Welf. & Inst. Code 10000. Their administration of the Medi-Cal program has deprived Petitioners and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries the amount of aid to which [they are] entitled . . . . Id. 10500. 140. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the outcome of this proceeding and have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law except by way of this writ of mandate. 141. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under state law governing the Medi- Cal program. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate state law. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under state law. 31 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Fifth Cause of Action Writ of Mandate Under Code Civil Proc. 1085 Against All Respondents (Denial of Rehearing) 142. Petitioners reallege and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 143. When a social services applicant or recipient requests a rehearing to contest an administrative order, Respondents have a ministerial duty under Welfare & Institutions Code 10960(c) to either grant or deny the request on a lawful ground and to explain the reasons and legal basis for the decision. 144. Respondents have failed to fulfill this duty because they denied Petitioner Lodin and other Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ rehearing requests without adequately explaining the reasons and legal basis for the decision. Respondents continue to use only boilerplate language to explain their reasons for denial. Respondents ignore their own due process violations, including ex parte contacts with the ALJs, and procedural violations that occurred during the hearing process in denying these rehearing requests. 145. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the outcome of this proceeding and have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law except by way of this writ of mandate. 146. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under state law governing rehearing requests. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate state law. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under state law. 32 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Sixth Cause of Action Petitioners Kantor and Lodin Against All Respondents Relief from Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds (Violation of C.C.P. 526(a)) 147. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 148. Petitioners Kantor and Lodin have paid a tax within and to the State of California within one year before commencement of this action. 149. Respondents have expended public funds in the promulgation and implementation of the unlawful policies and practice alleged in this petition and complaint. 150. Unless and until enjoined by this court, Respondents’ unlawful conduct will cause great and irreparable injury to petitioners in that respondents will continue to make illegal expenditures. 151. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Petitioners and Respondents concerning their respective rights and duties under state law prohibiting the expenditure of public funds on unlawful policies and practices. Petitioners desire a judicial determination of the rights and duties of the parties and a declaration as to whether Respondents’ practices as alleged herein violate state law. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time so that all parties may ascertain their rights and duties under state law. REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Petitioners request the following relief: 1. A peremptory writ of mandate prohibiting Respondents with regard to appeals of MERS denials from: (a) Proceeding to hearing without conducting a pre-hearing evaluation of the appeal and contacting the Medi-Cal beneficiary to attempt informal resolution of the case; 33 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (b) Preventing Medi-Cal beneficiaries from adequately accessing their case files and records; (c) Submitting written statements at the hearing that do not include facts and a summary of Respondents’ position specific to each individual case on appeal; (d) Appearing at the hearing only by statement of position and not in person; (e) Withholding the identities and qualifications of the medical reviewers who recommend the denial of Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ MERs; (f) Conducting MER fair hearings without allowing Medi-Cal beneficiaries to review all of the evidence Respondents relied on to support DHCS’ statements of position and addenda, including the names of the DHCS medical reviewers as well as their qualifications, opinions, and bases of their opinions; (g) Submitting evidence, supplemental statements of position, or addenda without giving the Medi-Cal beneficiary timely notice of the submission and a reasonable opportunity to respond; (h) Conducting MER fair hearings without using the correct standard to evaluate medical evidence according to the standard set forth in 22 C.C.R. 53887 as to the determination by the Medi-Cal beneficiary’s treating physician; (i) Upholding MER denials at fair hearings when any of the unlawful actions in the subsections (a) (h) occur; (j) Issuing final hearing decisions that improperly rely on conclusory and unsubstantiated statements about Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ medical conditions; and (k) Denying rehearing requests without adequately explaining the reasons for denial. 34 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Respondents with regard to appeals of MER denials from: (a) Proceeding to hearing without conducting a pre-hearing evaluation of the appeal and contacting the Medi-Cal beneficiary to attempt informal resolution of the case; (b) Preventing Medi-Cal beneficiaries from adequately accessing their case files and records; (c) Submitting written statements at the hearing that do not include facts and a summary of Respondents’ position specific to each individual case on appeal; (d) Appearing at the hearing only by statement of position and not in person; (e) Withholding the identities and qualifications of the medical reviewers who recommend the denial of Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ MERs; (f) Conducting MER fair hearings without allowing Medi-Cal beneficiaries to review all of the evidence Respondents relied on to support DHCS’ statements of position and addenda, including the names of the DHCS medical reviewers as well as their qualifications, opinions, and bases of their opinions; (g) Submitting evidence, supplemental statements of position, or addenda without giving the Medi-Cal beneficiary timely notice of the submission and a reasonable opportunity to respond; (h) Conducting MER fair hearings without using the correct standard to evaluate medical evidence according to the standard set forth in 22 C.C.R. 53887 as to the determination by the Medi-Cal beneficiary’s treating physician; (i) Upholding MER denials at fair hearings when any of the unlawful 35 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 actions in the subsections (a) (h) occur; (j) Issuing final hearing decisions that improperly rely on conclusory and unsubstantiated statements about Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ medical conditions; and (k) Denying rehearing requests without adequately explaining the reasons for denial. 3. Declare that the following actions by Respondents violate state law and regulation with regard to appeals of MER denials: (a) Proceeding to hearing without conducting a pre-hearing evaluation of the appeal and contacting the Medi-Cal beneficiary to attempt informal resolution of the case; (b) Preventing Medi-Cal beneficiaries from adequately accessing their case files and records; (c) Submitting written statements at the hearing that do not include facts and a summary of Respondents’ position specific to each individual case on appeal; (d) Appearing at the hearing only by statement of position and not in person; (e) Withholding the identities and qualifications of the medical reviewers who recommend the denial of Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ MERs; (f) Conducting MER fair hearings without allowing Medi-Cal beneficiaries to review all of the evidence Respondents relied on to support DHCS’ statements of position and addenda, including the names of the DHCS medical reviewers as well as their qualifications, opinions, and bases of their opinions; (g) Submitting evidence, supplemental statements of position, or addenda without giving the Medi-Cal beneficiary timely notice of the submission 36 VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 and a reasonable opportunity to respond; (h) Conducting MER fair hearings without using the correct standard to evaluate medical evidence according to the standard set forth in 22 C.C.R. 53887 as to the determination by the Medi-Cal beneficiary’s treating physician; (i) Upholding MER denials at fair hearings when any of the unlawful actions in the subsections (a) (h) occur; (j) Issuing final hearing decisions that improperly rely on conclusory and unsubstantiated statements about Medi-Cal beneficiaries’ medical conditions; and (k) Denying rehearing requests without adequately explaining the reasons for denial. 4. Reasonable costs of suit. 5. An award of attorneys’ fees payable to petitioners’ counsel. 6. Such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper. DATED: September 19, 2017 Respectfully submitted, _______________________________ By: Helen Tran for NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY Attorneys for Petitioners asmith Typewritten Text 37 asmith Typewritten Text VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF asmith Typewritten Text 38 asmith Typewritten Text VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF asmith Typewritten Text VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF asmith Typewritten Text 39 Robbins-Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, 9-19-17 Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief INTRODUCTION PARTIES JURISDICTION AND VENUE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Overview of Medi-Cal Statutes and Regulations Enrollment in Medi-Cal Managed Care Medical Exemption Requests (MERs) Notice and Hearing Requirements Evidence in the Administrative Hearing Rehearing STATEMENT OF FACTS Petitioner Brendon Robbins Petitioner Inna Kantor Petitioner Al-Muzzamil Lodin CAUSES OF ACTION First Cause of Action Second Cause of Action Third Cause of Action Fourth Cause of Action Fifth Cause of Action Sixth Cause of Action REQUEST FOR RELIEF Robbins-Robbins Verification Robbins-Kantor Verification Robbins-Lodin Verification ”

Document Romain v. Sonnier – ABAWDS Class Action Case

In Welfare Complaint Library 1522 downloads

Download (docx, 348 KB)

Romain v. Sonnier – ABAWDS Class Action Case.docx

“[bookmark: _GoBack]Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 1 of 29 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA Civil Action No.Lisa Romain, Stacey Gibson, Joanika Davis, Schevelli Robertson, Jericho Macklin, Dameion Williams, Brian Trinchard, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. SUZY SONNIER, in her official capacity as Secretary of Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services, Defendant. CLASS ACTION CLASS ACTION C O M P L A I N T I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Named plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent are indigent adult recipients of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ( SNAP ), commonly known as food stamps, threatened with termination of their SNAP benefits, effective January 1, 2016, by the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Social Services ( DCFS ). These terminations result from the Defendant’s flawed and hasty implementation of a complex federal law limiting SNAP benefits to three (3) months in a thirty-six (36) month period for adults who are determined to be Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents ( ABAWD ), unless the adult meets defined work requirements. 2. For eighteen years, Defendant and her predecessors consistently sought and obtained a waiver of the ABAWD requirements from the United States Department of Agriculture ( USDA ). The waiver was based on the state’s high unemployment. Early this 1 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 2 of 29 year, Defendant chose, for the first time, notwithstanding a continuing high unemployment rate, to not renew the waiver. As a consequence, the waiver expired on September 30, 2015 and ABAWDs throughout the state became subject to the work requirements for the first time in 18 years. 3. However, as detailed below, Defendant failed to ensure that DCFS was equipped to handle the more than 62,000 SNAP recipients who would, all on October 1, 2015, become subject to the ABAWD requirements. As a consequence, Defendant’s threatened terminations of SNAP results from the DCFS’s pattern and practices of failing to assure that only those properly subject to the time-limit are terminated by: a) failing to provide adequate notice of the termination of SNAP, effective January 1, 2016 to plaintiffs and those similarly situated; b) failing to provide adequate notice to plaintiffs and those similarly situated of the applicable requirements and exemptions and the processes by which individuals can claim exemptions from the ABAWD work requirements and\/or show they are meeting such work requirements; and c) failing to fairly investigate, assess, and determine whether individuals are properly subject to the ABAWD time limit. As a result of these failures plaintiffs and those similarly situated are threatened with wrongful terminations of SNAP benefits. Defendant’s failures violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 7 U.S.C. 2020 (e)(10) and implementing regulations, 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) and implementing regulations, and 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a). Without continued access to SNAP as mandated by Due Process and federal law, these individuals face hunger and serious health risks. 4. Accordingly, plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, to challenge the defendant’s policies and practices of terminating individuals without the notice and procedures mandated by the Food Stamp Act and implementing 2 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 3 of 29 regulations and the Due Process Clause to assure Defendant’s fair and lawful application of the SNAP time limit. 5. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant, in her official capacity as Department Secretary, from terminating SNAP benefits without complying with Due Process and federal law. 6. Further, plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stay Defendant from terminating SNAP for any ABAWD household based on the three month limit until such time as she can demonstrate to this Court that DCFS can operate the ABAWD program in conformity with the Food Stamp Act, implementing regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 7. The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this action is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1331. 8. Declaratory relief is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 2201(a) and 2202, and by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Injunctive relief is authorized by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 to redress deprivations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional and federal statutory rights. 10. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(e) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this judicial district and because one or more of the Plaintiffs resides in this judicial district. III. PARTIES 11. Plaintiff Lisa Romain resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 3 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 4 of 29 12. Plaintiff Stacey Gibson resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 13. Plaintiff Joanika Davis resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 14. Plaintiff Schevella Robinson resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 15. Plaintiff Jericho Macklin resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 16. Plaintiff Dameion Williams resides in New Orleans, Lousiana. 17. Plaintiff Brian Trinchard resides in New Orleans, Louisiana. 18. Defendant Suzy Sonnier is the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services and is sued in her official capacity. As Secretary, Defendant is responsible for, inter alia, the statewide operation and administration of the Louisiana Food Stamp Program, in compliance with the federal Food Stamp Program. La. R. S. 36.477 (B) (1). IV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 19. Plaintiffs are SNAP recipients who sue on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20. The plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program recipients who have received or who will receive a notice from Defendant terminating their SNAP benefits because they have received SNAP for 3 out of 36 months without meeting the Able-Bodied Adult without Dependents work requirement. 21. The plaintiff class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 22. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class, including whether defendant’s policies and practices of terminating SNAP recipients without first determining whether they are correctly subject to ABAWD requirements deprives eligible individuals of SNAP in violation of the Food Stamp Act and implementing regulations and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 4 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 5 of 29 23. The named plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the plaintiff class. The named plaintiffs and members of the class are SNAP recipients whom Defendant has determined are subject to the ABAWD requirements and time limit and have received notices that they are subject the time limit. 24. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed plaintiff class. In supporting their individual claims, the named plaintiffs will simultaneously advance the claims of absent class members. 25. Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in complex class litigation involving public benefit programs and civil rights laws. Counsel have the resources, expertise and experience to prosecute this action on behalf of the plaintiff class. 26. Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief with respect to the proposed class as a whole. V. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SCHEME A. Federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Purpose and Administration 27. Congress established the federally funded, state-administered Food Stamp Program in 1964, to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 2, 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 2011). In order to alleviate . . . hunger and malnutrition, Congress enacted the Food Stamp Program to permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation. Id.; 7 C.F.R. 271.1. 5 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 6 of 29 28. Effective October 1, 2008, the federal Food Stamp Program was renamed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the federal Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 4001 and 4002, 122 Stat. 1651, 1853-1860. 29. At the federal level, SNAP is administered by the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service ( FNS ). 30. The federal government provides complete funding to the states for all benefits under SNAP, and at least 50% of the states’ administrative costs involved in their operation of the program. 7 U.S.C. 2013(a), 2019, 2025(a); 7 C.F.R. 277.1(b), 277.4. 31. Each state must designate a single state agency responsible for administering SNAP and complying with federal food stamp statutory and regulatory requirements. 7 U.S.C. 2020(a), (d), and (e); 7 C.F.R. 271.4(a), 277.4. The state agency’s responsibilities include the certification of eligible applicant households and the issuance of food stamp benefits to those households. 7 U.S.C. 2020(a)(1), (e). 32. Louisiana participates in SNAP. DCFS is the single state agency responsible for administering SNAP in Louisiana, in compliance with federal statutes and implementing FNS regulations. La. R. S. 36.477 (B) (1). B. Overview of Federal SNAP Food Stamp Program (SNAP) 1. General Eligibility Requirements 33. To be eligible for SNAP, a household’s gross non-excludable income must not exceed 130% of the federal poverty line, and its net income, after specified allowable exclusions and deductions, must be below the federal poverty line. Households with an elderly person or a person with a disability must only meet the net income test. 7 U.S.C. 2014(c). 6 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 7 of 29 34. The maximum monthly SNAP benefit for a household of one is $194. http:\/\/www.fns.usda.gov\/snap\/eligibility. 35. In addition to meeting the income and assets tests in the federal SNAP law, households must comply with other eligibility requirements, such as those in 7 U.S.C. 2015, including the work requirement for ABAWDs in subsection (o). 36. The state agency must determine the eligibility of applicant households and certify their eligibility in accordance with the eligibility rules and procedures set forth in the federal Food Stamp Act and implementing regulations. See generally, 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a); 2020 (e) (3), (4), (9) and implementing regulations at 7 C.F.R. Part 273. 37. The state agency must certify households as eligible for a specified period of time, and households must then renew their eligibility (also called recertification) to receive SNAP for subsequent periods. 7 C.F.R. 273.10(f); 7 U.S.C. 2020 (e)(4); 7 C.F.R. 273.14. 38. Eligible households may be subject to requirements that they file periodic reports on their circumstances, according to the reporting system option chosen by the state, one of which is known as simplified reporting. 7 U.S.C. 2015 (c); 7 C.F.R. 273.12 (A)(5). 39. 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a) requires that [a]ssistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible household who make application for such participation. 2. Requirements Regarding Work and Time-Limits for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents 40. 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (2) provides that no individual is eligible for SNAP if during the preceding 36-month period, the individual received SNAP for not less than 3 months (consecutive or otherwise) during which the individual did not engage in work as defined in 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (2) (A)-(C) or receive benefits pursuant to (o) (3)-(6) . The implementing 7 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 8 of 29 regulation is 7 C.F.R. 273.24. This provision is commonly known as the ABAWD 3 month- time limit. 41. A State must implement 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (2) unless it applies for and gets the approval of the USDA Secretary for a waiver pursuant to subsection (4). Such waiver may apply to any group of individuals in the State if the USDA Secretary determines that the area in which the individuals reside has an unemployment over 10% or does not have enough jobs to provide employment for the individuals. 42. As set forth in the following paragraphs, 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24, have detailed provisions defining the work requirement, exemptions from the work requirement, how months count toward the time limit, good cause for an individual’s temporary failure to meet the work requirements, and how an individual who has lost eligibility can regain eligibility. 43. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (2) (A) (C), the work requirement is defined as a. working 20 or more hours a week, averaged monthly (7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (2) (A)); b. participating in and complying with the requirements of a work program for 20 hours or more a week, as determined by the state agency; a work program means a program under title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998; a program under section 236 of the Trade Act of 1974; and a program of employment and training, other than a job search or job search training program, operated or supervised by a State or political subdivision of a State that meets standards approved by the Governor of the State, including activities under the State Employment and Training Program under 7 U.S.C. 2015 (d)(4) ((7 U.S.C. 8 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 9 of 29 2015 (o) (2) (B) and (o) (1)); or c) participating in and complying with the requirements of a workfare program under 7 U.S.C. 2029 or a comparable program established by the State or political subdivision of the State (7 U.S.C. 2015 (o)(2)(C)). 44. Pursuant 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) (3) (A) (E) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (c), individuals are exempt from the work requirement if they are: 1) under 18 or over 50 years of age; 2) medically certified as physically or mentally unfit for employment; 3) a parent or other member of a household with responsibility for a dependent child; 4) otherwise exempt from general SNAP work requirements under 7 U.S.C. 2015 (d) (2), as implemented by 7 C.F.R. 273.7 (b) (including on the basis that they are complying with the work requirements of another program or receiving unemployment compensation); or 4) a pregnant woman. 45. 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (b)(1) defines countable months for purposes of determining the 3-month time limit as months in which an individual receives benefits for the full month while not 1) exempt under 273.24 (c); 2) covered by a waiver under 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o)(4); 3) fulfilling the work requirement in 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o)(2); or receiving SNAP benefits that are pro-rated in accord with 7 C.F.R. 273.10. 46. 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (c) provides for a good cause exception for individuals who could not comply with the 20 hour a week average requirement because of temporary circumstances beyond the individual’s control, including but not limited to illness, illness of another household member requiring the presence of the member, a household emergency, or the unavailability of transportation. 9 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 10 of 29 47. 7 U.S.C. 2015(o) (5) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (d) prescribes how an individual who has lost eligibility under subsection (2) can regain and maintain eligibility. 48. On November 19, 2015 USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) issued guidance to States regarding the ABAWD Time Limit Policy and Program Access. http:\/\/www.fns.usda.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/snap\/ABAWD-Time-Limit-Policy-and-Program- Access-Memo-Nov2015.pdf. The purpose of the guidance is to explain what the Food Stamp Act and implementing regulations require of the states in implementing the ABAWD requirement. 49. The November 19, 2015 FNS Guidance states that: To comply with Federal law, States must do more than track ABAWDs. States must also carefully screen for exemption from the time limit and connect ABAWDs to the information and resources necessary to maintain eligibility consistent with federal requirements. Id. at 1. 50. The November 19, 2015 FNS Guidance also states that: State agencies are responsible for assessing an individual’s fitness for work methodically and comprehensively. The certification and recertification interview is critical in identifying fitness for work. Id. at 2. 51. The November 19, 2015 FNS Guidance further summarizes the good cause exception for failure to meet the ABAWD work requirement, how individuals can meet the work requirements, and how individuals can regain eligibility after losing it. Id. at 2-4. C. Notice and Hearing Requirements 52. When a state agency proposes to reduce or terminate a household’s SNAP benefits, federal law requires the agency to provide the household with opportunity for a fair 10 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 11 of 29 hearing and continued benefits until the hearing decision. 7 U.S.C. 2020 (e)(10) and implementing regulations 7 C.F.R. 273.13, 273.15. 53. 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a), which is one of the regulations that implements 7 U.S.C. 20202(e)(10), requires the state agency to send timely and adequate advance notice before taking any action to terminate or reduce a household’s benefits within its certification period. As to adequate notice, 273.13(a)(2) provides , in relevant part, that the notice of adverse action shall be considered adequate if it explains in easily understandable language: The proposed action; [and] the reason for the proposed action. VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Facts Common to the Class 54. Until September 30, 2015, Louisiana had a USDA-approved waiver of the federal ABAWD time limit requirement. Defendant declined to seek a renewal of the waiver, and as of October 1, 2015 the ABAWD time limit requirement took effect throughout the state. 55. Louisiana has informed USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) that it has 62,780 ABAWDs. 56. Defendant issued policies and procedures regarding SNAP Time-Limits for ABAWDS. Office of Family Support, CH. 4 B-1470 (November 1, 2015). According to the policies, the DCFS worker must determine if the household includes an ABAWD at application, at the midpoint of the certification period (simplified report), and at redetermination; and at these times, the policies provide for automatically sending an automated notice about the policy to each ABAWD. The policies also provide for an ABAWD Interviewing Guide for the agency worker to use in interviewing the household and a checklist to assist in the ABAWD determination. Id. at B-1476. 11 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 12 of 29 57. However, Defendant’s policies do not address how the DCFS worker was to make the initial determination of ABAWD status on October 1, 2015 for ongoing cases that did not have an initial application, simplified report, or recertification pending when the new ABAWD time limit requirement took effect. 58. In September 2015, DCFS sent out generic letters, titled Important Information About the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Time Limit (herein Information Letter ) about the new ABAWD Work Requirement that was to take effect on October 1, 2015 to those SNAP recipients whom it had determined subject to the new rule. The letter said You are getting this letter because our records show that you are age 18 through 49 and have to meet new work rules called the Able-Bodied Adult without Dependents (ABAWD) work requirement starting October 1, 2015. The Information Letter briefly described the new rule, the exemptions, and how to meet the requirement. It also gave a telephone number for assistance. 59. The Information Letter did not explain how or whether DCFS had determined that the recipient was already meeting the work requirement, what a recipient must do to show compliance with the work requirement or to claim an exemption, or how or when to present any information or claim to the agency. The Information Letter only stated that an ABAWD subject to the work requirement had to report changes (by the 10th of the month after the month when the change occurred) in hours worked if the changes resulted in the ABAWD working an average of less than 20 hours per week. 60. The Information Letter says that an exemption applies to those who have a physical or mental disability that keeps them from working. (emphasis added). This disability test imposes a stricter test than the exemption in 7 U.S.C. 2015(o)(3)(B), which exempts those 12 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 13 of 29 medically certified as physically or mentally unfit for employment. See also, 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (c)(2). 61. Defendant’s Information Letter, in explaining that a person can meet the ABAWD work requirement by working in a job for 20 hours or more each week , does not explain that work includes work in exchange for goods or services (not just money) and unpaid or volunteer work. 62. As indicated by the facts of the named Plaintiffs below, DCFS did not provide additional information to those subject to the new requirement that would allow them to understand how the new rule applied to them individually, whether DCFS considered them to be in compliance with the new rule, how they could seek an exemption or demonstrate compliance, and when they could or should assert such claims or otherwise show compliance with ABAWD requirements 63. As indicated by the facts of the named Plaintiffs below, Defendant’s practices in implementing the new ABAWD requirement, effective October 1, 2015, for the tens of thousands of recipients it concluded were subject to the requirement were deficient because they failed to include in practice a fair system for 1) investigating the current status of individual recipients; 2) seeking relevant current information from such recipients to inform the agency’s decision of an individual’s status; 3) providing adequate information to individuals about exemptions, numerous means of complying with the work requirements, and the existence of good cause for temporarily failing to comply with the work requirements; 4) providing and using effective processes by which individuals could provide relevant information to the agency and receive determinations from the agency of their status, including determinations of whether the 13 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 14 of 29 individual had good cause for temporary failure to comply with the work requirement; and 5) informing recipients of those processes and how to access them. 64. On or about December 1, 2015 DCFS sent out generic notices of SNAP Change\/Closure (Termination Notice) telling the recipient that SNAP will end 12\/31\/2015 due to a sanction to, upon information and belief, more than 50,000 persons. The December 1, 2015 notice stated that the named individual is disqualified as of January 1, 2016 because he or she received SNAP for 3 out of 36 months without meeting the work requirement. The Termination Notice does not explain the availability of a good cause exception for individuals who could not comply with the 20 hour a week average requirement because of temporary circumstances beyond the individual’s control, including but not limited to illness, illness of another household member requiring the presence of the member, a household emergency, or the unavailability of transportation as required by 7 C.F.R. 273.24 (c). The Termination Notice refers to exemptions without explaining them and has no individualized information about how the individual failed to meet the work requirement or qualify for an exemption. B. Facts of Individual Named Plaintiffs Lisa Romain 65. Lisa Romain is 49 years old. She lives with her husband, Kurt Romain, in Kenner, LA. 66. Ms. Romain worked for approximately 20 years for the United States Postal Service until 2008, when she had to resign, due to being diagnosed with serious medical conditions leading to physical impairment. 67. Ms. Romain and her husband Kurt Romain constitute the same SNAP household. After she stopped working because of her medical conditions in 2008, Mr. and Ms. Romain 14 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 15 of 29 began to receive $234 per month in food stamp benefits. The Romain household recertifies its SNAP eligibility each year and has continued to receive $234 each month. 68. Mr. Romain receives $1,314 each month in Social Security Disability Insurance ( SSDI ) benefits. The Romain household has no other income except for this SSDI check and their monthly food stamps. 69. In September 2015, a DCFS caseworker asked Kurt for verification of Lisa’s medical condition. The reason for the request was unclear to Kurt. 70. In response to the caseworker’s request, Mr. and Ms. Romain obtained a letter from Daughters of Charity, a healthcare provider where Lisa Romain has been receiving medical care since 2011. The letter states that Ms. Romain is unable to work due to her medical condition. 71. A few days later, Kurt Romain brought the Daughters of Charity letter to the DCFS office and gave it to the front desk staff. The staff looked up his name in the database and said she would give the letter to their caseworker. The Romains have not heard back from DCFS regarding the letter. 72. In October 2015, Lisa received a letter from DCFS telling her about the ABAWD work requirements. The letter did not state that SNAP benefits would be terminated. 73. Ms. Romain did not think that the October 2015 letter applied to her because her husband had already given DCFS the letter about her medical conditions and their effects on her ability to work, in September 2015. 74. Lisa and Kurt received a letter dated December 8, 2015, which DCFS sent to both Mr. and Mrs. Romain, stating that Lisa will be disqualified from receiving SNAP benefits beginning January 1, 2016, because she was not meeting the ABAWD work requirement. 15 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 16 of 29 75. The December 8, 2015, letter said that Lisa must work an average of 20 hours per week or participate in a job training at least 20 hours per week. In order to regain eligibility for SNAP, [she] must work or participate in a job training program at least 80 hours in a 30-day period or become exempt from the SNAP time limit. The letter also informed them that their household’s food stamps will be reduced to $24 each month since Lisa will lose all her benefits. 76. On December 14, 2015, Kurt went back to the DCFS office to submit another letter, dated December 14, 2015, from Daughters of Charity. The letter states that Lisa is unable to work due to her medical condition. The Romains have not heard back from DCFS. 77. In December 2015, Lisa visited an attorney, who helped her to request a fair hearing regarding the food stamps reduction. She has not received a hearing date. 78. Lisa Romain depends on food stamps to survive. She does not have any other source of income. Her filed application for SSDI benefits was denied in 2014. She is unable to apply for SSI, because Kurt’s SSDI allotment places them over income. Kurt’s SSDI benefits represents the only other income that they are able to depend on for rent, utilities and medications that they both need. If their food stamps are terminated, they will have difficulty meeting their nutritional needs. Stacey Gibson 79. Stacey Gibson is 43 years old. He has been homeless and living at the Salvation Army Homeless Shelter in New Orleans, Louisiana since 2013. 80. Mr. Gibson first applied for SNAP with DCFS in 2013. When he applied, Mr. Gibson stated on his application that he was homeless and gave the Salvation Army as his address. 81. Mr. Gibson receives $194 each month in SNAP. 82. Ms. Gibson has recertified several times for SNAP and neither his address nor his homeless status has changed. 16 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 17 of 29 83. In October 2015, Mr. Gibson received a letter from DCFS telling him about the ABAWD work requirements. Mr. Gibson continued to try to find work as he had already been doing. 84. In December, Mr. Gibson received another letter from DCFS, telling him that he will no longer be getting SNAP as of January 1, 2016, because he was not meeting the ABAWD work requirement. 85. Mr. Gibson has have been looking for work, but has found it hard to find work in New Orleans. But, Mr. Gibson has not given up and continues to apply. 86. Mr. Gibson volunteers at the First Presbyterian Church for a few hours per week, but did not keep a record of her hours because he did not know that volunteer work could count as work to help him remain eligible under the new work requirements. Mr. Gibson learned of this for the first time when Sima Atri, from the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, came to speak at a church Mr. Gibson attends. 87. Mr. Gibson was not told how to go about showing that his volunteer work at First Presbyterian Church may count as work. He also never thought to record hours because he did not know that it would qualify as work. 88. The notices that Mr. Gibson received did not explain the manner in which to report volunteer time, to explain good cause for not finding work, or that being homeless may exempt him from the ABAWD rules. 89. Mr. Gibson has does not have any other income; he needs SNAP to survive. Joanika Davis 90. Ms. Davis was diagnosed with a serious psychological condition in 2012. 91. She take strong medications during the day and night, which make it very difficult to work. Her medications interfere with daily life activities. 92. Even finding unpaid work has alluded Ms. Davis as a result. 17 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 18 of 29 93. Ms. Davis began receiving SNAP from the DCFS in 2012 after she was diagnosed and she receives $194 a month. She has been recertified for the same amount each year. 94. In June 2015, Ms. Davis was recertified for SNAP. Her recertification interview was on the phone. There was no live person. Ms. Davis called a number and answered questions that the computer asked her. 95. Ms. Davis could not discuss the impact of her medical condition with anyone during the recertification because it was an automated process. 96. In September 2015, Ms. Davis received a letter from DCFS that said that she would need to work to keep getting SNAP. 97. Ms. Davis tried many times to reach a worker at DCFS but kept getting automated messages. She was unable to get through to anyone. 98. Because Ms. Davis does not have and cannot afford transportation, she could not go the DCFS office. 99. In December 2015, Ms. Davis received a closure notice from DCFS telling her that her SNAP will be stopping beginning January 1, 2016, because she was not meeting the ABAWD work requirement. 100. Ms. Davis is not able to work. Ms. Davis was not informed by Defendant as to how she was supposed to meet the work requirement with her medical problems. Moreover, had Defendant screened Ms. Davis, she would have discovered that Ms. Davis was unfit to work and, therefore, exempt. Schevella Robertson 101. Schevella Robertson is 47 years old. She lives in New Orleans, Louisiana. 18 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 19 of 29 102. She has been receiving food stamps most of her life. In October 2015, she received a notice from DCFS, stating that she would lose her SNAP benefits unless she met the ABAWD work requirements. 103. Prior to October 2015, Ms. Robertson had been working at Dollar Tree for three months, earning approximately $125 every two weeks. 104. In October 2015, she required a number of surgeries, which made it difficult for her to work, especially at Dollar Tree, since her job involved lifting heavy boxes. 105. Ms. Robertson told her caseworker by phone about her surgeries at the time they happened, because she knew the surgeries would make it hard for her to work. She told her DCFS caseworker that she could not work and had to quit her job because of her surgeries. The caseworker said she would need to work. 106. In December 2015, she received a DCFS notice informing her that her food stamps would be terminated beginning January 1, 2016, because she was not meeting the ABAWD work requirements. 107. After receiving the December 2015 notice, she called the number listed on the notice, but was not able to speak to anyone. Ms. Robertson was able to make an appointment to speak with her caseworker, but not until the morning of December 16, 2015. When she spoke with her caseworker, Ms. Robertson reminded the worker about her surgeries and about how that had made it hard to work. The case worker told her that since she had not worked from October to December, 2015, her food stamps would be terminated three months after October 1st. She did not ask for a fair hearing, because the date had passed for the receipt of continued benefits, by the time her case worker had called me back. 19 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 20 of 29 108. Ms. Robertson is now able to work, but has not yet been able to find another job. When she spoke with her caseworker, the worker didn’t tell her that she could do volunteer work while she looked for paid work. Ms. Robertson is able to do volunteer work, and wants to. 109. Ms. Robertson spoke with Sima Atri at the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, who explained how volunteer work qualifies as work for the ABAWD work requirements. Ms. Robertson plans to start recording the hours of volunteer work she does, cleaning up her community. She will send her hours of work to DCFS, so that they are aware that she is completing 20 hours of work per week, which the October 2015 notice stated as an ABAWD requirement. 110. On December 16, 2015, after speaking with Sima Atri, Ms. Robertson called her caseworker, to ask about volunteer work satisfying the ABAWD work requirement. The caseworker told her that volunteer work or community service did not count as work for the ABAWD work requirement. She explained that even if Ms. Robertson performed 20 hours of volunteer work per week, she would not be meeting the work requirements. 111. On December 16, 2015, the caseworker also told Ms. Robertson that her food stamps had already been terminated. Ms. Robertson received the December Adverse action notice, but has still been receiving food stamps money during December 2015. 112. It is difficult for Ms. Robertson to pay cash for food. Her daughter pays Ms. Robertson’s rent of $50 per month, because she cannot afford to stay where she is living.. Losing my food stamps will increase the burden on her and her children. She has 11 children. She needs stamps to survive and take care of herself. 20 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 21 of 29 Jericho Macklin 113. Plaintiff Jericho Macklin is 37 years old and lives alone in New Orleans, Louisiana. 114. Mr. Macklin used to work more than twenty (20) hours per week as a cook. In September 2015, he was diagnosed with a serious medical condition. He takes several medications that affect his short term memory, make him drowsy and cause him to have difficulties sleeping. When he became ill, he had to reduce his working hours to ten (10) hours per week. 115. He has been receiving SNAP periodically for many years from DCFS. He currently receives $194 each month in SNAP benefits. 116. Due to issues with his memory, Mr. Macklin does not recall getting a letter from DCFS in October. He does remember receiving a letter from DCFS in December 2015, telling him that his SNAP will terminate, because he is not meeting ABAWD work requirements. 117. No DCFS worker has explained to Mr. Macklin how to satisfy the ABAWD work requirements. No one at DCFS told him that his medical status might make him unfit for work and eligible to keep getting SNAP. 118. On December 12, 2015, after receiving the December letter informing him of the termination of his SNAP benefits, Mr. Macklin requested a fair hearing, with the assistance of an attorney. In this fair hearing request, he informed DCFS about his medical status. 119. On December 16, 2015, he received a call from a DCFS worker, who informed him that his benefits would terminate on December 31st. 120. He applied for a fair hearing before the deadline outlined in the December letter, so that his benefits would continue until his medical status would be assessed at his hearing, with 21 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 22 of 29 respect to whether he would be exempted from the ABAWD work requirements. The DCFS worker told him that although he had applied for a fair hearing, his benefits would still terminate on December 31st. 121. On December 16, 2015, the DCFS worker also told Mr. Macklin that his health conditions would not have an effect on whether he would remain eligible as an ABAWD. The worker stated that the only relevant factor was whether or not he was working 20 hours a week. DCFS added that a medical note from a doctor stating that he was unfit for work was not sufficient to prove the effect of his medical condition on his fitness for work. Mr. Macklin had previously provided DCFS with a letter from his doctor with his diagnosis and medications. 122. Because he can only work approximately ten (10) hours per week due to his medical condition, Mr. Macklin does not have enough income to support himself without assistance. He depends on SNAP to meet his nutritional needs. He also has to take medications for his medical condition along with food. Dameion Williams 123. Dameion Williams is 34 years old. He has lived at the Ozanam Homeless Shelter in New Orleans, LA. 124. Mr. Williams has been volunteering approximately 60 hours per week at Ozanam Inn since October 2015, working in the kitchen. After speaking with Sima Atri from the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, he has been recording his volunteer hours, in order to verify his continued eligibility for food stamps. He is using the DCFS volunteer hours form and Ozanam Inn will verify his work hours. Mr. Williams submitted the volunteer hours form to DCFS on December 16, 2015. 22 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 23 of 29 125. Before he began volunteering at Ozanam, Mr. Williams worked as a cook for a restaurant. The restaurant closed for renovations and he was laid off. He has been applying for work, but has not been able to find another job as a cook. 126. In approximately September 2015, Mr. Williams applied for food stamps at the DCFS office in New Orleans. I got $194 in food stamps in September and in October. 127. When he applied for food stamps, a DCFS caseworker told Mr. Williams that he would only get benefits for three months unless he found a job or enrolled in school. 128. Mr. Williams did not know that his volunteer work for Ozanam could count as work, for purposes of ABAWD eligibility. His caseworker did not tell him that volunteer work may satisfy the ABAWD work requirement. 129. Mr. Williams has not received any food stamps in December 2015. He received a closure letter in December, which stated that he would continue to receive food stamps until January 2016. 130. Mr. Williams does not have any other income. He needs food stamps to help survive. Brian Trinchard 131. Brian Trinchard is 43 years old. He has been living at Ozanam Homeless Shelter in New Orleans, Louisiana, since August 2015. 132. Mr. Trinchard volunteers at Ozanam Homeless Shelter about sixty (60) hours per week in the kitchen. He volunteers cleaning tables, setting people up to eat, working at the front desk, and keeping the center organized. He gets a weekly stipend of $15. He has no other source of income. 23 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 24 of 29 133. Before he was incarcerated Mr. Trinchard worked periodically in construction for many years. He came to Ozanam Homeless Shelter soon after he was released in August, 2015. 134. In September 2015, Mr. Trinchard applied for food stamps at the DCFS local office. He was approved for $194 per month. 135. When Mr.Trinchard met with a DCFS caseworker during the SNAP application process, he was told that he would receive food stamps for only three (3) months unless he got a job or enrolled in school. 136. His caseworker did not ask Mr. Trinchard during the initial application if he was doing volunteer work. No DCFS worker informed him during his application process that his volunteer work at Ozanam Homeless Shelter might make him eligible to keep getting food stamps after the three month ABAWD period. For this reason, Mr. Trinchard did not report this information to his caseworker. 137. Mr. Trinchard received food stamps in October and November 2015. 138. In December 2015, he got a letter from DCFS telling him that his food stamps will end because he is not meeting the ABAWD work requirements. 139. When Mr. Trinchard got the December 2015 letter, he immediately went to Job One to register for work. He has not yet been called for work. When he get paid work, Mr. Trinchard still is unaware of how to inform DCFS that he is working and meeting the work requirements, so that his food stamps can continue. 140. On December 15, 2015, Sima Atri from the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice informed Mr. Trinchard that he should submit a record of his volunteer hours to DCFS, to demonstrate that he has been working over 20 hours per week. He has now recorded 24 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 25 of 29 his hours and they have been verified by Ozanam Inn. and Mr. Trinchard plans to send them to DCFS. 141. Mr. Trinchard needs his food stamps to help survive. He already lives in a shelter because he cannot afford rent. VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CLAIM: 142. Defendant’s policy and practice of sending inadequate termination notices to ABAWDs violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 7 U.S.C. 2020 (e) (10) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a)(2). SECOND CLAIM: 143. Defendant’s policy and practice of terminating SNAP recipients without providing such recipients at the time of implementation of the new ABAWD requirement on October 1, 2015 with adequate notice and accurate information about the new requirement, how to meet the requirement, how to demonstrate compliance to the agency, how to claim an exemption, the existence of good cause for failure to comply temporarily and how to claim good cause, and how to regain eligibility after reaching the time limit violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 7 U.S.C. 2015(o) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24, and 7 U.S.C. 2014(a). THIRD CLAIM: 144. Defendant’s policy and practice of terminating SNAP recipients without having done an individual investigation, assessment and determination of the status of each SNAP recipient and without having a fair system to inform recipients about the new eligibility rules and 25 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 26 of 29 provide an opportunity for individuals to demonstrate their compliance, their eligibility for an exemption, and their eligibility for a good cause exception violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24, and 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a). REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: A. Assume jurisdiction of this matter; B. Certify this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) with respect to the proposed class identified herein; C. Enter a declaratory judgment, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, declaring that the defendant’s policies and practices of: i) failing or refusing to send adequate termination notices to ABAWDs violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 7 U.S.C. 2020 (e) (10) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.13(a)(2). ii) terminating SNAP recipients without providing them at the time of implementation of the new ABAWD requirement on October 1, 2015 adequate notice and accurate information about the new requirement, how to meet the requirement, how to demonstrate compliance to the agency, how to claim an exemption, the existence of good cause for failure to comply temporarily and how to claim good cause, and how to regain eligibility after reaching the time limit violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24, and 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a); and 26 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 27 of 29 iii) terminating SNAP recipients for non-compliance with the ABAWD requirement without having done an individual investigation, assessment and determination of the status of each SNAP recipient and without having a fair system to inform recipients about the new ABAWD eligibility rules and provide an opportunity for individuals to demonstrate their compliance, their eligibility for an exemption, and their eligibility for a good cause exception violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 7 U.S.C. 2015 (o) and its implementing regulation, 7 C.F.R. 273.24, and 7 U.S.C. 2014 (a). D. Enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, to stay Defendant from terminating SNAP for any ABAWD household based on the time limit as of January 1, 2016 and thereafter until such time as she can demonstrate to this Court that DCFS can operate the ABAWD program in conformity with the Food Stamp Act, implementing regulations, and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. E. Award plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; and F. Order such other, further, or different relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Dated: December 18, 2015 New Orleans, Louisiana Respectfully submitted, William P. Quigley #07669 Loyola University New Orleans College of Law 27 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 28 of 29 7214 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, LA 70118 Cell 504.710.3074 [email protected] Jennifer J. Rosenbaum [email protected] Admitted to Practice in the Eastern District of Louisiana La. Bar No. 31946 Sima Atri Alaska Bar # 1512121 [email protected] NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ CENTER FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 217 N. Prieur St. New Orleans, LA 70112 Telephone: (504) 309-5165 Facsimile: (504) 309-5205 NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMIC JUSTICE, INC. Marc Cohan* Mary R. Mannix* Greg Bass* Francisca D. Fajana* 275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506 New York, NY 10001 Tel: (212) 633-6967 Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Counsel By: William P. Quigley William P. Quigley *Pending pro hac vice admission Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Counsel 28 Case 2:15-cv-06942 Document 1 Filed 12\/18\/15 Page 29 of 29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Class Certification and accompanying Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion was served by United States Mail, postage pre-paid, on the following this 18th day of December, 2015. By: William P. Quigley William P. Quigley Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Counsel 29 DECLARATION I, Lisa Romain, hereby declare under the pains and penalties of perjury the following to be true and correct: 1. I make the following statement based on personal knowledge\u00b7. 2. I am 49 years old. I live with my husband, Kurt Romain, in Kenner, LA. 3. I worked for about 20 years for the United States Postal Service until 2008 when I had to resign. I had been sick for a number of years but then had to leave when my conditions got progressively worse. I was diagnosed with a serious skeletal disorder, a hormonal disease, and a sleep related disorder. I have severe pain in my legs, knees and feet which make it difficult for me to stand for an extended period of time. I also have high blood pressure. 4. I am part ofmy husband, Kurt Romain’s, SNAP household. We receive $234 a month in food stamp benefits. 5. My husband, Kurt, is on SSDI and gets $1,314.00 each month. Our household has no other income except for Kurt’s SSDI check and our monthly food stamps. 6. In May 2015, our LA Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) caseworker asked Kurt for verification of my medical condition. When I asked Kurt why she needed that information, he told me that she might be a new worker. 7. In response to the caseworker’s request, Kurt obtained a letter from Daughters of Charity Health Centers, a healthcare provider where I have been getting medical care since 2011, saying that I am unable to work due to my medical condition. 8. A few days later, Kurt brought the Daughters of Charity letter to the DCFS’s office and gave it to the front desk staff. 9. In October 2015, Kurt received a letter from the DCFS telling us about Able Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWD) work requirements. The letter did not require a response from us. I 0. I did not think that the ABAWD letter applied to me because Kurt had already given DCFS a letter about my medical conditions and their effects on my ability to work in May. 11. In early December, we received a letter dated December 8, 2015, from DCFS stating that I will be disqualified from receiving SNAP benefits beginning January 1, 2016, because I was not meeting the ABAWD work requirement. I have attached the letter as # 1. 12. The DCFS December 8, 2015, letter said that I \”must work an average of20 hours per week or participate in a job training at least 20 hours per week. In order to regain eligibility for SNAP, [I] must work or participate in a job training program at least 80 hours in a 30-day period or become exempt from the SNAP time limit.\” 13. The DCFS December 8, 2015, letter also informed us that our household’s food stamps will be reduced to $24 each month since I will lose all my benefits. 14. No one at DCFS has contacted me to explain how I should go about satisfying the ABAWD work requirement with my medical condition. 15. Kurt brought another letter dated December 14, 2015, from the Daughters of Charity Health Centers stating that I am \”currently unable to work due to [my] condition\” to the DCFS office after we received the December 8 food stamps reduction letter. I have attached the Daughters of Charity letter as #2. 16. In December 2015, Kurt and I met with a lawyer to get legal help with our food stamps reduction. They helped me request a fair hearing. I do not yet have a hearing date. I do not know what will happen as of January 1, 2016, when our food stamps will be only $24. 17. I do not have any other source of income. My application for Social Security Disability which I submitted in 2014 was denied because I applied too late. I cannot apply for SSI because Kurt’s SSDI puts us slightly over-income. 18 I depend on Kurt’s SSDI as our sole source of income other than food stamps. If my food stamps are stopped, we will not be able to eat. 19. I am willing to serve as a class representative in this lawsuit on behalf of myself and other low-income individuals living in Louisiana who face the loss of SNAP benefits to which they are entitled. 20. My lawyers have informed me of my responsibilities as a class representative. 21. As a representative of a plaintiff class harmed by the same unlawful conduct, I am willing to protect and advance the interests of the plaintiff class rather than acting in my sole interest. [image: ],) Dated: Dtt,J ,WjJ [image: ] SNM’ 1:1A 1-lnv 11\/15 05\/11 lss11e Obsnl(1to j l( ;,\”,I 1\\ IP No: 500223 7 —–\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7\u00b7– Ye; \u25a1N;; Dale: 12\/8\/2015 LA Dept. of Children ancl Family Se,vices P 0. Box 260031 Baton Ro11qe, LI\\ \/0826 0031 — . – ——- ———- 1\\dvnnce Notice of Adverse Actirn, IZl Notice Expiration Date: 12\/21\/2015 [image: ]l Act.,:Lon E;,q_d.res: 12\/14\/ ‘.( 1[ 1- ) Afl\u00b7er careful cor1Dideration of your situation, the follu1- irHJ dec.iRi,)n has been made regarding your Supplemental N11tri tion Assis I.ance Program r \u00b71 :NAP ) case: )’our monthly benefit will be for the renson(s) given below. $125.00 effective lJliOJ\/201G SCHEVELLI ROBERTSON is being disqualified beginning 1Januai:y as he or she has received SNAP benefits for 3 of 36 rnontlis wit.111 ,ut. meeting the Able–Bodied Adnlt.s Witi1out Dependents ( ABAWD) work requirement-.. SNAP .requirements are that non-exempt able bodied persons age 18-49 without dependents must work an average o.f 20 hours per week or participate in a job training pro.gram at least 20 hours per wee.k. In order to regain eligibility for SNAP, he or she must work 01 participate in a job training program at least BO hours in a 30 dr:ty period or become exempt from the SNAP time lim.i.t. ‘l’he receipt of a Louisiana Purchase Automated Benefit ca.rd. does not mean you have been determined eligible for benefits. If you do receive this card, keep it to use if you are found eligibJ.e to receive benefits in the future, For more information about progn-nns and services or for specific .i.nfonnation about your case, call 1-RBR-\u00b7 LAHELPU (l-888-524-3578). A. child whois a member nf a hnllRPhnJd recei.virlg asRi Rtnnce front SNA:1-‘ fir FITAP may be eligible for free meal benefits at school. You shonld ,.:ontacl\u00b7 your local school :for information on free meal benefit.B [nr school meals. FAIR HEARING EXPLANA ‘ION CASE rn, 36 XXXXX4691 NAME: SCHEVELLI ROBER’ISCll\”I If you disagree with the above decision, yo11 rna.y diHcuss il wit.h a supervisor in the local Department of Child1en and F,1m:\\ ly Oervices. You may reques L a fair hearing but yon mus l: do :.;i, on 01: before 02\/2q\/2016.If youi benefits are being reduced or closed a11d you request a fair Hearing on or before 12\/14\/2015, your behefits can be continued at the current. level ‘Unless you i.ndica.te you do not w;int. them continued. If your benefits are continued, they will be continued c1t that level until the hearing or the end of yoLu: certification period whichever is sooner. A fair hearing may be requested by completing the sect.i.on below And mailing it or delivering it to the local DCFS. You may be Page 2 of2 represented at the hearing by an authorized representative, such as legal counsel, relative, friend, or other spokesperson, or you may represent yourself. For free legal advice, call (504) 529-1000. In the space provided, give the reason you are requesting a fair hearing. COMPLETE AND SIGN ONLY IF YOU WISH TO REQUEST A FAIR HEARING. Complete this section and sign below if you wish to appeal the decision on your caae. Do you want to continue receiliJg the receive until the hearing? (l..J yes amount-of benefits you now ( ) no If the final decision is in your favor, retroactive benefits will be issued if appropriate. IF THE DECISION OF THE LOCAL OFFICE IS UPHELD, ALL INELIGIBLE BENEFI’rS WILL BE SUBJECT TO REPAYMENT. [image: ]Use this space to tell why you want a hearing. The reason:A,l’C( 1 , oPI[ o1a J Z i ‘1 \/5 Date .5,,l\/: .51..5 \u00b79a Phone No. . Signature of Authorized Representative Address of Authorized Rep\”resentative City State Zip CodeOR Return to: DCFS ORLEANS- MIDTOWN -ES P.O. BOX 260031. BATON ROUGE, LA 70826-00J.1 DECLARATION I, Jericho Macklin, hereby swear under pains and penalties of perjury that the following is true and correct: 1. I make the following statement based on personal knowledge. 2. I am 37 years old. I live in New Orleans, LA. 3. I used to work more than twenty (20) hours per week as a cook at New Orleans Hamburger and Seafood. When I became ill I had to drop down to ten (10) hours per week. 4. In September 2015, I was diagnosed with a serious medical condition. I take several medications that affect my short term memory, make me drowsy and cause me to have difficulties sleeping. 5. I have been receiving food stamps on and off for many years from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). I currently get $194 each month. 6. I do not recall getting a letter from DCFS in October. My memory issues make it hard for me to remember things. But I do remember receiving a letter from DCFS in December 2015, telling me that my food stamps will end because I am not meeting work requirements. The letter is attached as# 1. 7. No one at DCFS told me how to satisfy work requirements. No one at DCFS told me that my medical status might make me unfit for work and eligible to keep getting food stamps. 8. When I got the December letter ending my food stamps, I spoke with a lawyer. They helped me request a fair hearing on December 12th In this fair hearing request, I informed DCFS about my medical status. 9. On December 16’1\\ I received a call from the Department of Children and Family Services. DCFS told me that my benefits would terminate on December 31st I applied for a fair hearing before the deadline outlined in my letter so that my benefits would continue until my hearing when they could determine how my medical status impacts my status to be exempted from the new work requirements. DCFS said that although I had applied for a fair hearing, my benefits would still terminate on the 31st 10. I provided DCFS with a letter from my doctor explaining my diagnosis and medications. DCFS said they wanted another letter from the doctor saying that my medications counteract with my diagnosis and impede my ability to work. 11. Because I can only work about ten (10) hours per week due to my medical condition, I don’t have enough income to support myself without assistance. I depend on food stamps to eat. I have to take medications for my medical condition. Taking these medications is a matter of life and death for me. I have to take them for the rest of my life. These medications must be taken along with food. I also have to eat to remain healthy. I need my food stamps to survive because I will be forced to choose between my life-saving medicines and food. 12. I am willing to serve as a class representative in this lawsuit on behalf of myself and other needy individuals living in Louisiana who face the loss of SNAP benefits to which they are entitled. 13. My lawyers have informed me of my responsibilities as a class representative. 14. [image: ]As a representative of a plaintiff class harmed by the same unlawful conduct, I am willing to protect and advance the interests of the plaintiff class rather than acting in my sole interest. Dated:12- lz 15\u00b7r r, ; f’age 1 DCFS ORLEANS- MIDTOWN -ES P.O. BOX260031 BATON ROUGE, LA 70826-0031 \/W\/&&f#c?bt – NEW ORLEANS, LA 70126 DATE: CASE ID: WORKER ID: CID: 12\/01\/2015 36 .. tt 9900 C16 001140033 [image: ]001834 . -, \u00b7\u00b7., .- SNAP CHANGE\/CLOSURE Dear JERICHO MACKLIN: Advance Notice of Adverse Action Expires: 12\/14\/2015 A.Et:8X careful c,,r1slderatlon of yol.lr situation, the following d!.::l:cision has been made regarding your Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) case, Your monthly benefit will end 12\/31\/2015 for the reasons given below. A member of your household has been disqualified due to a sanction. Your shelter expenses, which may include rent or mortgage, home insurance, prope:rty tax, utilities, or other shelter expenses, have changed. JERICHO MACKLIN is being disqualified beginning January as he or she has received SNAP benefits for 3 of 36 months without meeting the Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents(ABAWD) worJt requirement. SNAP requirements are that non-exempt able bodied persons\u00b7age 18 49 without dependents must work an average of 20 hours per week or participate in a job training program at least 20 hours per week. In order to regain eligibility for SNAP, he or she must work or participate in a job training program at least 80 hours in _a 30 day period or become exempt from the SNAP time limit. The receipt of a Louisiana Purchase Automated Benefit card does not mean you have been determined eligible for benefits. If you do receive this card, keep it to use if you are found eligible to receive benefits in the future. For more information abouc )?rog:rains and services or for s)?ecif1c information about your case, call 1-888- LAHELPU (1-888-524-3578). A child who is a member of a household receiving assistance froll) SNAP or FITAP may be eligible for free meal benefits at school. You should contact your local school for information on free meal benefits for school meals. FAIR HEARING EXP.Li\\JllATION CASE ID: 36 XXXXX9900 NAME: JERICHO MACKLIN If you disagree with the above decision, you may discuss it with a su)?ervisor in the local Department of Children and Family services. You may request a fair hearing but you must do so on or before ’02\/29\/2016.If your benefits are being reduced or closed and you request a fair Hearing on o-r before 12\/14\/2015, your benefits can be continued at the current level unless you indicate you do not want. them continued. If your benefits are continued, they will be Page 2 of: ..continued .at..that. level until thcffi;lz4t GW’M lf{jflll!fa-i)so.}. l$’c&-lo (bo-f!_.. 1: r,tiJ.Jvl;f o\/flQ,,,tl-1 WCJZ1. u.\u00a3_ \u00b7fn\/\u00a3..111(\/,, X lvtl1 k.{!\/lA {,t;{t- \” off\u00b7 f:ie.{‘4illl, \u00b7 c rn tef 11\/Cv\/:Jt , Tu 1f:1\/lffl..,,.J:\/24,.u,:,.iJ hdf,v 1!_-. c\\:J ; B, \u00b7 1,aH, ttlwa711 ttf!!yt111 jrYJ’!i_\u00b71 ut9rt1&7, do, c ! \/1:i;feih, r. J\/.tWl,, hll.d..\/Jad’fw:Ct\u00ae iii;qq1ar1LI y hJ.Ne, c’.dlilit Cj-, I lltMI a \/21trzllilw fl\/ttlifu.iof ,jdf4i}\/2111;n J;am 1vt.,f:!p1u1 to b. ,,tf!&,fo i e\u00a3b, [image: ]ii !Jea,1u6.v 14 2015′ !\u00b7 \u00b7, RAMl!flA. DECLARATION I, Greg ,hereby swears under pains and penalties of perjury as follows: 1. I make the following statement based on personal knowledge. 2. I am 30 years old with no dependents. I live in New Orleans, LA at Ozanam Inn. 3. On November 25, 2015, I applied for food stamps. I received a call the next week about my application. My caseworker explained that as of October, there were new work requirements for food stamps so I would have to work 20 hours a week continue getting food stamps passed three months. I told the worker that I did not think I would have a job in three months because it can take time to fiud work. I also told her that I am homeless and asked whether this would impact the work requirements. I have been homeless for 6 months. She said no, and that I would have to work or lose my food stamps. 4. The caseworker told me that I would have to prove that I am working. She didn’t tell me how I would show this proof. 5. My caseworker also did not explain that volunteering could qualify as work. I volunteer 60 hours a week at Ozanam Inn. 6. On December 7th, I received paperwork saying I qualified for food stamps. I also received the ABAWD work requirements notice stating I would have to work 20 hours a week in order to remain eligible. I was worried and wanted to figure out what was going on because I do not have a job right now. 7. On December 14’\”, I called Sima Atri, from the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice. She explained that I should record my volunteer hours because they would qualify as work. She also said that I should send this to DCFS to prove that I am meeting the work requirements. I have started recording my work hours and will send them to DCFS every month. 8. Based on the notice, it was unclear that I could do volunteer work in order to not lose my food stamps. It was also unclear what a \”work program\” was. I work at the front desk at Ozanam Inn so I see what mail comes in for other homeless residents in this shelter. It seems like many people are getting these notices and I do not think people know what they mean. I don’t even think they uuderstand that many will lose their food stamps in January. 9. The food stamps office also knows that I am homeless. I gave Ozanam Inn as my address when I applied and I was living there before I applied for food stamps. The caseworker did not ask me questions about my homeless status. 10. I have not yet received a closure notice since I have just started my first month of food stamps. I hope that because I am recording volunteer hours, I will be complying with the work requirements. 11. I was approved for food stamps on December 7th but on December 17th, I have yet to receive my card still. I am supposed to get $194 per month in food stamps in December. 12. I have no income right now and really need these food stamps until I can find a full-time job. I want to work, it just takes time to find work. [image: ]Dated: \/2-17.- 201$\”\” DECLARATION I, Kim Piper, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: 1. I make the following statements based on personal knowledge. 2. I am very active and involved in my community and have helped people my whole life. I am the President of the Iberville Resident Council in New Orleans and served on the Iberville redevelopment working team. I was a resident in Iberville for over 30 years, and have lived in the Ninth Ward for the last two years. 3. Some of what I do to help people in my community is providing rides to seniors to go to the food bank, helping people find housing, representing residents and our interests at Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) meetings, and helping young mothers obtain food stamps and childcare assistance. 4. In helping people with their food stamp applications, I have heard a lot of complaints about the way the food stamp office processes applications and recertifications, and have also experienced some of these problems directly. 5. The most common complaint I hear is that the food stamp office does not receive information that people send them. Whether sent in by mail or by fax, many times when people send in the information the food stamps office has asked for, the food stamp office says they have not received it. 6. One young woman I work with faxed her information to the food stamp office, and was told they had not received it. She told her caseworker that she had a copy of her fax confirmation sheet, and the caseworker told her that did not matter. 7. I have personally mailed information as part of a young woman’s food stamp application, and the food stamp office told her they did not receive it. 8. If the food stamp office does not receive information they requested for an application or recertification, the office will cut off the person’s food stamps. The person then has to start the application process over again, which can take 30 days. During those 30 days, the person is not receiving any food stamps and their children are hungry for a month. 9. It is also difficult sometimes for people to get more copies of documents they have already collected and sent to the food stamp office. For example if a person sent in their paystubs and the food stamp office lost them, they do not have another copy of them to send in again. 10. Another problem for my community is the requirement to have a phone interview for applications or recertifications. In the past a person could interview in person at the food stamp office, but this is no longer allowed. This is a big problem because a lot of the people in my community do not have a phone, making it very difficult to complete a necessary step in the application or recertification process. 11. The food stamp offices in New Orleans are not effective at working with members of my community or having policies that work well at getting people their food stamps. Dated: fu. l] , ;),o1,:,- Signed: \u00bdo Y,.’fl o rs) Kim Piper DECLARATION I, Kenitha Williams, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: 1. I make the following statements based on personal knowledge. 2. I work at the Lantern Light project, part of the Rebuild Center of St. Joseph’s Church in New Orleans. The Rebuild Center provides a setting, resources, and opportunities for collaboration among Catholic and other faith-based organizations in the City ofNew Orleans for the service of those in need. The services we provide include serving lunch daily, providing showers, restrooms, laundry, and toiletries, running a food pantry, and assisting individuals in finding employment. 3. The Rebuild Center assists homeless men and women in finding jobs. We post job openings on our job board, and assist people in looking for job openings, writing resumes, and filling out job applications. We also provide computers and internet access for people to apply for the increasing number of jobs that only accept online applications. 4. I work with a lot of who have had a really hard time finding a job. They very much want to work but are unable to find employment. 5. I work with clients who have come to the center frequently over the past year and applied for many jobs, and still have not been hired after a year of applying. 6. I know a lot of unemployed people in our area will lose their food stamps as a result of the state’s refusal to continue to give nutrition assistance to the unemployed. Because of that, we expect to have a significant increase in requests for food boxes after January 1, 2016. We have barely been able to keep up with requests for food all year long during 2015. Second Harvest Food Bank, which supplies food to programs like ours, is already overwhelmed by the need, so we have had to look elsewhere for donations – \u00b7 local churches and schools. People losing their food stamps will be forced to depend more on food pantries like ours, as well as soup kitchens and other feeding programs. 7. Existing job training programs do not adequately serve the homeless population. 8. Some job training programs, such as the one offered by the Goodwill, require participants to have a birth certificate. Many homeless people do not have their birth certificate. The Rebuild Center assists people in obtaining copies of their birth certificate, but the process can be very lengthy, more than three or four months, especially if the person was born outside the state of Louisiana. For homeless people without any form of identification, the process of obtaining a birth certificate is longer. 9. A job training program that would truly benefit the population I serve would include an offer of employment from a company upon completing the program. Existing job training programs often require participants to jump through a lot of hoops and do not succeed in placing people with an actual job. 10. Homeless individuals do not have mailing addresses, which causes difficulty in obtaining food stamps. The ability to receive mail from the food stamps office is necessary in order to successfully complete an application or recertification application for food stamps. 11. The Rebuild Center offers the service that homeless individuals can use our mailing address to receive mail from the food stamps office. However, because of our resource limitations we are not able to hold all mail indefinitely, so individuals must check with us at least once every six weeks to receive mail. Many homeless individuals are transient and unable to check with us that frequently. We occasionally have to return mail to the food stamp office if an individual has not come to claim their mail in more than six weeks. 12. The Rebuild Center currently has more than 200 individuals signed up to receive mail at our address. Our clients have also told us that workers at the food stamps office have told them they can receive mail at the Rebuild Center, without speaking to Rebuild Center staff or signing up for our mail service. 13. Even if an individual is able to receive their mail from the food stamps office, there are still often problems in applying or recertifying for food stamps. The population I serve experiences frequent frustrations and delays in their interactions with the food stamp office. Often times with the food stamp office it seems that the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. 14. Clients tell me that it can take up to 1-2 months to receive their food stamps card after their application has been approved. 15. A required step in the application and recertification processes is a phone interview with a caseworker. In the past, these interviews could take place in person in the food stamps office, but now they are required to be over the phone. However, many people do not have phones. 16. Another common problem I hear from my clients is that they receive notice of their interview date after that date has already passed. And if the notice of the interview does arrive before the interview date, often the caseworker does not actually call at the date and time stated on the interview notice, but later in the day or the next day. 17. Many clients have also told me that the food stamp office does not receive paperwork that individuals send it. Many people have told me that they faxed paperwork to the food stamps office for their application or recertification and the office claimed they never received it. I have helped people fax information to the food stamp office from our fax machine at the Rebuild Center, and seen them successfully fax the same information five or six times, only to have the food stamp office say that they have not received it. 18. The decision to add a work requirement for adults to receive food stamps will only exacerbate the problems faced by the homeless population of New Orleans. Food Stamps are desperately needed by the population of homeless men and women that the Rebuild Center serves. DECLARATION I, Colette Tippy, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct: 1. I make the following statements based on personal knowledge. 2. I am an organizer with STAND with Dignity, a membership-based project of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice in New Orleans. The New Orleans Workers’ Center is a non-profit advocacy organization that works to defend the rights of low\u00ad income workers and to increase community participation in public policy initiatives. 3. I have been working with low-income residents in New Orleans since 2006. 4. STAND works with low-wage and unemployed workers to provide know your rights education, to defend the rights of community members, and to promote just, equitable, and inclusive public policy. Stand’s members include public housing and Section 8 tenants, formerly incarcerated community members, men and women, young and old, working together to address the Black Jobs Crisis in New Orleans. Statistics show fifty-two percent of Black men are out of work in New Orleans. My experience confirms that it is very difficult for workers to find and keep a permanent job in this economy doing low-wage work, and especially hard to keep full time work. 5. My understanding is that the new work requirements will affect over 7000 New Orleans residents. The loss of benefits will not only hurt residents who rely on the support, it will hurt our city’s economy since food stamps recipients use their benefits in local businesses. 6. STAND has at least four members who received notice that their food stamps would be cut off on January 1, 2016, if they are not able to meet new work requirements. Two of these members are receiving their mail from the food stamps office at our office because they are homeless or marginally housed. 7. I have reviewed the letters our members received, and they do not include language about possibility of doing volunteer work to satisfy the new work requirement. The members who received these letters were not aware of how to comply with the new requirements when they received the letter, and are still not clear about what they need to do to comply now. 8. STAND members and other low-income people I have spoken with have told me that the food stamps office is not effective in the way they process applications and re\u00ad certifications. 9. The food stamps office has an ineffective system for receiving communications from people applying and recertifying. I have talked to numerous people who were cut off from their food stamps because the food stamps office claimed they did not receive a communication from a recertification, whether sent by fax or email or submitted online or in person when the recipients did in fact provide the necessary notification. 10. Many food stamp recipients I have spoken to have never seen their caseworker in person. 11. I have not met anyone who was given an individual assessment to determine if they are in fact subject to the new work requirement. 12. Residents I have spoken to understand that the state’s decision to not request a waiver of the work requirements is based in the goal of incentivizing people to work. I have been working with low-wage workers to increase employment opportunities for almost a decade, and I do not believe this approach will work. It will instead cause more harm to vulnerable people. 13. The notice provided to persons identified by DCFS as ABAWDs does not direct recipients to appropriate training programs or resources for job placement. The state’s stated interest in this program will not be served by this type of notice which does not provide additional employment opportunities to recipients. New Orleans needs jobs, and needs jobs that actually pay a living wage and are enough to actually support a family. Those opportunities are very difficult to find in Louisiana. 14. [image: ]STAND is eager to work with the State to apply for Employment and Training funds, and would like to work together to design better programs that actually work. An effective job training program places graduates in jobs. Training programs should offer guaranteed employment upon completion. The state should create these types of training programs; but they should not be created at the expense of critical baseline supports like the SNAP program. [image: ]Dated: Declaration under 28 USC 1746 I, Don Everard, do state under penalty of perjury of the laws of the US that the following is true and correct. 1. I have been the Director of Hope House, a catholic social service agency in the Irish Channel of New Orleans for 30 years. Hope House was founded by members of the Sisters of Mercy in 1969 and has been serving poor and working people of our neighborhood and city continuously since then. We have a food pantry that provides emergency food boxes for neighbors in need of food. We provide direct assistance to people facing eviction or utility turn off. We provide very affordable housing for low income households. Our job coach helps people find employment or enroll in college. We serve coffee and pastry to homeless people three mornings each week. We also operate a GED program. 2. Hope House sees a lot of people because our poverty rate in New Orleans is so high with more than one in every four people living in poverty. Loyola University estimated in 2013 that only 48 percent of African American men in New Orleans are employed. 3. As a result of working with poor people in our city for decades, I am personally familiar with hundreds of people who rely on SNAP food stamps to feed themselves or their families. Many are long term unemployed and many do not have stable living arrangements. Most are people who have tried very hard to support themselves by working over the years. But they struggle because of literacy challenges, inadequate educational opportunity, inadequate availability of care for physical and mental health issues, and the fact that unemployment is very high in our city. The homeless and those without stable housing have their days consumed with just trying to survive. They cannot get regular jobs when they carry their clothing and possessions around with them. 4. I know a lot of unemployed people in our area will lose their food stamps as a result of the state’s refusal to continue to give nutrition assistance to the unemployed. Because of that, we expect to have a significant increase in requests for food boxes after January 1, 2016. We have barely been able to keep up with requests for food all year long during 2015. Second Harvest Food Bank, which supplies food to programs like ours, is already overwhelmed by the need, so we have had to look elsewhere for donations – local churches and schools. People losing their food stamps will be forced to depend more on food pantries like ours, as well as soup kitchens and other feeding programs. 5. The decision not to seek SNAP benefits for the unemployed from the federal government will only add to a hunger crisis that already exists. And food pantries and feeding programs are already struggling to provide food to needy families. Nobody wins in this situation. [image: ] Don Everard Date N00 160 c Sen) aed Es Sen) aed Es em ee eS Al Ne A ET AE LOM Ap Lt siened: Ov en (Cif. Coumse,. | Weve Weer Ce eee ote. ‘Adine Wow Verh ca fon af Fai WOU \u00ab ee Ye Jywedte s fv December.’ Tegliea Cand qnature Coumse,. | Weve Weer Ce eee ote. ‘Adine Wow Verh ca fon af Fai WOU \u00ab ee Ye Jywedte s fv December.’ Tegliea Cand qnature AO AL hha AO AL hha Dated: LY 19\/ VOpe ie D4 Marten CUIBLITA METI Signed: (PLINY v arate Cl Cverurell lhirhe lhirhe ”

pdf Smith v. USDA, USDA failure to issue benefits if there is a government shutdown

In Welfare Complaint Library 1936 downloads

Download (pdf, 266 KB)

Smith v. USDA.pdf

” Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page1 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page2 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page3 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page4 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page5 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page6 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page7 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page8 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page9 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page10 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page11 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page12 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page13 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page14 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page15 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page16 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page17 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page18 of 18 ”

pdf Smith v. USDA, Federal Food Stamp Class Action Law Suit

In Welfare Complaint Library 1850 downloads

Download (pdf, 263 KB)

Smith v. USDA .pdf

” Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page1 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page2 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page3 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page4 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page5 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page6 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page7 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page8 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page9 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page10 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page11 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page12 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page13 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page14 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page15 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page16 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page17 of 18 Case3:15-cv-04497 Document1 Filed09\/30\/15 Page18 of 18 ”

pdf Soza v. Lightbourne – CDSS Answer Complaint for Writ of Mandate, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In Welfare Complaint Library 1266 downloads

Download (pdf, 1.28 MB)

Soza v. Lightbourne – CDSS Answer Complaint for Writ of Mandate, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief..pdf

” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California RICHARD T. WALDOW Supervising Deputy Attorney General GREGORY M. CRIBBS Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 175642 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Telephone: (213) 269-6259 Fax: (213) 897-2805 E-mail: [email protected] Attorneys for Respondents California Department of Social Services and Will Lightbourne, in his official capacity as Director, California Department of Social Services Fee Exempt Per Govt. Code 6103 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT JOE SOZA, ESTHER ORTEGA, Petitioners, v. WILL LIGHTBOURNE, in his official capacity as Director, California Department of Social Services; and the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondents. Case No. BS172114 RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Code Civ. Proc. Sections 1085 AND 1094.5; Welf. & Inst. Code Section 10962) Dept: 86 Judge: Hon. Amy D. Hogue Action Filed: January 22, 2018 COME NOW respondents Will Lightbourne, as Director of the California Department of Social Services, and the California Department of Social Services (collectively, Department or respondents), in response to the \”First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief [Code of Civ. Proc., 1094.5, 1085; Welf. & Inst. Code 10962]\” (Petition), in the above-captioned action, and admit, deny and allege as follows: 1. Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Petition, the Department asserts that there are no allegations contained therein that require admission or denial, and on that basis Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. To the extent that it can be construed that paragraph 1 of the Petition contains proper allegations, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged in paragraph 1 of the Petition, and on that basis denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. 2. Answering the allegations in the first and second sentences of paragraph 2 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation contained within the first and second sentences of paragraph 2 of the Petition. Answering the allegations in the third sentence of paragraph 2 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that on January 17, 2017, it adopted the Proposed Decision (Case No. 2016273045), denying petitioner Soza’s request for reimbursement of stolen CalFresh benefits in the amounts of $17.19, $61.66, $10.31, and $76.22. The Department further asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decision. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 2 of the Petition. 3. Answering the allegations in the first and second sentences of paragraph 3 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and an that basis denies each and every allegation contained within the first and second sentences of paragraph 3 of the Petition. Answering the allegations in the third sentence of paragraph 3 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that on August 22, 2017, it adopted the Proposed Decision (Case No. 2017151334), denying petitioner Ortega’s request for reimbursement of stolen CalFresh benefits in the amounts of $81.13, $32.01, $115.45, and $112.21. The Department further asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and 2 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (Bg172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decision. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 3 of the Petition. 4. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 4 of the Petition. 5. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 5 of the Petition. 6. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the Petition. 7. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Petition. 8. Answering the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of paragraph 8 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies the first and second sentences of paragraph 8 of the Petition. The Department denies the allegations contained in the third sentence of paragraph 8 of the Petition. Answering the allegations contained in the fourth sentence of paragraph 8 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that administrative hearings were held on December 20, 2016 (Case No. 2016273045) and on July 3, 2017 (Case No. 2017151334), which resulted in the adoption of Proposed Decisions on January 17, 2017 (Case No. 2016273045) and on August 22, 2017 (Case No. 2017151334), respectively. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Petition regarding the Proposed Decisions, the Department asserts that the Proposed Decisions speak for themselves, and therefore the allegations regarding them do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the 3 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decisions. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the Petition. 9. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 9 of the Petition. 10. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient infoiiiiation or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 10 of the Petition. 11. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 11 of the Petition. 12. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 12 of the Petition. 13. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 13 of the Petition. 14. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 14 of the Petition. 15. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 15 of the Petition. 4 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 16. Answering the allegations contained in the first, second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph 16 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation contained in the first, second, third, and fourth sentences of paragraph 16 of the Petition. Answering the allegations contained in the fifth sentence of paragraph 16 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that petitioner Joe Soza requested an administrative hearing on September 21, 2016, and that an administrative hearing (Case No. 2016273045) was held on December 20, 2016. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in the fifth sentence of paragraph 16 of the Petition. 17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize ACL 13-67 or the November 22, 2016 denial notices, no admission or denial thereof is required because the ACL and denial notices speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of ACL 13-67 or the November 22, 2016, denial notices. 18. The Department admits the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Petition. 19. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that an administrative hearing was held on December 20, 2016 (Case No. 2016273045) which resulted in the adoption of a Proposed Decision on January 17, 2017. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of the Petition regarding the Proposed Decision, the Department asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed 5 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Decision. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 19 of the Petition. 20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Petition regarding the Proposed Decision, the Department asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decision. 21. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 21 of the Petition. 22. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 22 of the Petition. 23. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 23 of the Petition. 24. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 24 of the Petition. 25. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 25 of the Petition. 26. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 26 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 26 of the Petition. 6 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 27. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 27 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 27 of the Petition. 28. Answering the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Petition, to the extent that these . allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize the April 21, 2017 denial notices, no admission or denial thereof is required because the denial notices speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the April 21, 2017, denial notices. 29. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 29 of the Petition. 30. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 30 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 30 of the Petition. 31. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 31 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 31 of the Petition. 32. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 32 of the Petition, the Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged therein, and on that basis denies each and every allegation of paragraph 32 of the Petition. 33. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 33 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that petitioner Esther Ortega requested an administrative hearing on May 24, 2017, and that an administrative hearing (Case No. 2017151334) was held on July 3, 7 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2017. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 33 of the Petition. 34. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the Petition, the Department affilinatively asserts that an administrative hearing was held on July 3, 2017 (Case No. 2017151334) which resulted in the adoption of a Proposed Decision on August 22, 2017. In response to the allegations contained in paragraph 34 of the Petition regarding the Proposed Decision, the Department asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decision. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in paragraph 34 of the Petition. 35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Petition regarding the Proposed Decision, the Department asserts that the Proposed Decision speaks for itself, and therefore the allegations regarding it do not require admission or denial. If a response is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the Proposed Decision. 36. Answering the allegations contained in the first and second sentences of paragraph 36 of the Petition, the Department admits the allegations contained therein. Answering the allegations contained in the third sentence of paragraph 36 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 7 U.S.C. 2011, no admission or denial thereof is required because the federal code speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the code. 37. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 7 U.S.C. 2013(c), 7 C.F.R. 8 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 272.2(a)(2), and\/or 7 C.F.R. 276.1(a)(2), no admission or denial thereof is required because the federal code and regulations speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the code and\/or regulations. 38. Answering the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 38 of the Petition, the Department admits the allegations contained therein. Answering the allegations contained in the second and third sentences of paragraph 38 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize the Department’s Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) Division 63 and the case of Gregory v. State Bd. of Control (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 584, 595, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP and case law speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MMP and\/or case law. 39. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 39 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 63-101.1, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations contained therein. 40. The Department admits the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Petition. 41. The Department denies the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Petition. 42. Answering the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 42 of the Petition, the Department affirmatively asserts that Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 22, 1996. Except as affirmatively asserted herein, the Department denies each and every remaining allegation contained in the first sentence of paragraph 42 of the Petition. Answering the allegations contained in the second and third sentences of paragraph 42 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to 9 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 16-001.1, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the 11\/IMP. 43. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 43 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code sections 10065, et al. and 10553(b), (e), and MPP sections 16-001.2 and 16-001.3, no admission or denial thereof is required because the statutes and MPP speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the statutes or MPP. 44. Answering the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 44 of the Petition, the Department denies the allegations contained therein. Answering the allegations contained in the second and third sentences of paragraph 44 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 16-501.1, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP. 45. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 45 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 10065(b), no admission or denial thereof is required because the statute speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the statute. 46. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 7 C.F.R. section 271.2, no admission or denial thereof is required because the federal regulation speaks for itself. To the 10 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the federal regulation. 47. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 63-102(a)(1), no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP. 48. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 48 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 7 C.F.R. section 274.8(b)(9), no admission or denial thereof is required because the federal regulation speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the federal regulation. 49. The Department denies the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Petition 50. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 50 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 63-603.1 and\/or Government Code section 29853.5, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP and statute speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP and\/or statute. 51. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 51 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 63-603.12, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP. 11 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 52. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 52 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP section 63-603.15, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP. 53. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 53 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize MPP. section 63-603.2, no admission or denial thereof is required because the MPP speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the MPP. 54. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 54 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 7 C.F.R. section 276.2(b)(7), no admission or denial thereof is required because the federal regulation speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations contained therein. 55. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 55 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 15125,110 admission or denial thereof is required because the statute speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations contained therein. 56. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 56 of the Petition. 57. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 57 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 10500, 7 U.S.C. section 2016(h), 7 C.F.R. sections 274.8(a)(1)(ix) and (b)(3), and Government Code section 29853.5, no admission or denial thereof is required because the 12 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) statutes, federal codes, and federal regulations speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations contained therein. 58. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 58 of the Petition. 59. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 59 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 10072(i)(1), no admission or denial thereof is required because the statute speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations contained therein. 60. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 60 of the Petition. 61. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 61 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize All County Information Notice (ACIN) No. 1-25-031, dated April 16, 2003, no admission or denial thereof is required because the ACIN speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the ACIN. 62. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 62 of the Petition. 63. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 63 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize 2012 Assembly Bill (AB) 2035, no admission or denial thereof is required because the bill speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of AB 2035. 64. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 64 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize AB 2035 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 10072(i)(2)-(3), no admission or denial thereof is required because the 1 The Petition mistakenly refers to ACIN No. 1-25-02. 13 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) bill and statute speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of AB 2035 and the statute. 65. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 65 of the Petition. 66. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 66 of the Petition. 67. Answering the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize ACL 13-67, no admission or denial thereof is required because the ACL speaks for itself. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of ACL 13-67. 68. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 68 of the Petition. 69. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 69 of the Petition. 70. Answering the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, no admission or denial thereof is required because the statutes speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the statutes. 71. In response to paragraph 71 of the Petition, the Department asserts that there are no allegations contained therein that require admission or denial, and on that basis denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. To the extent that it can be construed that paragraph 71 of the Petition contains proper allegations, the Department denies each and every purported allegation that differs from the plain language of the statute. 72. Answering the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Welfare and Institutions Code section 10600, no admission or denial thereof is required because the statute speaks for itself. To the 14 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the statute. 73. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 73 of the Petition. 74. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 74 of the Petition. 75. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 75 of the Petition. 76. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 76 of the Petition. 77. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 77 of the Petition. 78. Answering the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Petition, to the extent that these allegations purport to paraphrase, interpret, or characterize Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5 or 42 U.S.C. 1983, no admission or denial thereof is required because the statutes and federal code speak for themselves. To the extent an admission or denial is required, the Department denies all allegations that differ from the plain language of the statutes or federal code and specifically denies that it has violated any state or federal laws. 79. The Department admits the allegations contained in paragraph 79 of the Petition. 80. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 80 of the Petition. 81. In response to paragraph 81 of the Petition, the Department asserts that there are no allegations contained therein that require admission or denial, and on that basis denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. To the extent that it can be construed that paragraph 81 of the Petition contains proper allegations, the Department incorporates by reference each and every response in this Answer as though fully set forth herein. 82. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 82 of the Petition. 83. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 83 of the Petition. 84. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 84 of the Petition. 85. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 85 of the Petition. 15 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 86. In response to paragraph 86 of the Petition, the Department asserts that there are no allegations contained therein that require admission or denial, and on that basis denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. To the extent that it can be construed that paragraph 86 of the Petition contains proper allegations, the Department incorporates by reference each and every response in this Answer as though fully set forth herein. 87. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 87 of the Petition. 88. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 88 of the Petition. 89. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 89 of the Petition. 90. In response to paragraph 90 of the Petition, the Department asserts that there are no allegations contained therein that require admission or denial, and on that basis denies each and every purported allegation contained therein. To the extent that it can be construed that paragraph 90 of the Petition contains proper allegations, the Department incorporates by reference each and every response in this Answer as though fully set forth herein. 91. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 91 of the Petition. 92. The Department lacks sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny the matters alleged in paragraph 92 of the Petition, and on that basis denies each and every allegation contained therein. 93. The Department denies the allegations contained in paragraph 93 of the Petition. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Because the Petition is couched in conclusionary terms, the Department cannot anticipate fully all affirmative defenses that may be applicable to this matter. Accordingly, the Department hereby reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses, if and to the extent such affirmative defenses are applicable. 16 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (B5172114) SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Department asserts that petitioners have failed to allege facts sufficient to form the basis for the court’s issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 against the Department. THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE The Department asserts that petitioners have failed to allege facts sufficient to form the basis for the court’s issuance of a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 against the Department. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Petitioners received all due process required under the law. FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE At all times relevant herein, the Department acted within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion, with due care, in good faith fulfillment of its responsibility pursuant to applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and practices, within the bounds of reason under all the circumstances known to it, and with the good faith belief that its actions comported with all applicable federal and state laws. SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Petitioners lacks standing to assert the purported claims alleged in the second and third causes of action. WHEREFORE, respondents pray as follows: a. That the Petition be denied; b. That petitioners take nothing by way of their Petition and that judgment thereon be entered in favor of respondents; c. That respondents be awarded their costs of suit herein; 17 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) d. That this Court issue a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632; and e. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: August 2018 LA2018600945 62909851.docx Respectfully submitted, IER BECERRA ey General of California RD T. WALDOW g Deputy Attorney General GREGORY M. CRIBBS Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Respondents California Department of Social Services and Will Lightbourne, in his official capacity as Director, California Department of Social Services 18 Respondents’ Answer to First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, etc. (BS172114) DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: Javier Porras v. Will Lightbourne, California Department of Social Services, et al. Case No.: BS1722114 I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member’s direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United ‘ . Stat7eS Postal Serice. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal ,Mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States ‘Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business. On August 14, 2018, I served the attached RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF AND COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Code Civ. Proc. Sections 1085 And 1094.5; Welf. & Inst. Code Section 10962) by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013, addressed as follows: Mr. Alexander Prieto Mr. Andrew Kazakes Mr. Richard Rothschld Mr. Tyler Sutherland WESTERN CENTER OF LAW AND Ms. Yolanda Arias POVERTY LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS 3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 208 ANGELES Los Angeles, California 90010 5228 Whittier Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90022 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August 14, 2018, at Los Angeles, California. Veronica Sawers VX\/4\/4,_ Declarant signature LA2018600945 62919298.docx IL. ,I ”

pdf Soza v. Lightbourne – Complaint for Writ of Mandate, Declaratory and Injunctive – Replacing Stolen Food Stamps Relief

In Welfare Complaint Library 1977 downloads

Download (pdf, 1.72 MB)

Soza v. Lightbourne – Complaint for Writ of Mandate, Declaratory and Injunctive – Replacing Stolen Food Stamps Relief.pdf

” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Andrew Kazakes, SBN 277912 Tyler Sutherland, SBN 287337 Yolanda Arias, SBN 130025 LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES 5228 Whittier Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90022 Telephone: (213) 640-3944 Facsimile: (213) 640-3911 Email: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Alexander Prieto, SBN 270864 Richard A. Rothschild, SBN 67356 WESTERN CENTER ON LAW & POVERTY 3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 208 Los Angeles, CA 90010 Telephone: Facsimile: Email: (213) 235-2614 (213) 487-0242 [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for JOE SOZA and ESTHER ORTEGA No allicAjzF j5 ttlEd4 per WA` TE* rgia)for a Code 10962 -2′ MAR 2 7 2018 Sherri H. framer, executive Officer\/Clerk By Michael Rivera, Deputy SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES JOE SOZA; ESTHER ORTEGA Petitioners, v. ) Case No.: BS 172114 ) FIRST AMENDED PETITION ) FOR WRIT OF MANDATE ) AND COMPLAINT FOR ) DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE WILL LIGHTBOURNE, in his official capacity as ) RELIEF Director, California Department of Social Services; ) and the CALIFORNIA ) [Code of Civ. Proc. 1094.5, 1085; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES ) Welf. & Inst. Code 10962] Respondents. ) Dept.: 86 ) Judge: Hon. Amy D. Hogue ) Action filed: Jan. 22, 2018 ) Answer: Not filed FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 INTRODUCTION 1 Petitioners JOE SOZA and ESTHER ORTEGA bring this action to challenge the Respondents’, WILL LIGHTBOURNE and the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES’ (CDSS), decisions upholding the denial of the restoration of their electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. 2. Petitioner Joe Soza was a CalFresh and General Relief (GR) recipient at the time of the allegations contained herein and accessed his food and cash benefits through an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card. In early September 2016, while under curfew at a sober living facility, Mr. Soza was the victim of electronic benefits theft, losing nearly all of his monthly food and cash benefits through a series of early morning, unauthorized transactions despite retaining sole possession of his physical EBT card. After promptly reporting the theft to the EBT helpline and filing a police report, his cash benefits were restored but his request for restored CalFresh benefits was denied. 3. Petitioner ESTHER ORTEGA is and was a CalFresh and CalWORKs recipient at the time of the allegations contained herein and accessed her food and cash benefits through an EBT card. In early April 2017, Ms. Ortega was the victim of electronic benefits theft, losing nearly all of her monthly food and cash benefits through a series of early morning, unauthorized transactions despite retaining sole possession of her physical EBT card. After promptly reporting the theft to the EBT helpline and filing a police report, her cash benefits were restored but her request for restored CalFresh benefits was denied. PARTIES 4. Petitioner JOE SOZA was a CalFresh recipient whose request for restoration of electronically stolen food benefits was denied by Respondents, and has exhausted his 2 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 administrative remedies in seeking reversal of this erroneous denial. Mr. SOZA resided in Los Angeles County at all times relevant to these proceedings. Mr. Soza subsequently relocated to Arizona. 5. Petitioner ESTHER ORTEGA is and was a CalFresh recipient whose request for restoration of electronically stolen food benefits was denied by Respondents, and has exhausted her administrative remedies in seeking reversal of this erroneous denial. Ms. ORTEGA resided in Los Angeles County at all times relevant to these proceedings. 6. The Respondent, WILL LIGHTBOURNE, is the Director of the California Department of Social Services. As Director, he is charged under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10553 with administering the CalFresh program. His duties with respect to the CalFresh program are partially set out in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 18900, et seq. The Respondents must comply with both state and federal law. The Respondent WILL LIGHTBOURNE is sued in his official capacity. 7. The Respondent, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (CDSS), is the single state agency responsible for supervising the administration of public social services in California, including the CalFresh program, in order to secure full compliance with applicable state and federal laws. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600. For Los Angeles County, the Respondents delegated responsibility for administration of the CalFresh program to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). At all relevant times, DPSS was and is the agent of the Respondents. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 8. Petitioners JOE SOZA and ESTHER ORTEGA have each been the victims of electronic benefit \”skimming\” theft by which their EBT account numbers and PIN codes were 3 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 illegally obtained and used to steal Petitioners’ cash and food benefits through unauthorized EBT transactions, despite the fact that Petitioners maintained possession of their EBT cards and account information at all times. Both Petitioners timely reported the thefts to the EBT helpline and filed police reports. In both cases, Petitioners’ cash benefits were promptly restored, but Respondents refused to restore any CalFresh benefits, in contravention of California and federal regulations. Petitioners requested state fair hearings, and in both cases Respondents\u2014although it was undisputed that Petitioners were victims of theft\u2014upheld the denials of Petitioners’ requests for restoration of their electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. Petitioner Joe Soza 9. Petitioner JOE SOZA resided at Action Sober Living Homes, 5149 Cavanagh Road, Los Angeles, CA 90032 at the time of the allegations contained herein. Since June 2016, Mr. Soza received CalFresh and GR benefits through the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). He accessed both his food and cash benefits through an EBT card. 10. On September 3, 2016 at approximately 1:33 AM, Mr. Soza’s GR and CalFresh accounts were credited with his monthly benefit allotments, $221.00 for GR and $194 for CalFresh. 1 1. Within a few hours, there were four unauthorized transactions using Mr. Soza’s benefits. At 4:12 AM in a Rite Aid Store located at 21949 Ventura Blvd. in Woodland Hills, there was a $17.19 transaction from Mr. Soza’s CalFresh account. One minute later, at the same location, there was a cash purchase made, with cash back, from Mr. Soza’s GR account totaling $129.25. Two hours later, at 6:23 AM in the same Rite Aid, another cash purchase with cash back from Mr. Soza’s GR account occurred in the amount of $47.95. A little more than an hour after that, at 7:39 AM at the same Rite Aid, there was yet another cash purchase with cash back made 4 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 from Mr. Soza’s GR account in the amount of $41.41. These cash purchases consumed $218.61 of Mr. Soza’s $221 GR benefits for September. 12. Over the subsequent two days, there were three additional unauthorized transactions from Mr. Soza’s CalFresh account, all of them again from the same Rite Aid store in Woodland Hills. These included: a $61.66 food purchase on September 4 at 2:45 AM, a $10.31 food purchase on September 5 at 2:23 AM, and a $76.22 food purchase on September 5 at 4:15 PM. In total, Mr. Soza had $165.38 stolen from his CalFresh account. All of these unauthorized transactions were performed by \”keying\” the account number and PIN code at the point of sale device without swiping a physical card. 13. Mr. Soza was the victim of electronic benefits theft. At all times he remained in possession of his EBT card and never distributed his account number or PIN code to anyone. Mr. Soza lived by himself at Action Sober Living Homes. 14. Action Sober Living Homes is a structured sober living home with mandatory curfews. Mr. Soza was required to be at home between 10:00 PM and 5:30 AM Sunday through Thursday, and 12:00 AM to 5:30 AM Friday and Saturday. Mr. Soza remained in full compliance during his entire time at Action Sober Living Homes, as confirmed in writing by Program Director Robert Anderson. Mr. Soza has never been to Woodland Hills, nor to the Woodland Hills Rite Aid store where the unauthorized transactions occurred. 15. On information and belief, Mr. Soza was the victim of \”skimming\” fraud, a technique by which a thief surreptitiously acquires a victim’s EBT or debit card account number and PIN code information. This is often accomplished by installing a false casing onto a point of sale card reader to intercept account information, often in conjunction with a discreet camera that visually records victims keying their PIN codes. The electronic thief then uses this information to 5 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 misappropriate the victim’s benefits by either creating and using a \”cloned\” physical EBT or debit card, or by conducting \”keyed\” transactions at point-of-sale devices in the complete absence of a physical card. With advances in technology, this foiin of fraud has become increasingly common. 16. Mr. Soza realized that his benefits had been stolen within days of the theft when he tried to withdraw cash and was unexpectedly notified that there were no funds available in his account. On or about September 5 or 6, Mr. Soza immediately tried to report the theft at a local DPSS office located downtown near an outpatient program that he attended, but he was told to go to the Wilshire office instead to follow up about the issue. Around the same time, he called the EBT customer service helpline to report the theft, but was told to go file a police report and go to the Wilshire office, instead of being allowed to file a dispute claim on the spot. After several trips between the police department and the Wilshire office, Mr. Soza obtained assistance from the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, which assisted Mr. Soza with reporting the theft to DPSS and filing a police report on September 15. On September 21, a request for hearing regarding Mr. Soza’s stolen CalFresh was submitted to DPSS along with a report of electronic theft. Mr. Soza’s case was assigned administrative hearing number 2016273045. 17. Based on the theft reported in the case complaint, Mr. Soza’s cash aid was promptly restored. However, Respondents refused to restore Mr. Soza’s CalFresh benefits, even though they were stored on the same electronic account and were stolen as part of the same series of unauthorized transactions between September 3 and 5, 2016. While the first hearing date was pending in this matter, counsel for Mr. Soza was notified that according to ACL 13-67, Mr. Soza was required to initiate a separate dispute claim through the EBT customer helpline with respect to his CalFresh benefits, even though he had previously reported the theft and had already called the EBT customer helpline. Nonetheless, Counsel for Mr. Soza requested a postponement in order to 6 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 exhaust this additional administrative process, and assisted Mr. Soza in submitting these four dispute claims. On November 22, 2016, Mr. Soza received three denial notices with respect to these four dispute claims, with one of the four claims erroneously omitted. The basis for the denials was that no system error had occurred. 18. Mr. Soza attended the December 20, 2016 hearing and provided sworn testimony. 19. On January 17, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Eli Palomares issued a decision that was adopted by the Respondents. The decision accepted the undisputed evidence that Mr. Soza was the victim of electronic benefits theft, but upheld the Respondents’ denial of the reimbursement for Mr. Soza’s electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. 20. The decision is based on the conclusions, challenged in this Petition, that: (1) Manual of Policies and Procedures Section 63-603.115(c) does not provide for the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits; and (2) Welfare & Institutions Code 10072, as amended in 2012 by A.B. 2035, should be interpreted as expressly excluding restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits, contrary to the stated intent of this legislation to expand\u2014not narrow\u2014 crime victims’ access to restored subsistence welfare benefits in instances of such theft. 21. Judge Palomares’ written decision was received on January 20, 2017. Petitioner Esther Ortega 22. Petitioner ESTHER ORTEGA resides and resided in Whittier California at the time of the allegations contained herein. Ms. Ortega is a victim of domestic violence, and has been a recipient of Cal WORKs and CalFresh benefits on and off over the last seventeen years through DPSS. Ms. Ortega does not drive. She accesses and accessed both food and cash benefits through an EBT card. 7 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 23. On April 2, 2017, at approximately 12:58 AM and 1:23 AM, Ms. Ortega’s CalFresh benefits and CalWORKs benefits were deposited with her monthly allotments, $625 and $577, respectively. 24. At 9:08 PM on April 2, 2017 $280 in CalWORKs benefits was stolen from Ms. Ortega’s account at an ATM at 7568 Lankershim Blvd., North Hollywood and on April 3, 2017 at 12:25 PM another $60 in cash benefits was stolen at an ATM located at 6015 Franklin Ave, Los Angeles. 25. On April 9, 2017 there were four unauthorized transactions on Ms. Ortega’s EBT account. $81.13 in CalFresh benefits was stolen at 9:35 AM at a CVS store located at 861 North Vine Street, Hollywood, CA 90038. $115.45 in CalFresh benefits was stolen at 9:04 AM at a Ralphs Grocery Store located at 7257 Sunset Blvd., West Hollywood, CA 90046. $32.01 in CalFresh benefits was stolen at 9:09 AM at Ralphs Grocery Store located at 7257 Sunset Blvd., West Hollywood, CA 90046. Finally, $112.21 in CalFresh benefits was stolen at 9:39 AM at a Ralphs Grocery Store located at 1233 N. La Brea, West Hollywood, CA 90046. 26. On April 11, 2017 Ms. Ortega went to use her benefits and discovered the discrepancy in her balance, and called the EBT customer service helpline to report these thefts. She reported the six unauthorized transactions (two CalWORKs and four CalFresh) and cancelled her EBT Card. 27. On April 12, 2017 Ms. Ortega reported the thefts to DPSS and received a replacement EBT card. 28. DPSS issued three Denial Notices dated April 21, 2017 denying Ms. Ortega’s request for replacement of the funds withdrawn from her EBT CalFresh account on April 9, 2017. 8 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 The theft of $81.13 was erroneously omitted. The basis for the denials was that no system error had occurred. 29. On April 25, 2017 Ms. Ortega filed a police report. 30. Ms. Ortega was the victim of electronic benefits theft. At all times she remained in possession of her EBT card and never distributed her account number or PIN code to anyone. Ms. Ortega does not drive, and the unauthorized transactions all took place over twenty miles from her home. 31. On information and belief, Ms. Ortega was the victim of electronic benefit \”skimming\” fraud. 32. DPSS reimbursed Ms. Ortega for the stolen CalWORKs cash benefits. 33. On May 24, 2017 Ms. Ortega submitted a request for hearing to challenge DPSS’s denial of her request for CalFresh reimbursement. An administrative hearing was held on July 3, 2017, where Ms. Ortega’s sworn affidavit was submitted as evidence. 34. On August 22, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Jonathan Huang issued a decision that was adopted by the Respondents. The decision upheld the Respondents’ denial of the reimbursement of Ms. Ortega’s electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. 35. The decision is based on the conclusions, challenged in this Petition, that: (1) Manual of Policies and Procedures Section 63-603.115(c) does not provide for the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits; and (2) Welfare & Institutions Code 10072, as amended in 2012 by A.B. 2035, should be interpreted as expressly excluding restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits, contrary to the stated intent of this legislation to expand\u2014not narrow\u2014 crime victims’ access to restored subsistence welfare benefits in instances of such theft. 9 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK CalFresh Benefits Program 36. CalFresh is a California state benefits program that provides monthly benefits to low-income households for purchasing food to maintain adequate nutritional levels. It was formerly known as the Food Stamp program, and is part of the federally authorized Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Congress has declared that the primary purpose of the SNAP program is to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by reducing hunger and malnutrition among the Nation’s low-income households. 7 U.S.C. 2011. 37. Federal law requires that state agencies participating in the SNAP program comply with all SNAP statutes, regulations, and rules. 7 U.S.C. 2013(c); 7 C.F.R. 272.2(a)(2); 7 C.F.R. 276.1(a)(2). 38. In California, the CalFresh benefits program is governed by Welfare & Institutions Code Section 18900 et seq. CDSS administers the CalFresh program under the regulations contained in Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP) Division 63. Respondents have a ministerial duty to comply with their own rules and regulations. Gregory v. State Bd. of Control, 73 Cal. App. 4th 584, 595 (1999). 39. Under the MPP, Respondents are responsible for the administration, distribution, management, and facilitation of the CalFresh benefits program. Respondents have the duty to \”promote the general welfare and to safeguard the health and well-being of the nation’s population\” in its administration of the CalFresh program. MPP 63-101.1. The EBT System 40. Since the passage of the Food Stamp Act in 1964, Respondents have implemented a variety of methods for the delivery of food benefits to participants. These benefits were originally 10 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 issued in the form of physical coupons, or \”stamps,\” which were then redeemed at authorized points of sale in exchange for food. 41. An \”authorization document\” system was also developed by which a participant was mailed a physical voucher each month that was then redeemed at designated locations in exchange for the participant’s allotted quantity of coupons. 42. In 1996 Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 22, 1996, which mandated that States implement EBT systems to modernize the delivery of food benefits. Under the EBT system, benefits are stored in a central computer database. MPP 16-001.1. Recipients access their electronically stored benefits at point-of-sale terminals, ATMs (for cash benefits), and other electronic funds transfer devices. Id. 43. In California, the EBT system is governed by the California Electronic Benefits Transfer Act, Welfare and Institutions Code 10065 et seq. (the \”EBT Act\”). Under Welfare and Institutions Code 10077, Respondents have the authority to adopt regulations to implement the EBT Act. Respondents also have the authority to adopt regulations and general policies \”necessary for the administration of public social services.\” WIC 10553(b), (e). Regulations issued by Respondents require counties to use the EBT system to deliver benefits under the CalFresh program and the California Food Assistance Program (CFAP). MPP 16-001.2. Counties may also use the EBT system to distribute cash benefits under other programs, such as the CalWORICs program and the GR program. MPP 16-001.3. 44. Under the EBT system, counties automatically load benefits onto recipients’ electronic EBT accounts at designated times each month. County welfare departments are responsible for issuing EBT cards and personal identification numbers (\”PINs\”), which recipients use to access the benefits stored electronically in their EBT accounts. MPP 16-501.1. Recipients 1 1 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 can access their electronic accounts at a point-of-sale terminal either by swiping a physical EBT card (\”swiping\”) or by keying in the account number and PIN code manually (\”keying\”).’ 45. One of the primary purposes of the EBT system, as stated in the EBT Act, is \”to afford public social services recipients the opportunity to better and more securely manage their financial affairs.\” WIC 10065(b). Accordingly, the CalFresh program has discontinued the usage of \”coupons\”2 and \”authorization documents\”3 and has transitioned to distributing benefits electronically through an \”access device\” system, a change in terminology that has been incorporated into both state and federal regulations. 46. A physical EBT card with a magnetic strip is a type of \”access device,\” but the term broadly includes all technical means of accessing food benefits, including the use of an account number and PIN code to access food benefits without swiping a physical card. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, the term \”access device\” is defined in broad, functional terms, and specifically includes the use of an account number and code to access benefits separate and apart from a physical card: Access device means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of access that can be used alone, or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain payments, allotments, benefits, money, goods, or other ‘ Retailers who conduct EBT transactions are required to have the capacity to conduct manual \”key entered transactions,\” in which the account number and PIN code are typed into the point-of-sale device in lieu of swiping a physical card. 7 CFR 274.8(b)(9)(\”Minimum transaction set. At a minimum, the State agency shall ensure that the EBT system, including third party processors and retailers driving their own terminals, is capable of … key entered transactions ….\”)(second emphasis added); see also The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Training Guide for Retailers, Pg. 13, available at https:\/\/www.fns.usda.gov\/snap\/retailers-store-training-information (providing that if an EBT card cannot be read by a POS machine, \”SNAP regulations permit key entry as a back-up convenience for recipients . The MPP retains a legacy definition of the term \”coupon\” as \”a type of certificate provided pursuant to the provisions of Division 63, Food Stamp Regulations, for the purchase of eligible foods.\” MPP 63- 102(c)( 14). 3 The MPP likewise retains a definition of the term \”authorization document\” as \”an intermediary document issued by the CWD and used to authorize a specific benefit amount for a household. An ‘Authorization to Participate card (ATP)’ is a type of authorization document.\” MPP 63-102(a)(8). 12 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 things of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, as amended.\” 7 C.F.R. 271.2 (emphases added). 47. The MPP, which contains California’s regulations governing state welfare programs, defines the term \”access device\” in similarly broad terms and specifically refers to the physical EBT card as only a particular type or example of the broader \”access device\” category: \”Access device\” means the device which may be used to access the master issuance or record-for-issuance file in an automated direct access system. A plastic card with a magnetic strip is a type of access device. M.P.P. 63- 102(a)(1) (emphases added).4 48. Both the controlling federal definition and subordinate MPP definition of the term \”access device\” make clear that the term is not limited to a physical EBT card, but instead includes whatever technological means exist or are developed to access benefits. Federal regulations also require that state EBT systems possess the capacity for \”key entered\” transactions through which benefits are accessed with only an account number and PIN code without utilization of a physical card. 7 C.F.R. 274.8(b)(9). The term \”access device\” includes the EBT account number and PIN code\u2014independent of a physical EBT card\u2014because states are required to ensure technical capacity for such cardless, key-entered transactions at point-of-sale terminals. Replacement Issuances for Stolen CalFresh Benefits 49. No state or federal statute or regulation exists that prohibits the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. 4 The \”master issuance file\” is the state’s entire database of current CalFresh beneficiary households and benefit allotments, while the \”record-for-issuance file\” is the file created monthly from the master issuance file which shows each individual household’s monthly benefit entitlement and the amount actually issued to the household. MPP 63-102(m)(3), (r)(4). 13 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 50. Instead, California regulations contained in the MPP affirmatively provide for replacement CalFresh issuances, including mandatory replacement of CalFresh benefits when a beneficiary is the victim of benefits theft: 63-603 REPLACEMENT ISSUANCES .1 Providing Replacement Issuances CWDs shall provide replacement issuances to households. .11 Allowable Replacements CWDs shall provide a replacement issuance or authorization, as appropriate, as a result of an agency issuance error or when a household reports any of the following occurrences. .115 In an automated direct access issuance system using an access device, the initial access device was: (a) Not received in the mail; (b) Stolen from the mail; or (c) Stolen after receipt. MPP 63-603.1 (emphases added); see also Cal. Gov’t Code 29853.5. 51. The MPP also specifies six circumstances in which replacement CalFresh issuances are disallowed, none of which apply to cases where an access device is stolen. MPP 63-603.12. 52. The MPP also contains specific reporting responsibilities as a prerequisite to receiving a CalFresh replacement issuance in cases where an access device is stolen after receipt: .15 Household Reporting Responsibilities The following allowable replacement issuances or authorizations shall be provided only if a household timely reports a loss or in writing provides a DFA 303 as specified in Section 63-603.3. In the following systems replacement requests shall be considered timely: 14 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 .154 Direct Access Issuance System (b) Replacement requests made to the CWD within 10 days of the loss when the access device is reported as stolen after receipt. MPP 63-603.15 (emphasis added). 53. Finally, the MPP contains a limitation on the number of replacement issuances within a six-month period. This section expressly contemplates CalFresh replacement issuances in instances where an access device is stolen after receipt: .2 Replacement Limitations The number of countable replacements provided to a household within a six-month period shall be limited as follows: .211 Two countable replacement issuances or authorizations caused by any combination of the following occurrences: (c) In an automated direct access issuance system, a replacement authorization made because the access device was not received in the mail or was stolen from the mail or after receipt. MPP 63-603.2 (emphases added). 54. The provisions of the MPP providing for replacement issuances in instances of access device theft in an EBT system are consistent with federal regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Agriculture, which mandate state agencies’ strict liability for certain overissuances, including unauthorized account access: State agencies shall be held strictly liable for overissuances resulting from Electronic Benefit Transfer system errors and unauthorized account activities. Such overissuances shall include but not be limited to: . . . replacement benefits to a 15 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 household’s account due to unauthorized use of the benefits in a household’s account . . . . 7 C.F.R. 276.2(b)(7)(emphasis added). 55. Consistent with federal regulations, California has created a central fund for the purpose of providing payments or advances to CalFresh beneficiaries, including in cases of theft. Welf. & Inst. Code 15125. 56. On information and belief, Respondents currently utilize the Central Benefit Issuance Fund, or other funding source, to provide replacement issuances or payments to certain victims of CalFresh benefits theft and possess the technical capacity and legal authorization to restore the CalFresh benefits electronically stolen from Petitioners and others similarly situated. 57. State and federal rules provide that Respondents are responsible for ensuring the security of the EBT system to minimize the incidence of theft and unauthorized use of food benefits. Welf. & Inst. Code 10500; see also 7 U.S.C. 2016(h); 7 C.F.R. 274.8(a)(1)(ix), (b)(3); Cal. Gov. Code 29853.5. EBT Consumer Protection Legislation After Carpio v. Lightbourne 58. Despite the increasing frequency of electronic benefits theft, Respondents have consistently refused to replace electronically stolen benefits despite the mandatory language contained in MPP Section 63-603.115(c). 59. Prior to December 31, 2012, the Welfare and Institutions Code provided for restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits, but was drafted on the assumption that such theft would occur through theft of a beneficiary’s physical EBT card: A recipient shall not incur any loss of electronic benefits after reporting that his or her electronic benefits transfer card or personal identification number has been lost or stolen. Welf. & Inst. Code 10072(i)(1) (formerly subsection (g))(emphasis added). 16 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 60. The language contained in Section 10072(i)(1) was originally added as part of the Thompson-Maddy-Ducheny-Ashburn Welfare-to-Work Act of 1997. 1997 Cal AB 1542 (August 11, 1997). 61. Respondents’ policy guidance issued after passage of this 1997 legislation operated under the assumption that theft of benefits in an EBT system would occur only through theft of a physical EBT card. All County Information Notice (ACIN) No. 1-25-02, dated April 16, 2003, set forth Respondents’ policy regarding restoration of CalFresh benefits in instances where the beneficiary’s physical EBT card was stolen after receipt. According to this interpretive policy, in cases where a beneficiary reports a physical EBT card stolen, only those benefits taken after the card is reported stolen can be replaced. This policy did not address or consider instances of electronic theft in which benefits are electronically skimmed without the beneficiary losing the physical EBT card.5 The policy did, however, provide for the replacement of benefits taken before a report of theft where the physical EBT card is stolen from the mail (i.e. where the theft occurred before the beneficiary could have known about and had good cause to report the theft): BENEFIT REPLACEMENT 1. Under what circumstances can lost or stolen benefits be replaced? Recipients are instructed to immediately contact the EBT contractor [Citicorp Electronic Financial Services, Inc. (CEFS)J by calling the automated response unit or customer service center, or the county to report that their card has been lost or stolen. At the time of such report, the recipient is issued a replacement card, the lost or stolen card is immediately deactivated and no further use of the deactivated card is possible. Any benefits accessed prior to the report of the loss or theft of the original card cannot be 5 In cases of physical EBT card theft, it is possible for a victim to become aware of and report the theft before the thief attempts to access benefits. But in cases of electronic benefits theft such as skimming, it is impossible for a victim, who retains possession of his or her physical EBT card, to know about and report the theft in advance because the loss of benefits is the very event that alerts the beneficiary to the fact that the theft has occurred. 17 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 replaced. If the original card is not deactivated (due to inaction by CEFS or the county), any benefits accessed subsequent to the report shall be replaced. However, in those counties opting for mail-based issuance of EBT cards and Personal Identification Numbers (PINS), there may be circumstances in which the mailed card and PIN (sent separately) are not received by the recipient. In those cases, the recipient is entitled to replacement of benefits accessed prior to their reporting the non-receipt of the card. In such cases, CDSS strongly recommends that any recipient whose card has been stolen from the mail prior to receipt be issued their replacement card over the counter. Again, such benefit replacement can only occur during the EBT conversion period and for initial issuances in those counties choosing mail-based card and PIN issuance. ACIN No. 1-25-02, dated April 16, 2003 (italics in original, other emphasis added). 62. In response to the lack of legislation addressing the increasingly prevalent problem of electronic skimming theft that had not been originally contemplated, and Respondents’ policy interpretation of refusing to restore benefits stolen through skimming, a writ petition was filed in 2011 in Carpio v. Lightbourne, BS 135127 (\”Carpio\”). 63. In 2012, the California Legislature passed A.B. 2035 in explicit response to Carpio, finding and declaring its intent to address the issue specifically raised in Carpio: The Legislature finds and declares as follows: (a) State law provides relief for CaIWORKs parents and recipients, to restore their benefits when stolen. (b) However, no similar remedy exists when the benefits are delivered in electronic form, via an electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card, and the benefits have been stolen through the practice of skimming. (c) Countless families that depend on the basic needs grants CaIWORKs provides are vulnerable to electronic crimes, and currently have nowhere to turn. 18 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 (d) Because of this inequity, a petition for writ of mandate, Carpio v. Lightbourne (Case No. BS135127) was filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court in December 2011, to address a solution for families that have been victims of skimming. (e) It is therefore the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to address the problem of electronic theft of public benefits that is at issue in Carpio v. Lightbourne. 2012 Cal AB 2035 (emphasis added). 64. The Governor signed A.B. 2035 on September 14, 2012. The new law took effect on:January 1, 2013. This bill added two subparagraphs to subdivision (g) of Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10072, later renumbered as subdivision (i), which provided for the express restoration of cash benefits in cases of electronic skimming theft: (2) A recipient shall not incur any loss of cash benefits that are taken by an unauthorized withdrawal, removal, or use of benefits that does not occur by the use of a physical EBT card issued to the recipient or authorized third party to directly access the benefits. Benefits taken as described in this paragraph shall be promptly replaced in accordance with the protocol established by the department pursuant to paragraph (3). (3) The State Department of Social Services shall establish a protocol for recipients to report electronic theft of cash benefits that minimizes the burden on recipients, ensures prompt replacement of benefits in order to minimize the harm to recipients, and ensures program integrity. This protocol may include the automatic replacement of benefits without the need for recipient reporting and verification. Welf. & Inst. Code 10072(i)(2)-(3). 65. While Carpio and the consequent legislative modification to the Welfare and Institutions Code did not directly address the issue of skimming theft of CalFresh food benefits, the policy goals expressly furthered in the legislature’s statement of intent apply equally if not with greater force with respect to the victims of electronic skimming theft of CalFresh food benefits. 19 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Indeed, as with the Petitioners here, the victims of skimming often have both cash and food benefits stolen at the same time. 66. In passing A.B. 2035, the Legislature did not exclude or prohibit the restoration of CalFresh benefits stolen through skimming, did not express any intention to exclude or prohibit such restoration of CalFresh benefits, did not provide for the elimination of existing regulations mandating restoration of such stolen benefits, and did not provide any policy basis for denying critical food benefits to the victims of skimming theft in mandating the restoration of cash benefits for those self-same victims. 67. Following the passage of A.B. 2035, on or about August 30, 2013, Respondents issued an all-county letter (ACL) containing their \”Final County Instructions for Implementation of Assembly Bill 2035, Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Electronic Theft.\” The letter was addressed to all county welfare departments, all CalWORKs program specialists, and all EBT coordinators. It instructs all counties that \”the AB 2035 statute does not apply to food benefits issued via the CalFresh and California Food Assistance Program (CFAP).\” ACL 13-67, August 30, 2013. 68. Respondents have misinterpreted this statement as a prohibition on replacement of CalFresh benefits and relied on ACL 13-67 to deny Petitioners’ claims for restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits. This interpretation conflicts with existing state regulations contained in MPP Section 63-603.115(c), which expressly mandate the restoration of such stolen benefits. Respondents have improperly relied upon ACL 13-67 to justify an ultra vires, unlawful policy of denying the rights of Petitioners and other similarly situated welfare beneficiaries who are the victims of the crime of electronic benefits theft to have their critical, subsistence food benefits restored. 20 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE REQUISITES FOR RELIEF 69. The instant application for writ of administrative mandate requested under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 is Petitioners’ sole and exclusive remedy for review of Respondents’ decisions upholding the denial of restored CalFresh benefits. 70. This verified petition is brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 and is authorized by Welfare & Institutions Code Section 10962, which permits filing a petition to review the entire proceeding conducted by CDSS. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10962, no filing fee or bond is required for such filing. 71. This verified petition is also brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 to compel Respondents’ compliance with its duty to administer public welfare benefits programs and administrative procedures in accordance with state and federal statutes, regulations, and rules. 72. California has declared that public social services are to be administered in full compliance with applicable federal and state laws. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600. 73. Respondents each have a ministerial duty to comply with the state and federal regulations set forth above and they continue to violate these regulations. 74. An actual and continuing controversy exists between Petitioners and Respondents regarding Respondents’ duties as alleged above. Petitioners contend that the actions of Respondents violate the law as specified above. Petitioners are info’ ned and believe that Respondents will dispute this contention. 75. Petitioners are beneficially interested in the faithful execution of Respondents’ duties, have exhausted available administrative remedies, and have no other adequate, plain, or speedy remedy at law to obtain Respondents’ compliance other than the relief sought by this 21 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 complaint and petition. Respondents’ failure and refusal to carry out the aforesaid duties has caused substantial hardship to Petitioners and other persons similarly situated. 76. Unless compelled to perform their duties and obligations in accordance with law, Respondents will continue to fail to do so, causing irreparable harm to Petitioners and the public. 77. This is a matter of significant public concern. The ongoing violation and misapplication of CalFresh rules and regulations causes the unjust and unlawful deprivation of subsistence nutritional benefits to eligible beneficiaries who are the innocent victims of electronic benefits theft. Respondents’ violations will continue to needlessly cause affected beneficiaries to challenge this violation, causing a drain on public funds. Petitioners have no adequate remedy at law to prevent this haiin. 78. Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1085 and 1094.5 confer a right of action to enforce the state and federal statutes and regulations Respondents have violated. 42 U.S.C. 1983 confers a right of action to enforce the federal laws Respondents have violated. Respondents have acted under color of state law to deprive Petitioners of their rights under federal law. 79. An actual and continuing controversy exists between Petitioners and Respondents regarding Respondents’ duties as alleged above. Petitioners contend that the actions of Respondents violate the law as specified above. Petitioners are informed and believe that Respondents will dispute this contention. 80. Separate and apart from their individual claims for relief, Petitioner Esther Ortega has standing to maintain this action as a citizen of this state with a significant interest in having the public duties in question enforced and in preventing Respondents from impairing or defeating the purpose of statutes and regulations establishing a public right to restoration of electronically stolen 22 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 CalFresh benefits. Petitioner Joe Soza has standing as a former citizen of this state at all times relevant to this action. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion – Failure to Proceed in the Manner Required by Law) (Administrative Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5) 81. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 82. The Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting decisions that failed to proceed in the manner required by law. The Respondents’ decisions do not comply with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations governing the administration of the CalFresh program (specifically including, without limitation, those statutes, regulations, and rules governing the restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits) and state hearings. 7 C.F.R. 276.2(b)(7); MPP 63- 603.1; Cal. Gov’t Code 29853.5. 83. Respondents, through the actions of ALJs, committed errors of law by denying Petitioners’ requests for restoration of their CalFresh benefits after they were the victims of electronic benefits theft. 84. Respondents, through the actions of ALJs, committed errors of law by erroneously relying on and\/or misinterpreting ACL 13-67 as a basis for denying Petitioners’ requests for restoration of their CalFresh benefits after they were the victims of electronic benefits theft. 85. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). 23 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion – Failure to Proceed in Manner Required by Law) (Traditional Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1085) 86. Petitioners reallege and incorporate by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 87. The Respondents are willfully failing to perform their public duty to fully and fairly administer the CalFresh program in accordance with governing statutes, regulations, and rules (specifically including, without limitation, those statutes, regulations, and rules governing the restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits). 7 C.F.R. 276.2(b)(7); MPP 63-603.1; Cal. Gov’t Code 29853.5. 88. Respondents, through the actions of ALJs, committed errors of law by erroneously relying on and\/or misinterpreting ACL 13-67 as a basis for denying Petitioners’ requests for restoration of their CalFresh benefits after they were the victims of electronic benefits theft. 89. An Order of Mandamus from this Court directing Respondents to comply with the law in the administration of their public duties and enjoining Respondents from relying on ACL 13-67 as a basis for denying claims for restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits is required to protect Petitioners and those similarly situated from prejudicial harm to their vested rights to public benefits that will foreseeably continue in the absence of such Order. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Relief from Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds) (Violation of Code of Civil Procedure 526(a)) 90. Petitioner Ortega realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 24 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 91. Respondents have expended public funds in the promulgation and implementation of the unlawful policies and practice alleged in this petition and complaint. 92. Petitioner Esther Ortega has paid a tax within and to the State of California within one year before commencement of this action. 93. Unless and until enjoined by this court, Respondents’ unlawful conduct will cause great and irreparable injury to Petitioner Ortega in that Respondents will continue to make illegal expenditures. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for the following relief: 1. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to rescind their decisions in Administrative Hearing Nos. 2016273045 and 2017151334; 2. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to issue a new decision cancelling their notices of denial of Petitioners’ requests for restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits and approving Petitioners’ requests; 3. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to pay Petitioners any benefits improperly withheld on the basis of the denial of their requests for the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits, or cash equivalent, plus interest at the statutory rate of ten percent on all benefits due to Petitioners here until paid in full; 4. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 commanding the Respondents to order their agents to comply with the mandatory 25 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 requirements of federal and state law with regard to the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh, CFAP, and other non-cash benefits; 5. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 commanding the Respondents to amend or clarify any and all policy statements or interpretive documents, including without limitation All County Letter No. 13-67, to the extent that they conflict with federal and state statutes and regulations regarding the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh, CFAP, and other non-cash benefits; 6. Issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Respondents, their agents, successors, employees, and those acting in concert therewith from: (a) Denial of properly submitted beneficiary requests for the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits; (b) Reliance upon ACL 13-67 as a basis for refusing beneficiary requests for the restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits; 7. Declare that the following actions by Respondents, their agents, successors, employees, and those acting in concert therewith, violate state law and regulation: (a) Denial of properly submitted requests for the restoration of electronically stolen CalFresh benefits; (b) Reliance upon ACL 13-67 as a basis for denying beneficiary requests for the restoration of stolen CalFresh benefits; 8. That this Court award Petitioners their costs of suit; 9. That this Court award Petitioners their reasonable attorneys’ fees; and 10. The Court award such other and further relief as it deems proper. 26 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE DATED: 03\/27\/2018 Respectfully submitted, LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES, By: By: Andrew Kazakes Attorney for Petitioners Tyler Sutherland Attorney for Petitioners 27 FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 VERIFICATION STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I, Andrew Kazakes, declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in California and represent Petitioners. 2. I have read the foregoing petition for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents thereof. They are true to the best of my knowledge except those allegations on information and belief which I believe to be true. I am more familiar with the factual and legal claims raised in this petition than the Petitioners. I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: 03\/27\/2018 28 Signed: Andrew Kazakes Attorney for Petitioner FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE ”

pdf Story v. Sacramento County Brd. of Sup. – GA case for medical evidence

In Welfare Complaint Library 2108 downloads

Download (pdf, 325 KB)

Story_decision.pdf

” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 FILED\/EWMflSED ov r 8 2013 By S. Lee, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO MARTIN STORY, Petitioner, SACRAMENTO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; SACIMMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ASSISTANCE; PAUL LAKE, Director, Sacramento County Department of Human Assistance Respondents. Case No. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER: PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDATE I. Introduction This matter arises out of petitioner Martin Story’s application for General Assistance benefits in July, 2011. Respondent County Depaitment of Hainan Assistance denied petitioner’s application on the ground that he was employable. Petitioner appealed that determination, and an evidentiary hearing was held before an Administrative Hearing Officer on December 8, 2011. The Administrative Hearing Officer issued a written decision denying petitioner’s appeal and upholding the County’s employability deterinination on December 22, 2011. The petition in this matter includes a request for issuance of a writ of traditional mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and a request for issuance of a writ of administrative mandate under 1 RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. 2 In connection with the petition for writ of traditional mandate, petitioner alleges that respondents have a policy of refusing to consider evidence, including inedical evidence, that does not make an express 3 ^ conclusion about whether a General Assistance benefit claimant is employable, and that is not verified by 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 23 24 25 26 27 28 a qualified, licensed medical or mental health professional. Petitioner contends that this policy led to the adverse result in his case, and violates his due process rights. In connection with the petition for writ of administrative mandate, petitioner alleges that the weight of the evidence in his case supports a determination, contrary to the decision the Administrative Hearing Officer made, that he was not employable for purposes of evaluating his claim for General Assistance benefits. II. Standard of Review The parties agree that the applicable standard of review in this case is the independent judgment standard. The issue of whether respondent’s action violated petitioner’s due process rights, as raised by the petition for writ of traditional mandate, is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. (See, Duncan I g V. Department of Personnel Administration (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4\”‘ 1166, 1174.) In the petition for writ of -\u03027 administrative mandamus, because this is a matter that involves petitioner’s fundamental vested right to 18 welfare benefits if found eligible for such benefits, the Court reviews the entire record and weighs the 19 evidence to determine whether the decision of the respondent was correct. (See, e.g., Frinkv. Proc\/(1982) 20 31 Cal. 3’\u0302 ” 166, 180.) The administrative decision is entitled to an initial presumption of correctness, and 21 the burden rests upon the challenger to demonstrate that the decision is contrary to the weight of the 22 evidence. (See, Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4\”‘ 805, 817.) III. Traditional Mandate; Due Process Having reviewed the administrative record and the other evidence in this case under the independent judgment standard of review, the Court concludes that respondents have a policy, as petitioner contends, of refusing to consider evidence, including medical evidence, that does not make an express conclusion about whether a General Assistance benefit claimant is employable, or that is not RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 verified by a qualified, licensed inedical or mental health professional 2 The Court finds that this policy arises out of at least two written documents issued by the County 3 Department of Human Assistance relating to the General Assistance program ^ In the document entitled \”Employability Deterinination and Case Plans\”, respondents set forth a policy that acceptable verification of medical, mental health or functional limitations affecting the ability of an applicant to work must include the ability to work, degree, duration and nature ofthe incapacity, or the verification will be considered incomplete and unacceptable. This policy also requires that inedical, mental health or functional limitation verification must be completed, signed and dated by appropriate licensed and\/or trained medical or mental health professionals.’ Additionally, in the document entitled \”Administrative Hearings\”, respondents set forth a policy that Hearing Officers must sustain an employability determination based on medical or psychiatric findings of licensed health professionals absent contrary findings by similarly qualified licensed health care professionals.\u0302 In the hearing in this case, the Administrative Hearing Officer permitted petitioner to offer lg evidence relevant to the issue of whether he was employable, including recent prison inedical records, ly prior inedical opinions regarding petitioner’s employability from 2007-2009”, and petitioner’s own 18 testimony regarding his current condition and inability to work. That evidence was admitted and is present 19 in the administrative record. However, because the record also contained an opinion from a licensed 20 physician (Dr. Lipscomb) stating that petitioner was employable\”, the Administrative Hearing Officer did 21 not consider or weigh petitioner’s evidence at all in making her decision 22 The decision made this explicit, stating: \”The Hearing Officer has neither the expertise nor the 2-\u0302 authority to overturn the 08\/17\/11 medical evaluation. As Dr. Lipscomb’s evaluation provides the most 24 25 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ‘ See, Exhibit 2 to petitioner’s opening brief, page 4 of 16. ^ See, Exhibit 1 to petitioner’s opening brief, page 13 of 14. ‘ See, Administrative Record, pages 72-80. The Court notes that these prior determinations had been accepted by respondents in determining that petitioner was unemployable and thus eligible for General Assistance benefits in 27 these earlier periods. 28 \”* See, Administrative Record, pages 12-13. RULING ON SUBMirrED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 recent evidence of the claimant’s inedical conditions, and the Hearing Officer must sustain employability 2 determinations based on medical findings of licensed health care professionals, it is concluded that the county correctly determined the claimant to be employable.\”^ The italicized portions ofthis statement ^ make it clear that the Administrative Hearing Officer was applying an official policy that precluded her from considering petitioner’s evidence, solely on the ground that it did not meet the verification standards set forth above. In a letter to petitioner’s counsel dated March 9, 2012, Paul G. Lake, the Director of the Departinent of Human Assistance, confirmed the existence of such a policy.* The letter specifically addressed petitioner’s case, and acknowledged that petitioner had submitted \”records…from different medical and mental health professionals\”, but pointed out that \”none of these records appear to make any deterinination as to whether or not he is employable. As such, there is no basis on vvhich the hearing officer could have changed Mr. Story’s employability status. […] DHA Hearing Officers are not qualified to make independent determinations as to which inedical or mental health conditions may or may not impact a client’s employability status.\” The effect of respondents’ policy in this case was clear: potentially relevant evidence regarding ly petitioner’s employability simply was not considered. In effect, if not explicitly, respondents e.xcluded 8 potentially relevant evidence regarding employability, including recent prison medical records, prior 19 medical determinations of uneinployability made between 2007 and 2009, and petitioner’s own testimony 20 regarding his current condition and ability to work. 21 The Court finds that the application of the policy in this manner violates the procedural due 22 process rights of General Assistance claimants in general, and specifically violated the procedural due 23 process rights of petitioner in this case. 24 The due process clauses of Article I, Sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution apply to 25 cases involving a statutorily conferred benefit or interest, and focus on freedom from arbitrary adjudicative 26 \” 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 27 ^ See, Administrative Record, page 120. (Emphasis added.) 28 * See, Exhibit 3 to petitioner’s opening brief RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 procedures. (See, Gresher v. Anderson (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4\”‘ 88, 104-105.) It is undisputed that this 2 case involves a statutorily conferred benefit, specifically. General Assistance benefits. The existence of that interest triggers application ofthe California due process clauses in this case. Analysis of whether ^ respondents’ actions violated due process rights in this case involves consideration of four factors, as 5 3 6 7 follows: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures g used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the g nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side ofthe story before a responsible governmental official, JQ and (4) the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 11 procedural requirement would entail. (See, People v. Ramirez {\\919) 25 Cal. 3\u0302” 260, 269.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2j respondents is high, as illustrated by the result in this case. Respondent found petitioner to be employable, 22 and thus ineligible for General Assistance benefits, solely on the basis of Dr. Lipscomb’s opinion. Yet 23 that opinion consisted only of a box checked on a form stating that petitioner \”Can work\”, without 24 including any foundational facts or analysis supporting that bare conclusion.’ 25 Dr. Lipscomb’s report is subject to the principle that an expert’s opinion rendered without a 26 reasoned explanation of why the underlying facts lead to the ultimate conclusion has no evidentiary value 27 The private interest at stake here is the interest applicants for General Assistance benefits have in having their claims correctly decided on the basis of all relevant evidence regarding employability, and not only on evidence formally verified by inedical or mental health professionals. The Court considers this interest to be one of significant weight, because General Assistance benefits are an essential resource for the indigent and unemployable, and because evidence that does not formally meet respondent’s verification standards nonetheless may be relevant to and probative of the issue of whether a particular applicant is employable. The risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits through application of the policies used by 28 ^ See, Administrative Record, page 12. RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 because an expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons and facts upon which it is based. (See, 2 Bushling v. Fremont Medical Center (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4\”‘ 493, 510; Kelley v. Trunk {1998) 66 Cal. 3 App. 4\”‘ 519, 524.) It thus should have been given no weight in this proceeding, yet in the final analysis it ^ outweighed other evidence to such an extent that the other evidence was not even considered in reaching the ultimate decision. Basing a decision on an expert opinion that has no evidentiary value, as was done in this case, while refusing to evaluate and weigh other relevant evidence, creates an unacceptably high risk of error. It also creates the risk ofan arbitrary result. The value ofan additional procedural safeguard that would be established by requiring respondents to evaluate and consider all evidence related to employability, regardless of whether it meets respondents’ verification standards, is clear. The application of respondents’ policy in this case infringed petitioner’s dignitary interest in being able to present his side of the story to the responsible governmental officials. While petitioner admittedly was allowed to offer evidence of his employability at the hearing that did not meet respondents’ verification standards, the Administrative Hearing Officer simply refused to consider that evidence in making the ultimate decision. Refusing to recognize or analyze a claimant’s side of the story is 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 tantamount to not allowing that side of the story to be presented in the first place. Such an approach to ly relevant evidence violates basic concepts of fair procedure and amounts to arbitrary decision-making 18 Finally, the Court finds that the governmental interests underlying respondents’ policy are of little 19 weight. Respondents simply assert that Administrative Hearing Officers are not qualified to make 20 independent determinations of employability based on inedical evidence, and therefore must be permitted 21 to rely solely on the opinion of a licensed medical professional. Respondents have not established, 22 however, that it would be impossible, impractical, or unduly burdensome to train their Administrative 2-\u0302 Hearing Officers to evaluate all relevant evidence in employability cases. As petitioner argues persuasively, hearing officers in other types of cases, such as Social Security disability cases, evaluate 25 such evidence on a regular basis 26 The Court therefore concludes that respondents have a policy regarding the consideration of 27 \” 28 RULING ON SUBMirrED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS evidence in General Assistance cases involving employability that violates state due process standards. It 2 is clear that the application of that policy in petitioner’s case violated his state due process rights, because 3 it prevented the consideration of potentially relevant evidence, and led to a decision being entered solely ^ on the basis ofa summary medical opinion that was not entitled to any evidentiary weight. ^ The Court further concludes that respondents’ decision in petitioner’s case must be vacated in order to address the due process violation. At the hearing on this matter, the Court asked the parties whether the case should be remanded to the Administrative Hearing Officer for further proceedings, or whether the Court should decide the case itself in the exercise of its independent judgment. The Court concludes that the evaluation of evidence regarding employability in General Assistance cases is a inatter that should be undertaken by the Administrative Hearing Officers in the first instance. The Administrative Hearing Officer has discretion to evaluate the relevant evidence, but application of the invalid evidentiary policy in this case prevented the Administrative Hearing Officer from fully exercising that discretion. The inatter therefore should be remanded to permit the full exercise of administrative discretion. Such a result affords due deference to the legitimate exercise of administrative discretion in General Assistance lg employability cases. ly The petition for writ of traditional mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is 8 therefore granted. A writ of mandate shall issue as follows: (1) directing respondents to cease applying 19 their policy of refusing to consider evidence, including inedical evidence, that does not make an express 20 conclusion about whether a General Assistance benefit claimant is employable, or that is not verified by a 21 qualified, licensed medical or mental health professional; (2) directing respondents to vacate their decision 22 in petitioner’s case; (3) remanding the inatter to the Administrative Hearing Officer for reconsideration of 23 all of the evidence admitted at petitioner’s hearing; (4) directing the Administrative Hearing Officer to 24 . . . give no evidentiary weight to Dr. Lipscomb’s opinion; and (5) directing the Administrative Hearing 25 Officer to enter a new decision on petitioner’s appeal based on an evaluation of all the evidence admitted 26 \” 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ‘ In light of this conclusion, the Court finds it unnecessary to address federal due process requirements separately. 27 As noted by the court in Gresher v. Anderson (2005) 127 Cal. App.4\”‘ 88, 104-105, procedural due process under the California Constitution is \”much more inclusive and protects a broader range of interests than under the federal 28 Constitution\”. 7 RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 at petitioner’s hearing. Other than as stated above with regard to Dr. Lipscomb’s opinion, the writ shall 2 not restrict or control the Administrative Hearing Officer’s exercise of discrelion in the evaluation and 3 weighing of the evidence in the record that is relevant to the issue of petitioner’s employability. IV. Administrative Mandate In light of the Court’s ruling that petitioner is entitled to issuance of a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 that directs respondents to vacate the decision in his case and that remands the case for reconsideration based on all ofthe evidence received at the hearing, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to address petitioner’s administrative mandate claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The petition for writ of administrative mandate is therefore denied. V. Conclusion 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 The petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is granted for the reasons set forth above. The petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is denied. Counsel for petitioner is directed to prepare the order, judginent and writ of mandate in accordance with this ruling. The writ shall provide that respondents shall make a return within 60 days, I g setting forth what they have done to coinply with the writ. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this I I inatter to enforce compliance with the writ as necessary. 18 19 20 DATED: November 8, 2013 21 Jud^ Ml(M4AEL P. l ^ N N Y Superior Court of California, 22 County of Sacraineiyto 23 24 25 26 27 28 RULING ON SUBMI’ITED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING (C.C.P. Sec. 1013a(4)) I , the undersigned deputy clerk of the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, do declare under penalty of perjury that I did this date place a copy of the above- entitled RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER in envelopes addressed to each of the parties, or their counsel of record as stated below, with sufficient postage affixed thereto and deposited the same in the United States Post Office at 720 9\”\u0302 Street, Sacramento, California. STEPHEN E. GOLDBERG, ESQ. Legal Services of Northern California 515-12\”‘ Street Sacramento, CA 95814 Dated: November 8, 2013 CATHERINE SPINELLI Deputy County Counsel 700 H Street, Suite 2650 Sacramento, CA 95814 Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento By: S.LEE Deputy Clerk RULING ON SUBMI’ITED MATTER CASE NO. 34-2012-80001092-CU-WM-GDS ”

pdf Tesma v. Lightbourne – CAPI Indigency Exception Denial – Violating the POMS

In Welfare Complaint Library 2046 downloads

Download (pdf, 2.30 MB)

Tesma v. Lighbourne.pdf

” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Andrew Kazakes, Esq. SBN 277912 Yolanda Arias, Esq. SBN 130025 LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES 5228 Whittier Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90022 Telephone: (213) 640-3944 Facsimile: (213) 640-3911 Email: [email protected] [email protected] Attorney for MATEBE TESMA MATEBE IESMA Petitioner, v. No filing fee is Required per Welf. & Inst. Code 10962 CONFORMED COPY RIGINAL FILEDs O umtycsatmcargraka AUG 1 1 2017 Sharri R. Garter, &motive After\/Clerknyi Charlie L Clulemee, Deputy SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES WILL LIGHTBOURNE, in his official capacity as Director, California Department of Social Services; and the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Respondents. BS170 8 ) Case No.: ) Unlimited Civil Case ) PETITION FOR WRIT OF ) MANDATE ) [Code of Civ. Proc. 1085, ) 1094.5; Welf. & Inst. Code ) 10962] INTRODUCTION 1. This action challenges the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES’ failure to follow federal and state statutes and regulations that are essential to the fair and efficient operation of the public welfare system, specifically the Cash Assistance Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled Legal Immigrants (CAP1). The statutes and regulations at issue require the State and the County to provide an exception to income-deeming rules for indigent aged and disabled legal immigrants whose sponsors have abandoned them to ensure that PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 this vulnerable population does not lose critical subsistence cash aid due solely to third party negligence. 2. Petitioner, MATEBE TESMA is a disabled legal permanent resident. Mr. I ESMA was approved for CAPI benefits because he is unable to work due to a severe and life- threatening seizure disorder that has damaged his cognition and memory. He is regularly hospitalized from these seizures, which in addition to incrementally harming his brain function also impairs his breathing during acute episodes. Because of his cognitive and memory impairments and the danger of asphyxiation during acute seizures, Mr. TESMA receives In- Home Supportive Services to assist with his daily affairs and to provide continual monitoring and crisis response in the event he suffers a seizure while at home. Mr. Tesma was originally sponsored by one of his adult daughters at the time he immigrated around 2012. His sponsor has since abandoned him, has ceased to provide him with any financial support, and has refused to provide her whereabouts, phone number, or any other means to allow him to initiate contact with her. Mr. TESMA’s modest CAPI income is his sole means of financial survival, which he relies upon to pay for rent, food, medicine, and other basic life necessities. 3. Federal and State rules and regulations allow for sponsor deeming rules to be waived under the indigence exception if a CAPI beneficiary would go hungry and homeless were sponsor deeming rules enforced. The indigence exception is expressly allowed even in cases where the sponsor is unavailable. In an unlawful effort to severely restrict access to the indigence exception, Respondents incoherently maintain that CAPI rules allow a beneficiary to qualify for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming if the beneficiary’s sponsor is unavailable, yet simultaneously require a beneficiary’s termination from the program unless the sponsor is also available to provide a signed income and asset verification. Respondents have relied on this absurd interpretation to terminate Mr. TESMA’s subsistence CAPI welfare benefits. The Respondents’ interpretation of program rules makes a cruel parody of logic and if left uncorrected will cause material prejudice to the rights of other disabled immigrants in this state like the Petitioner. 2 PET11 lON FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4. The Petitioner, MATEBE TESMA (\”Mr. 1ESMA\” or \”Petitioner\”) seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1085 to compel the Respondents WILL LIGHTBOURNE and the CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (CDSS) (hereinafter, collectively, \”Respondents\”) to comply with state and federal statutes and regulations requiring suspension of sponsor-deeming rules for indigent CAPI beneficiaries whose sponsors are unavailable. 5. Mr. TESMA also petitions the Court for a writ of mandate pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10962 and Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1094.5 to overturn Respondents’ administrative decision upholding the termination of Mr. 1ESMA’S CAPI welfare benefits, order Respondents to approve his application for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming, and reinstate his CAPI benefits on an ongoing basis. 6. Mr. 1ESMA also seeks an immediate stay of enforcement of Respondents’ termination decision to prevent the prejudicial loss of subsistence income during the pendency of the instant proceedings. PARTIES 7. The Petitioner, MATEBE TESMA, age 57, is originally from Ethiopia and is a native Amharic speaker. He has limited English proficiency and suffers from several severe disabilities, including a seizure disorder, memory and cognitive impairment, and cerebral toxoplasmosis, among other conditions. Mr. TESMA is regularly hospitalized from his seizures, which in addition to incrementally harming his brain function also impairs his breathing during acute episodes, creating a risk of asphyxiation. Mr. Tesma was originally sponsored by one of his adult daughters, who has since abandoned him, has ceased to provide him with any financial support, and has refused to provide her whereabouts, phone number, or any other means to allow him to initiate contact with her. Respondents have terminated Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits because his sponsor is unavailable to provide a signed income and asset verification as part of the CAPI redeteunination process, even though Mr. TESMA’s modest CAPI income is his sole means of financial survival that he relies upon to pay for rent, food, medicine, and other basic 3 PE 11110N FOR WRIT OF MANDA I E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 life necessities. Besides his CAPI benefits, Mr. TESMA is only able to earn around $48-$96 per month for parking lot services provided to his local church on Sundays when he is physically able, and he receives approximately 80 hours per week for in-home supportive services due to his disabling medical conditions. Mr. TESMA has at all relevant times resided in the city and county of Los Angeles. 8. The Respondent, WILL LIGHTBOURNE, is the Director of the California Department of Social Services. As Director, he is charged under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10553 with administering the CAPI program. His duties with respect to the CAPI program are partially set out in Welfare and Institutions Code Section 18937, et seq. The Respondents must comply with both state and federal law. The Respondents WILL LIGHTBOURNE is sued in his official capacity. 9. The Respondent, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (CDSS), is the single state agency responsible for supervising the administration of public social services in California, including the CAPI program, in order to secure full compliance with applicable state and federal laws. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600. For Los Angeles County, the Respondent has delegated responsibility for administration of the CAPI program to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (\”the County\”). At all relevant times, the County was and is the agent of the Respondents. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 10. Mr. TESMA, age 57, is originally from Ethiopia and is a native Amharic speaker with limited English proficiency. Mr. Tesma is a legal immigrant who obtained permanent legal resident status on or about February, 2012. Mr. TESMA has resided in the city and county of Los Angeles at all times relevant to this case. 11. Mr. TESMA was approved for CAPI benefits because he is unable to work due to a severe and life-threatening seizure disorder that has damaged his cognition and memory. He also suffers from cerebral toxoplasmosis and a serious condition affecting his immune function. He is regularly hospitalized due to his seizures, which in addition to incrementally harming his 4 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 brain function also impairs his breathing during acute episodes. Because of his cognitive and memory impairments and the danger of asphyxiation during acute seizures, Mr. TESMA receives approximately 80 hours per month for In-Home Supportive Services to assist with his daily affairs and to provide continual monitoring and crisis response in the event he suffers a seizure while at home. 12. Mr. TESMA applied for CAPI benefits on or about October 28, 2015. His application was approved on or about April 26, 2016 and he began receiving approximately $880 per month in cash assistance, which he has relied upon to secure food, housing, medicine, and other basic life necessities. 13. Mr. l’ESMA’s immigration sponsor is Kalkidan Matebe Teshale (hereinafter \”Kalkidan\”), one of his two adult daughters. Kalkidan previously lived at Mr. TESMA’s current residence but moved out of state sometime in the last few years. Kalkidan did not provide Mr. 1’ESMA any means to contact her, neither her address nor her phone number. Since leaving, Kalkidan has unilaterally contacted Mr. TESMA by telephone on occasion and indicated that she cannot help him anymore because she is now married, has a child and housing costs, and is also taking care of her mother. Mr. TESMA does not remember when these phone calls occurred, but he attempted to obtain Kalkidan’s phone and address and she has refused to provide this information or to provide him with any financial support. To the best of his ability given his memory and cognitive impairments, Mr. IhSMA recalled that the last of these phone calls occurred prior to the County commencing the CAPI redetermination and sponsor verification process at issue in this case. Mr. TESMA does not know Kalkidan’s whereabouts or what her current income and assets are, nor does he have the ability to initiate contact with her. 14. On or about September 20, 2016, Mr. TESMA appears to have gotten assistance to submit a SOC-804 forms to the County on which it was indicated that his daughter had previously provided him with approximately $150 worth of assistance, but that this assistance The title of this form is \”Statement of Facts for Determining Continuing Eligibility for the Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants (CAPI).\” 5 PE III ION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 \”stopped since 5\/1\/2016\” or earlier. May 1, 2016 represents the date when Mr. IE,SMA was approved for CAPI benefits and on information and belief, Mr. TESMA may have ceased receiving assistance from his sponsor sometime prior to May 1, 2016 but indicted this date on this form because it was the first month he believed was relevant for CAPI program purposes. Mr. TESMA does not specifically remember completing and submitting this SOC-804 form. 15. On November 2, 2016 and November 22, 2016, the County allegedly sent notices to Kalkidan requesting verification of her income and resources via a SOC-860 form.2 The second request gave a December 7, 2016 response deadline. These requests were apparently sent to Mr. TESMA’s home address, where Kalkidan previously resided but was no longer residing. Mr. TESMA does not remember receiving these notices and would not have been able to understand and competently respond to them on his own due to his cognitive impairments and limited English proficiency. Even if they were delivered, there was no way for Mr. TESMA to contact Kalkidan to request that she submit this information, and she had already indicated that she had abandoned Mr. TESMA and had no intention of providing him with any financial support. 16. Mr. TESMA obtained legal assistance through the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles (LAI-LA) beginning on November 21, 2016, initially to help him with an In-Home Supportive Services (MSS) issue. While interviewing Mr. Tesma regarding his IHSS problem, Mr. Tesma mentioned to LAI-LA attorney Yolanda Arias that he was told by the County that his CAPI benefits were going to be stopped but he did not know why. Ms. Arias initiated an inquiry with the County regarding the status of Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits. Human Resources Administrator Karine Tioufenktchian responded via email that Mr. TESMA’s CAPI would be terminated unless his sponsor provided her signed income verification, citing Manual of Policies and Procedures section 49-037.512 (hereinafter \”MPP\”). In response, LAFLA attorney Andrew 2 The title of this form is \”Sponsor’s Statement of Facts[:] Income and Resources.\” 6 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Kazakes prepared a SOC-809 forma to request the indigence exception and a signed statement in support thereof from Mr. TESMA indicating that Mr. TESMA did not know his sponsor’s current whereabouts, that Mr. TESMA’s sponsor had indicated she had financially abandoned Mr. 1ESMA, and requested that Mr. TESMA be evaluated for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming rules because he relied on his CAPI benefits to buy food and pay rent. These documents were submitted to Mr. ‘I ESMA’s eligibility worker Shakeh Hartoonian on December 1, 2016 via fax. After Ms. Hartoonian did not respond, Mr. Kazakes forwarded these documents directly to Ms. Tioufenktchian on December 20, 2016. The County acknowledged receipt of Mr. TESMA’s request for the indigence exception. 17. In response, Ms. Tioufenktchian informally and ambiguously indicated in an email to Attorney Kazakes dated January 17, 2017 that Mr. 1ESMA’s request for the indigence exception could not be evaluated (neither approved nor denied) without first submitting a signed statement from the sponsor regarding her income and resources, and indicated that the sponsor’s failure to do so would result in termination of Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits without review of the indigence exception. After Mr. Kazakes sought further clarification, Ms. Tioufenkchian further responded in a January 18, 2017 email that Mr. TESMA could qualify for the indigence exception if he asked his daughter to provide her income information and provide a letter stating that she is refusing to cooperate. These shifting, inconsistent responses from the County failed to account for the fact that Mr. TESMA was unable to initiate contact with his sponsor and that Mr. 1E,SMA had already indicated in writing that his sponsor had unequivocally told him that she was refusing to cooperate with her sponsorship responsibilities. The County also improperly failed to approve Mr. TESMA’s indigence application even though he satisfied all criteria for approval under state and federal statutes, regulations, and rules. 18. The very next day, and without providing any formal notice of action in response to Mr. 1 ESMA’s indigence exception request, the County issued three concurrent termination 3 The title of this form is \”Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants (CAPI) Indigence Exception Statement.\” 7 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 notices dated January 19, 2017 for alleged non-cooperation with CAPI program requirements.4 These notices were inadequate and did not provide any explanation, as required by due process and state and federal regulations, as to why Mr. TESMA’s application for the indigence exception was not approved or even considered. These notices also failed to explain what allegedly missing information or incomplete action was requested from Mr. TESMA or his sponsor in order to comply with CAPI program requirements or indigence exception criteria, which left Mr. TESMA unaware of the specific reason for the termination or the opportunity to comply with any performance that allegedly remained due from him. 19. Attorney Kazakes initiated further communications on January 24, 2017 to explain to the County why it was logically and practically problematic to require a signed sponsor verification before considering the indigence exception to sponsor deeming given that the sponsor had abandoned Mr. TESMA and the indigence exception regulations expressly provide for circumstances in which the sponsor cannot be located. Human Services Administrator Alma Calvelo, on behalf of the County, responded in a January 25, 2017 email by reiterating the position that the indigence exception could not even be considered because Mr. TESMA’s sponsor had not submitted her signed income and asset verification. 20. In this January 25, 2017 email, the County also informally refused to accept Mr. TESMA’s statement that he was dependent on CAPI to pay for food and shelter and was receiving no financial support from his sponsor, incorrectly claiming there was a conflict between Mr. TESMA’s statements regarding sponsor abandonment and the County file because the sponsor’s last known address was listed at Mr. TESMA’s residence. This informal position by the County was later abandoned by Respondents at the May 2, 2017 hearing and did not form any part of the basis of the Respondents’ decision to uphold the termination of Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits. 4 The County had previously issued a pair of CAPI termination notices on Oct. 19, 2016, asserting an effective termination date of October 31, 2016. These notices were apparently canceled or rescinded. 8 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21. Mr. TESMA, through counsel, requested a state hearing on January 19, 2017 to challenge the termination of his CAPI benefits and a state hearing was held on May 2, 2017 (Hearing No. 2017025357). Mr. TESMA was present and all parties and the ALJ had the opportunity to question Mr. TESMA at the hearing, with the assistance of an Amharic interpreter provided by Respondents. 22. During the hearing, the County did not dispute that Mr. TESMA’s sponsor could not be located or contacted, or that Mr. TESMA would be unable to secure food and shelter without his CAPI cash aid, and no evidence was offered to contradict Mr. TESMA’s statements that he is not receiving any financial support from his sponsor. Nor was a determination ever made that Mr. ‘1ESMA lacked credibility with respect to any testimony or statements made before, during, or after the hearing. 23. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ inquired whether the parties were aware of recent All-County Letter (ACL) No. 17-33. Representatives for the parties indicated that they were not. At the time, CDSS policy guidance on the indigence exception was contained in ACL No. 02-63 and ACIN No. I-47-12. ACL No. 02-63 contained language allowing the indigence exception where the sponsor could not be located to provide a signed income and asset verification. Similarly, ACIN No. I-47-12 directed county welfare departments to \”presume that sponsor deeming would affect CAPI eligibility and\/or grant amounts in all [indigence exception] cases, thereby meeting the requirement in MPP Section 49-037.411.\” ACL No. 17-33 purported to supersede ACIN No. I-47-12 and implicitly departed from CDSS policy contained in ACL No. 02-63. 24. The ALJ consequently provided the parties with two weeks to submit supplemental briefing regarding ACL No. 17-33. LAMA submitted a supplemental brief on behalf of Mr. TESMA on May 16, 2017 along with written objections to ACL No. 17-33 as an improper and retroactive effort to interfere with Mr. TESMA’s right to a fair hearing and a subpoena request for communications by state officials to obtain corroborating evidence of the improper purpose behind ACL No. 17-33. On June 12, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision 9 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (\”the decision\”) upholding the termination of Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits, affirming the state’s failure to approve or even consider Mr. TESMA’s application for the indigence exception. The decision also overruled the objections to ACL No. 17-33 and denied the subpoena request. Counsel received this decision in the mail on June 19, 2017. 25. Principally relying on ACL No. 17-33, the ALJ’s asserted basis for the decision was the absence of evidence that Mr. TESMA had asked his sponsor to sign an income and asset verification form, even though the County and the ALJ failed to address or develop this issue during the hearing. 26. Counsel for Mr. TESMA submitted a request for rehearing on July 13, 2017 with a supplementary statement by Mr. TESMA. This request has been acknowledged by Respondents but at the time of filing the instant action no action has yet been taken in response.5 27. Mr. TESMA’s supplemental statement was necessary because the ALJ and the County failed to develop the record concerning the ultimate reasons asserted for the decision, namely his alleged failure to ask his sponsor to provide a signed income and asset verification. In his supplemental statement, Mr. TESMA provided clarification that to the best of his disability- impaired memory, the phone calls from his sponsor that the ALJ cited as alleged opportunities to request the sponsor’s signed income and asset verification all occurred prior to the commencement of the sponsor verification process at issue in the case. The statement also indicated that even during these past phone calls, his sponsor had begun to hang up on him as soon as he broached the subject of her sponsorship responsibilities and that it would be futile, even if he had the present opportunity to do so, for him to request a signed income and asset verification from his sponsor. This statement also indicated that Mr. TESMA does not know what his sponsor’s income or assets are currently, and that Mr. TESMA does not recall ever being told by Respondents that there was a requirement for him to ask his sponsor over the 5 Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 10960(e) and 10962, submission of a rehearing request or the rendering of a decision on a rehearing request are not prerequisites to filing the instant Petition. 10 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 phone to provide her income and asset verification in order to qualify for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming. 28. Ms. Tesma respectfully petitions this court for a writ of administrative mandate, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1085 and 1094.5, to overturn the Respondents’s decision and to Order Respondents to conform their policies and procedures to the law. Mr. TESMA is entitled to CAPI benefits from January 19, 2017, to the present and ongoing. BACKGROUND ON CAPI PROGAM AND INDIGENCE EXCEPTION 29. This case involves the CAPI indigence exception to sponsor-deeming rules. CAPI is a California public welfare program that provides cash assistance to aged and disabled legal immigrants who would otherwise be eligible for Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash assistance but for immigration status. 30. Deeming rules provide that the income and assets of certain individuals, including immigration sponsors, can be deemed as the income and assets of the beneficiary in determining CAPI eligibility and benefit amount. The indigence exception to sponsor-deeming allows a beneficiary to be financially eligible for CAPI, despite having an immigration sponsor who has signed an affidavit of support, if the individual would be unable to obtain food and shelter without CAPI cash aid. The express policy purpose underlying the indigence exception is \”to prevent the sponsored immigrant from falling into total distress if the sponsor defaults on his or her obligation. The agency may then provide assistance, assuming the sponsored immigrant is otherwise eligible, and collect the cost of the benefits from the sponsor.\” 71 FR 35732, 35743 (Vol. 71, No. 119, Part II, Wednesday, June 21, 2006).6 6 Provisions in the 1-864 Affidavit of Support form assign liability to the sponsor for failure to comply with sponsorship obligations. See 71 FR 35732, 35741 (Vol. 71, No. 119, Part II, Wednesday, June 21, 2006)(\”Moreover, the Form I-864… makes the sponsor responsible for reimbursing agencies for the costs of means-tested public benefits.\”). II PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAIE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Legislative Incorporation of Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Rules 31. The authorizing statute for the CAPI program is found at California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 18937 et seq. Through Section 18940(b), the California Legislature expressly incorporated federal deeming rules and related exceptions governing the SSI\/SSP program to apply to the CAPI program, and specifically emphasized that this included \”all federal and state laws and regulations designed to protect SSI\/SSP recipients and their resources . . . \” Welf. & Inst. Code 18940(b)(emphasis added). 32. The federal law creating the indigence exception to sponsor deeming is located at 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e): (e) Indigence exception[:] (1) In general[:] For an alien for whom an affidavit of support [1 has been executed, if a determination described in paragraph (2) is made, the amount of income and resources of the sponsor [1 which shall be attributed to the sponsored alien shall not exceed the amount actually provided for a period beginning on the date of such determination and ending 12 months after such date. (2) Determination described[:] A determination described in this paragraph is a determination by an agency that a sponsored alien would, in the absence of the assistance provided by the agency, be unable to obtain food and shelter, taking into account the alien’s own income, plus any cash, food, housing, or other assistance provided by other individuals, including the sponsor. 8 U.S.0 1631. (emphases added). 33. 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e) consists of a protection for SSI\/SSP recipients pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 18940(b) and is incorporated thereby into the Welfare and Institutions Code as a statutory provision governing the CAPI program. 34. 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e) creates an exception and qualification to the general federal sponsor deeming rules found in 42 U.S.C.S. Sections 1382j(b) and (d). These sections do not require collection of any specific forms of information (such as a sponsor’s signed verification of income and assets), but instead place a general responsibility on the beneficiary to 12 PE 1’1\”1 ION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1 h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 provide information necessary to make an overall determination about the application of sponsor deeming rules: (b) Determination of amount and resources. (1) The amount of income of a sponsor (and his spouse) which shall be deemed to be the unearned income of an alien for any year shall be determined as follows: [describing sponsor income and asset deeming calculation methods]. (d) Information and documentation . . . . (1) Any individual who is an alien shall . . . be required to provide [] such information and documentation with respect to his sponsor as may be necessary in order [] to make any determination required under this section, and to obtain any cooperation from such sponsor necessary for any such determination. 42 USCS 1382j (emphasis added). 35. 8 U.S.0 Section 1631(e) augments 42 USCS Section 1382j by rendering unnecessary a determination of the sponsor’s specific income and assets because under Section 1631(e)(1), \”the amount of income and resources of the sponsor . . . which shall be attributed to the sponsored alien shall not exceed the amount actually provided . . . .\” Under 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e)(2), the sponsor-deeming determination is made without reference to the sponsor’s actual income and assets, but considers only the \”cash, food, housing, or other assistance provided by other individuals, including the sponsor.\” Section 1631(e) thereby sets an express limitation on the information necessary to make a sponsor-deeming determination under 42 USCS 1382j(b); when the indigence exception under Section 1631(e) applies, only the assistance actually provided by the sponsor is necessary to make a sponsor-deeming determination under 42 U.S.C.S. Section 1382j(b). 36. 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e) does not require as a prerequisite for the indigence exception any demonstration by the beneficiary that imputation of verified income or assets from the sponsor would affect program eligibility, only that the beneficiary would be unable to obtain food and shelter if deprived of CAPI benefits. Under California law (through incorporation of these federal provisions) where the indigence exception applies under 8 U.S.C. 1631(e), it is unnecessary to make a determination about the actual income and assets of the sponsor because 13 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA lb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the only information necessary to make a sponsor-deeming determination under 42 U.S.C.S. Sections 1382j(b) and (d) in that circumstance is the amount of income and assets actually provided to the beneficiary, which the beneficiary can self-verify under federal regulations. 37. The Social Security Administration uses the Program Operations Manual System (the POMS) to administer a range of Social Security programs, including SSI. The POMS sections that pertain to deeming rules and related exemptions are expressly incorporated into the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Welf. & Inst. Code 18940(b). 38. POMS SI Section 00502.280 sets forth the procedure for applying the indigence exception to sponsor deeming. Under this POMS Section, the indigence exception applies, and sponsor-deeming is suspended, when two criteria are met: [1] sponsor deeming results in denial or suspension of an alien’s SSI eligibility, or reduction in the SSI benefit payable to an alien; and [2] the alien is unable to obtain both food and shelter. POMS SI 00502.280(B). 39. POMS SI Section 00502.280(D) expressly provides that a beneficiary can qualify for the indigence exception by self-verifying the income and assets made available by the sponsor in circumstances where the sponsor is unavailable and cannot be located: D. Procedure–Developing And Documenting Deeming Exception Cases involving the indigence exception are sensitive cases and, as such, require tactful questioning. 1. Determine Whether Deeming Exception Applies If the alien lives with his or her sponsor, determine that the exception does NOT apply. If the alien lives apart from his or her sponsor, develop the alien’s income and resources. If the income [] the alien actually receives is less than the FBR and resources available to the alien are under the applicable resource limit, determine that the alien meets the criteria for exception from deeming. 14 PE I I I ION FOR WRIT OF MANDA l’h, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21` 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2. Contact the Sponsor Contact the sponsor to confiuiii the alien’s allegations regarding amounts of income and resources the sponsor provides or makes available to the alien. If the alien does not know the sponsor’s whereabouts, contact DHS using DHS Form G-845 to obtain the sponsor’s address. If you cannot locate the sponsor, accept the alien’s signed allegation if the allegation is credible and does not conflict with other information in file. If the allegations are not creditable or conflict with other infoiination in file, weigh all evidence in file and make a decision based on all the information you have obtained. POMS SI 00502.280(D)(2) (textual emphases added, bold headings in original). CDSS Manual of Policies and Procedures and Policy Interpretations 40. CDSS publishes regulations governing its program operations in the Manual of Policies and Procedures (MPP). Pursuant to Government Code Section 11342.2, the MPP must be in accord with governing statutory provisions, and MPP provisions that conflict with governing statutes are void and unenforceable. Derived from governing federal statutes and regulations, as incorporated by state statute, MPP Section 49-037 contains CDSS policy on sponsor deeming and the indigence exception. 41. MPP Section 49-037 is entitled \”Sponsor Deeming.\” Under MPP Section 49- 037.23, \”Sponsor deeming does NOT apply under either basic CAPI or extended CAPI if a sponsor has signed a New Affidavit of Support and any of the following is true: . . . [] The county determines that the non-citizen meets the criteria for the indigence exception as described in MPP Section 49-037.4.\” (MPP 49-037.23). Under the MPP, a person is therefore exempt from CAPI sponsor deeming rules in Section 49-037 if: .411 Sponsor-deeming results in denial, suspension, or reduction of CAPI benefits; .412 The non-citizen is unable to obtain both food and shelter; .413 The non-citizen completes and signs the CAPI Indigence Exception Statement (SOC 809); and .414 The county determines that the indigence exception applies. (MPP 49-037.4 et. seq.) 15 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 42. Like the POMS, the MPP provides for approval of the indigence exception in circumstances where the sponsor cannot be located: [49-0371.46 The county must do all of the following whenever the non-citizen has requested the indigence exception: .461 Obtain a completed form (SOC 809) signed by the non- citizen specifically applying for the exception that provides information regarding his or her living arrangements and income. .462 Contact the sponsor to confirm the non-citizen’s allegations regarding the amount of income and resources that the sponsor provides or makes available to the non-citizen. (a) Contact INS for the sponsor’s address if the sponsor’s whereabouts are unknown. (b) If the sponsor cannot be located, accept the non- citizen’s allegation if it is credible and does not conflict with other information in the file. .463 Based on all available evidence, prepare a written determination as to whether the indigence exception applies or not. If the exception does apply: (a) Determine the amount of income and support the non-citizen receives from the sponsor plus other sources, and the resources available to the non-citizen. Determine CAPI eligibility and payment amount based on these figures. (b) Notify the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of the determination. MPP 49-037.46 (emphasis added). 43. Federal regulations define the term \”deeming\” to identify not just the computational act of imputing verified sponsor income and assets to the beneficiary, but rather the entire \”process of considering another person’s income to be your own.\” 20 C.F.R. 416.1160 (a). This sponsor deeming process includes verification of sponsor income and assets as an initial step: 16 PE ION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Steps in deeming. Although the way we deem income varies depending upon whether you are an eligible individual, an eligible child, an alien with a sponsor, or an individual with an essential person, we follow several general steps to determine how much income to deem. (1) We determine how much earned and unearned income your . . . sponsor . . . has, and we apply the appropriate exclusions. (2) Before we deem income to you . . . we allocate an amount for each ineligible child in the household. (3) We then follow the deeming rules which apply to you.\” 20 C.F.R. 416.1160(c)(first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 44. Federal regulations define the term \”deeming\” to include the verification of a sponsor’s income and assets as a first step in the overall deeming process. This definition clarifies the scope of the term \”sponsor-deeming\” as used in MPP Section 49-037.411. Under the federal definition of deeming, MPP Section 49-037.411 is satisfied when either sponsor income and asset verification rules (20 C.F.R. 416.1160(c)(1)) or income imputation rules (20 C.F.R. 416.1160(c)(3)) adversely affects a beneficiary’s CAPI benefits. This plain-meaning statutory construction of indigence exception rules is buttressed by the express allowance for the indigence exception in circumstances where the sponsor cannot be located (and by extension is unavailable to provide sponsor verification). POMS SI 00502.280(D)(2). This construction also comports with the common-sense purpose of the indigence exception, which is to provide a safe- harbor to prevent the loss of subsistence income to disabled immigrants due solely to sponsor non-compliance. 45. In addition to promulgating rules through the MPP, CDSS from time to time issues All-County Letters (ACLs) and All-County Information Notices (ACINs) providing policy guidance and interpretation of program rules. 17 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA IF. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 46. In January 2017, when Respondents took action to terminate Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits, CDSS guidance on the indigence exception was contained in ACL No. 02-63 and ACIN No. I-47-12. ACL No. 02-63 contained language allowing the indigence exception where the sponsor could not be located to provide a signed income and asset verification. It also mandated the issuance of a written determination notice in response to any indigence exception application, as required by POMS SI Section 00502.280(D): Determine, based on the immigrant’s living arrangements and income (and sponsor’s verification, when available), if the indigence exception applies. Include a written determination (use the attached Indigence Exception Deteiiiiination form SOC 813) in the casefile. ACL No. 02-63, Pg. 5 (emphases added). Similarly, ACIN No. I-47-12 directed county welfare departments to \”presume that sponsor deeming would affect CAPI eligibility and\/or grant amounts in all [indigence exception] cases, thereby meeting the requirement in MPP Section 49-037.411.\” 47. In direct response to Mr. TESMA’s case, and after the hearing process challenging the termination of his CAPI benefits was already underway, CDSS issued a new letter, ACL No. 17-33 containing a change in policy upon which the ALJ retroactively relied in upholding the termination of Mr. TESMA’s benefits for lack of a signed sponsor income and asset verification. ACL No. 17-33 reads, in relevant part: For the indigence exception to apply, sponsor deeming must result in denial, suspension or reduction of CAPI benefits. MPP 49- 037.411. . . . In cases where the sponsor fails to complete SOC 860 (or equivalent) to the county’s satisfaction (including requested verifications), the county will not be able to accurately determine whether sponsor deeming applies or whether the indigence exception applies. Accordingly, the county must deny or terminate CAPI benefits pursuant to MPP 49-037.512. ACL No. 17-33, Page 4, last full paragraph. 48. On its face, ACL No. 17-33 purports to supersede ACIN No. I-47-12, but does not purport to supersede nor reference ACL No. 02-63. 18 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS’ ERRORS OF LAW 49. ACL No. 17-33 erroneously, and in excess of statutory authorization, asserts that signed sponsor verification of income and assets is a requirement to qualify for the indigence exception: Additionally, as part of the indigence exception, CAPI regulations specifically require that the county obtain a signed statement from the sponsor(s) regarding the sponsor’s income and resources. MPP 49-037.53. Not only is this signed sponsor verification requirement absent from governing statutes and regulations setting forth indigence exception rules, but this requirement is not even included in MPP criteria for the indigence exception contained in Section 49-037.4. As such Respondents indigence exception policy both illegally impairs the scope of governing statutes contrary to legislative intent and to the detriment of vulnerable California welfare recipients whose sponsors have abandoned them, and constitutes a failure by Respondents to follow their own published policy. The ALT erroneously relied on ACL No. 17-33 to justify Respondents’ termination decision. 50. ACL No. 17-33, both on its face and as applied by Respondents, conflicts and is inconsistent with state and federal statutes and regulations, including Welfare and Institutions Code Section 18940(b), 8 U.S.C. Section 1631(e), 42 U.S.C.S. Sections 1382j(b) and (d), 20 C.F.R. 416.1160, and POMS SI Section 00502.280. None of these authorizing statutes and rules requires submission of a signed income and asset verification from an immigration sponsor for a CAPI beneficiary to be eligible for the indigence exception to sponsor-deeming. Instead, these authorities all recognize, implicitly and explicitly, that the indigence exception is available even if the sponsor’s whereabouts are unknown and the beneficiary cannot secure the sponsor’s signed income and asset verification. 51. ACL No. 02-63 apparently remains in effect yet is in direct conflict with ACL No. 17-33 with respect to whether obtaining a sponsor signed verification of income and assets is a prerequisite to qualifying for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming, though the 19 PE 111 ION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Respondents’, through the ALJ, failed to reconcile this conflict. In addition, ACIN No. I-47-12, which ACL No. 17-33 purports to supersede, remained in effect at the time Respondents made the decision to terminate Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits, yet Respondents retroactively applied ACL No. 17-33 as a legal justification for the decision, in violation of basic principles of fairness and due process as set forth in the California Constitution, Article I, Section 7, as well as the Administrative Procedures Act. Cal. Gov. Code 11340.5 (proscribing formal adoption and presentation of regulations to Secretary of State); Cal. Gov’t Code 11343.4 (specifically indicating effective date of properly adopted regulations). 52. ACL No. 17-33 constitutes a regulation under Government Code Section 11342.600. Respondents never submitted ACL No. 17-33 to the Secretary of State as required by Government Code Section 11340.5, as confirmed by the fact that ACL No. 17-33 does not appear on the Office of Administrative Law’s website on its listing of regulations recently filed with the Secretary of State.7 53. Respondents, acting through the ALJ, incorrectly narrowed MPP Section 49- 037.411 to mean that a beneficiary such as Mr. TESMA must establish that the imputation of a sponsor’s verified income must result in teiiiiination, suspension, or reduction of CAPI benefits in order for the indigence exception to be available. Federal definitions make clear, however, that the term \”sponsor deeming\” in MPP Section 49-037.411 includes the process of verifying the sponsor’s income and assets as well as the computational imputation of said income to the beneficiary once verified. Thus, proper construction of MPP Section 49-037.411 entails that this indigence exception criterion is satisfied if application of either sponsor verification rules or computational deeming rules result in termination, suspension, or reduction of CAPI benefits. The ALJ therefore misapplied the law in finding that Mr. 1ESMA could not qualify for the indigence exception because a signed sponsor verification was required to satisfy the indigence exception criterion in MPP Section 49-037.411. 7 See https:\/\/oal.ca.goviregulations_reeently_filed_with_the_sos\/ 20 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 54. When read as a whole, the statutory scheme setting forth the requirements for the indigence exception allows for approval of the exception even when the sponsor’s whereabouts are unknown and the sponsor fails to submit a signed income and asset verification. Respondents’ written interpretation of indigence exception rules, as adopted and applied by the All in this case, is in conflict with the statutory scheme and is also internally incoherent in that it expressly -penults sponsor unavailability yet simultaneously requires the sponsor to be available to provide a signed verification. It also renders as mere surplusage governing rules that allow for sponsor unavailability in violation of well-established nouns of statutory construction. Respondents’ ultra vires, incoherent policy has been deployed to unlawfully prejudice disabled, indigent immigrants like Mr. TESMA who rely on CAPI benefits as their sole subsistence-level income. REQUISITES FOR RELIEF 55. The instant application for writ of administrative mandate and traditional mandate herein requested under Code of Civil Procedure 1085 and 1094.5 is Mr. TESMA’S sole and exclusive remedy for review of Respondents’ decision upholding the termination of Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits. Mr. TESMA has a beneficial interest in the outcome of the 1085 and 1094.5 proceedings. 56. This verified petition is brought under Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 and is authorized by Welfare & Institutions Code Section 10962, which permits filing a petition to review the entire proceeding conducted by the Department of Social Services (CDSS). Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10962, no filing fee or bond is required for such filing. 57. This verified petition is also brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 and is authorized by Conlan v. Bonta,102 Cal.App.4th 745, 751-52 (2002) to be asserted simultaneously with a Section 1094.5 action to compel Respondents’ compliance with its duty to administer public welfare benefits programs and administrative procedures in accordance with state and federal statutes, regulations, and rules. 21 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 58. California has declared that public social services are to be administered in full compliance with applicable federal and state laws. Welf. & Inst. Code 10600. 59. Respondents each have a ministerial duty to comply with the state and federal regulations set forth above and they continue to violate these statutes and regulations. 60. An actual and continuing controversy exists between Petitioner and Respondents regarding Respondents’ duties as alleged above. Petitioners contend that the actions of Respondents violate the law as specified above. Petitioners are informed and believe that Respondents will dispute this contention. 61. Petitioner is beneficially interested in the faithful execution of Respondents’ duties, has exhausted available administrative remedies, and has no other adequate, plain or speedy remedy at law to obtain Respondents’ compliance other than the relief sought by this complaint and petition. Respondents’ failure and refusal to carry out the aforesaid duties has caused substantial hardship to Petitioner and other persons similarly situated. 62. Unless, compelled to perfoim their duties and obligations in accordance with law, Respondents will continue to fail to do so. 63. This is a matter of significant public concern. The ongoing violation and misapplication of the indigence exception to sponsor deeming rules causes the unjust and unlawful deprivation of subsistence income to aged and disabled immigrants whose sponsors have ceased to provide them with support, and will continue to needlessly cause affected beneficiaries to challenge this violation, causing a drain on public funds. 64. The real parties in interest here and those who will be affected by the judgment of this court are the Petitioner and Respondents named above, as well as similarly situated public welfare recipients subject to sponsor deeming rules who have or will apply for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming or who challenge agency actions with the expectation that the adjudicatory process is administered fairly and in compliance with standards of substantive and procedural due process. 22 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1E, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion – Failure to Proceed in the Manner Required by Law) (Administrative Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5) 65. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 66. The Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting a decision that failed to proceed in the manner required by law. The Respondents’ decision does not comply with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations governing the administration of the CAPI program (specifically including, without limitation, those statutes, regulations, and rules governing the indigence exception to sponsor deeming) and state hearings, as set forth in Paragraphs 7-54. 67. Respondents, through the actions of the AU, committed errors of law by failing to approve, or even to consider, Mr. TESMA’s indigence exception application as previously set forth above in Paragraphs 7-54 and summarized in Paragraphs 49-54. 68. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion – Failure to Proceed in Manner Required by Law) (Traditional Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1085) 69. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 70. The Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting a decision that failed to proceed in the manner required by law. The Respondents’ decision does not comply with applicable state and federal statutes and regulations governing the administration of the CAPI program (specifically including, without limitation, those statutes, regulations, and rules 23 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 governing the indigence exception to sponsor deeming) and state hearings, as set forth in Paragraphs 7-54. 71. Respondents, through the actions of the AU, committed errors of law by failing to approve, or even to consider, Mr. TESMA’s indigence exception application as previously set forth above in Paragraphs 7-54 and summarized in Paragraphs 49-54. 72. The Respondents are willfully failing to perform their public duty to fully and fairly administer the CAPI program (specifically including, without limitation, those statutes, regulations, and rules governing the indigence exception to sponsor deeming) and state hearings in accordance with governing statutes, regulations, and rules, as set forth in Paragraphs 7-54. An Order of Mandamus from this Court directing Respondents to comply with the law in the administration of its public duties is required to protect Petitioner and those similarly situated from prejudicial harm to their vested right to public benefits that will foreseeably continue in the absence of such Order. 73. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Denial of Fair Trial) (Administrative Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5) 74. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 75. The Respondents failed to conduct a fair trial in violation of Petitioner’s substantive and procedural due process rights. 76. As set forth in Paragraphs 7-54, Respondents, through the actions of the ALJ failed to provide Mr. TESMA with a fair trial by: a. Terminating Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits without adequate or proper notice; 24 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 b. Failing to approve or even consider his formal, timely, and complete request for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming; c. Upholding the County’s termination decision without addressing issues raised by Mr. TESMA during the hearing, including Respondents’ failure to issue an adequate pre-termination notice, Respondents’ failure to comply with the express statutory duty to provide Mr. TESMA with assistance as needed to establish or maintain eligibility, and Respondents’ failure to issue a written pre-termination decision approving or denying Mr. TESMA’s indigence exception request; d. Failing in the written decision to address and reconcile patent conflicts between state and federal statutes and regulations and the County’s interpretations of indigence exception criteria; e. Failing to adequately develop the record during the hearing process but relying on this undeveloped factual record to justify the termination decision; f. In relying on an undeveloped factual record, disregarding or failing to consider the effect of Mr. TESMA’s medical impairments to his cognition and memory on his ability to provide comprehensive and specific factual testimony; g. Retroactively applying an agency rule interpretation (contained in ACL No. 17-33) of indigence exception rules issued after the termination decision in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with due process; h. Overruling Mr. TESMA’s timely and proper objection to ACL No. 17-33; and i. Failing to issue a subpoena for internal agency communications pertaining to the apparently intentional abuse of the agency rule interpretation process to prejudice Mr. TESMA’s right to a fair and impartial adjudicative process. 25 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 77. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Denial of Fair Trial) (Traditional Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1085) 78. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 79. The Respondents failed to conduct a fair trial in violation of Petitioner’s substantive and procedural due process rights. 80. As set forth in Paragraphs 7-54, Respondents, through the actions of the ALJ failed to provide Mr. TESMA with a fair trial by: a. Terminating Mr. TESMA’s CAPI benefits without adequate or proper notice; b. Failing to approve or even consider his formal, timely, and complete request for the indigence exception to sponsor deeming; c. Upholding the County’s termination decision without addressing issues raised by Mr. TESMA during the hearing, including Respondents’ failure to issue an adequate pre-termination notice, Respondents’ failure to comply with the express statutory duty to provide Mr. TESMA with assistance as needed to establish or maintain eligibility, and Respondents’ failure to issue a written pre-termination decision approving or denying Mr. TESMA’s indigence exception request; d. Failing in the written decision to address and reconcile patent conflicts between state and federal statutes and regulations and the County’s interpretations of indigence exception criteria; e. Failing to adequately develop the record during the hearing process but relying on this undeveloped factual record to justify the termination decision; 26 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 f. In relying on an undeveloped factual record, disregarding or failing to consider the effect of Mr. TESMA’s medical impairments to his cognition and memory on his ability to provide comprehensive and specific factual testimony; g. Retroactively applying an agency rule interpretation (contained in ACL No. 17-33) of indigence exception rules issued after the termination decision in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with due process and the Administrative Procedures Act; h. Overruling Mr. TESMA’s timely and proper objection to ACL No. 17-33; and i. Failing to issue a subpoena for internal agency communications pertaining to the apparently intentional abuse of the agency rule interpretation process to prejudice Mr. TESMA’s right to a fair and impartial adjudicative process. 81. The Respondents are willfully failing to perform their public duty to conduct fair trials in the administration and adjudication of matters under the CAPI program (specifically including, without limitation, proceedings pertaining to the indigence exception to sponsor deeming). An Order of Mandamus from this Court directing Respondents to comply with the law in the administration of its public duties is required to protect Petitioner and those similarly situated from prejudicial harm that will foreseeably continue in the absence of such Order. 82. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion \u2014 Decision not Supported by Findings) (Administrative Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5) 83. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 27 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 84. The Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting a decision not supported by the findings. 85. As set forth in Paragraphs 7-54, Respondents, through the actions of the AU, prejudicially abused their discretion by issuing a decision not supported by the findings by: a. Concluding that Mr. TESMA’s application for the indigence exception could not be approved or even be considered based on an undeveloped absence of evidence regarding whether Mr. TESMA asked his sponsor on the phone to provide a signed income and asset statement; b. Failing to make a finding that any phone call between Mr. TESMA and his sponsor occurred at a time relevant to Mr. TESMA’s CAPI redetermination process; c. Expressly acknowledging that governing state and federal statutes and regulations contain no signed sponsor verification requirement for the indigence exception and yet approving the lack of a signed sponsor verification as the legal basis for the termination decision, thereby failing to bridge the explanatory gap between evidentiary findings and conclusions of law; d. Expressly acknowledging that the indigence exception criteria in the MPP contain no signed sponsor verification requirement for the indigence exception and yet approving the lack of a signed sponsor verification as the legal basis for the termination decision, thereby failing to bridge the explanatory gap between evidentiary findings and conclusions of law; e. Failing to establish Mr. ThSMA was formally given proper notice of any obligations or requirement giving rise to a duty to perform further actions to qualify for the indigence exception, nor the specific conduct requested from Mr. 1ESMA to comply with such an alleged duty; 28 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA I E, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 f Disregarding substantial evidence that Mr. 1ESMA’s sponsor refused to provide her phone number or address to him and that he had no way to initiate contact with her, even if Respondent had established the existence of this alleged duty; g. Retroactively relying upon ACL No. 17-33 to justify a termination decision that pre-dated issuance of this ACL, thereby failing to bridge the explanatory gap between findings and the law. 86. The issues in this cause of action concern a vested fundamental right to welfare benefits, and the appropriate standard of review is this Court’s independent judgment. Code Civ. Proc. 1094.5(c). SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Abuse of Discretion \u2014 Findings not Supported by the Evidence) (Administrative Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5) 87. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 88. The Respondents prejudicially abused their discretion by adopting a decision based on findings not supported by the evidence. 89. As set forth in Paragraphs 7-54, Respondents, through the actions of the ALT, rejudicially abused their discretion by making findings not supported by the evidence by: a. Making the finding, without evidence, and despite substantial evidence to the contrary, that Mr. TESMA had the opportunity to initiate contact with his sponsor during the CAPI redetermination process to request her signed income and asset verification; b. Making the implicit finding, without evidence, that any phone call between Mr. TESMA and his sponsor occurred at a time relevant to the CAPI redetermination process; 29 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDA 1’h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 c. Making the finding that no evidence was presented that Mr. TESMA asked his sponsor on the phone to provide a signed income and asset verification when this issue was not materially asserted at the hearing by Respondents and the AU failed to adequately develop the administrative record regarding this factual issue; d. Making the implicit finding that Mr. TESMA failed to meet his burden of proof to proffer evidence that the termination decision was incorrect when it was Respondents’ burden of proof to establish that the termination decision was proper and justified; 90. The issues in this cause of action concern a vested fundamental right to welfare benefits, and the appropriate standard of review is this Court’s independent judgment. Code Civ. Proc. 1094.5(c). SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Underground Regulation \u2014 Violation of Administrative Procedures Act) (Mandamus Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1085) 91. Petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference each and every paragraph and allegation contained in this Petition as though fully set forth herein. 92. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides, in pertinent part, that \”[n]o state agency shall issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule, which is a regulation as defined in Section 11342.600, unless the guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or other rule has been adopted as a regulation and filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to this chapter.\” Cal. Gov. Code 11340.5(a)(emphasis added). 93. \”Regulation\” is broadly defined as \”every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure.\” Cal. Gov. Code 11342.600. 30 PE 11110N FOR WRIT OF MAND A 1 h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 94. ACL No. 17-33 constitutes a regulation as defined by Government Code Section 11342.600. 95. ACL No. 17-33 was improperly adopted by Respondents without complying with the requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act. Cal. Gov. Code 11340 et seq. Pursuant to Government Code Section 11340.5, ACL No. 17-33 is invalid as a matter of California law and Respondents violated the Administrative Procedures Act in seeking to use or enforce ACL No. 17-33 in Mr. TESMA’s case and the cases of others similarly situated. 96. Respondents’ use of ACL No. 17-33 in Mr. TESMA’s case and the cases of others similarly situated has caused substantial injury by providing a false basis for the termination of Mr. TESMA’s and others’ subsistence public welfare benefits through the CAPI program. 97. Mr. TESMA timely objected to Respondents’ use of ACL No. 17-33 in the course of the hearing process. Respondents, acting through the ALJ, improperly overruled Mr. lESMA’s objection. 98. The issue in this cause of action concerns a matter of law and de novo review of the Respondents’ decision is thereby authorized; the reviewing court does not defer in any way to the Respondents’ interpretation of the law. Ruth v. Kizer, 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (1992). PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Petitioners pray relief as follows: 99. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to rescind their decision in Administrative Hearing No. 2017025357; 100. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to issue a new decision cancelling its notices of termination dated January 19, 2017, approving Mr. 1ESMA’s application for the indigence exception to sponsor-deeming, and reinstating Mr. TESMA’s CAPI cash aid with no interruption in entitlement; 31 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 101. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 commanding the Respondents to pay Petitioner any benefits improperly withheld on the basis of the termination of Mr. I ESMA from the CAPI program, plus interest at the statutory rate of ten percent on all benefits due to Petitioner here until paid in full; 102. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 commanding the Respondents to order his agents to comply with the mandatory requirements of federal and state law with regard to CAPI eligibility requirements, indigence exception criteria, substantive and due process rights to pre-termination notice and fair hearing, and to assume full legal and financial responsibility for any failure to do so; 103. That this Court issue a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085 commanding the Respondents to rescind and recall any and all policy statements or interpretive documents, including without limitation All-County Letter No. 17-33, that conflict with federal and state statutes and regulations regarding CAPI eligibility requirements and the indigence exception; 104. That this Court award Petitioner his costs of suit; 105. That this Court award Petitioner his reasonable attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, Welfare and Institutions Code Section 10962; Government Code Section 800, and\/or any other applicable provisions of California law; and 106. The Court award such other and further relief as it deems proper. DATED: 08\/11\/2017 Respectfully submitted, LEGAL AID FOUNDATION OF LOS ANGELES, By: AnZk akes, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner MATEBE TESMA 32 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 VERIFICATION STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I, Andrew Kazakes: 1. Am an attorney licensed to practice law in California and represent the Petitioner, MATEBE TESMA. 2. I have read the foregoing petition for Writ of Mandate, and know the contents thereof. They are true to the best of my knowledge except those allegations on information and belief which I believe to be true. I am more familiar with the factual and legal claims raised in this petition than the Petitioner. I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: 08\/11\/2017 Signe Andrew Kazakes, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner 33 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE ”

pdf Velma v. Lightbourne-Writ regarding DV waivers

In Welfare Complaint Library 1913 downloads

Download (pdf, 852 KB)

Velma v. Lightbourne-Writ regarding DV waivers.pdf

pdf Villafana v. San Diego County- STOP the 100% CalWORKs Unscheduled Home Visit Program law suit

In Welfare Complaint Library 1314 downloads

Download (pdf, 167 KB)

Villafana v. San Diego County.pdf

” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF DAVID LOY (SBN 229235) ([email protected]) MELISSA DELEON (SBN 272792) ([email protected]) JONATHAN MARKOVITZ (SBN 301767) ([email protected]) ACLU FOUNDATION OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES P.O. Box 87131 San Diego, CA 92138-7131 Telephone: (619) 232-2121 Fax: (619) 232-0036 CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN (SBN 244601) ([email protected]) ALEKSANDR GELBERG (SBN 279989) ([email protected]) MADELYN S. MCCORMICK (SBN 320063) ([email protected]) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 12390 El Camino Real San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: (858) 678-4050 Fax: (858) 678-5099 Attorneys for Plaintiffs SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO LUZ VILLAFANA, UHMBAYA LAURY; Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Defendant. CASE NO: COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF INTRODUCTION 1. This action challenges a state-funded program that disproportionately impacts people of color and women. Unlike every other county in the state, Defendant San Diego County ( the County ) forces nearly all persons seeking welfare assistance to submit to home inspections without any reason to believe they are ineligible. The County has effective other means to verify eligibility, yet it continues to waste time and money routinely inspecting the homes of families in distress. 2. CalWORKs ( California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids ) is the state’s cash assistance welfare program. It provides a safety net for persons who may become income-eligible, including those who suffer a catastrophic loss of income due to job loss or otherwise. 3. For over 20 years, the County has required persons in need of CalWORKs benefits to submit to Project 100%, also known as P100, or face denial of benefits. Under P100, absent any suspicion of ineligibility, nearly all persons applying for CalWORKs benefits must submit to an unannounced home inspection by a law enforcement investigator. The investigators may interrogate applicants about matters such as child care, living, and sleeping arrangements and inspect private areas such as closets, cupboards, desks, dressers, hampers, and laundry bags. 4. If persons do not cooperate with P100 inspections, they face denial of their applications, leaving them destitute. When not notified when the inspections will occur, CalWORKs applicants are effectively held hostage in their homes waiting for the investigator to arrive. 5. Plaintiffs bring this action to compel the County to stop operating P100, which adversely impacts thousands of innocent people each year at significant waste of public funds that could be put to better use investigating actual violations of law. The County can and does verify eligibility and prevent fraud through cost-effective means that do not require indiscriminate home inspection. Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to issue declaratory and injunctive relief to cure the County’s illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Luz Villafana is and at all times mentioned herein has been a citizen resident of San Diego County. Ms. Villafana owns a home in Escondido and, within the one year before the commencement of this action, has paid property taxes to the County of San Diego and the State of California for that property, and is currently assessed and liable to pay additional taxes therein. 7. Plaintiff Uhmbaya Laury is and at all times mentioned herein has been a citizen resident of San Diego County. She has previously applied or re-applied for public benefits under the CalWORKs program. As a condition of seeking benefits, for which she was ultimately approved, she was forced to submit to Project 100%. Within one year before the commencement of this action, she has paid sales tax, gasoline tax, or other taxes, charges, or fees routinely imposed in the County of San Diego. 8. Defendant County of San Diego is a public entity responsible for ensuring that the County, its agencies, officers, employees, and agents fulfill the requirements of all applicable provisions of federal and state constitutional law, statutes, and regulations with respect to the administration of public benefits, including CalWORKs. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 9. Congress enacted Title IV-A of the Social Security Act to provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives. 42 U.S.C. 601(a)(1). Public assistance funding under the Social Security Act stems from the Nation’s basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders and is based upon the recognition that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970). 10. CalWORKs is the state analog to the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ( TANF ) program, formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children ( AFDC ). AFDC was established by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 601-610. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 11. CalWORKs exists for the benefit of all otherwise qualified California families to provide a safety net for anyone who might become income-eligible due to job loss or otherwise. 12. To receive CalWORKs benefits, a family must be income-eligible. A family of three in San Diego County, for example, must have no more than $1,292 in net monthly income. See California Department of Social Services. All County Letter No. 16-47, California Work Opportunity And Responsibility To Kids (CalWORKs): Cost Of Living Adjustment (Cola) Increase To The Minimum Basic Standard Of Adequate Care (MBSAC) Levels, May 27, 2016 at 3; Manual of Policies and Procedures: Eligibility and Assistance Standards ( MPP ) 44-207. 13. California counties administer the CalWORKs program within their respective localities in conformity with state rules and regulations. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 11209, 10802. 14. The basic purpose of the [benefits] application process is to assist the individual in establishing his\/her eligibility for aid and services. MPP 40-115.1. Gathering the requisite evidence to make an eligibility determination is a joint responsibility of the applicant and the county. MPP 40-157.21. The county requires the applicant to produce only evidence necessary to determine past or present eligibility for the amount or delivery of aid. MPP 40-126.31. 15. The regulations spell out the Steps in the Application Process to determine eligibility for aid. See MPP 40-115.2. Initially, an applicant discusses with an eligibility worker the circumstances that have led to the application. MPP 40-115.211. The eligibility worker, in turn, explains the agency requirements, program limitations, [his\/her] rights and responsibilities and what he\/she can expect from the agency. Id. 16. The applicant completes a Statement of Facts form, which is signed under penalty of perjury. MPP 40-115.22, 40-128.1. The application is submitted to the Applicant System component of the state’s Income Eligibility Verification System ( IEVS ), administered by the Department of Health Care Services. See MPP 40-115.225. 17. The IEVS is a federally-mandated system consisting of a coordinated data exchange among various databases including but not limited to [w]age information from the State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF Wage Information Collection Agency [u]nemployment\/disability compensation benefits from the agencies administering those programs [b]enefits\/pensions\/wage information from the Social Security Administration [i]nternal Revenue Service (IRS)\/Franchise Tax Board (FTB) unearned income data Social Security number (SSN) verification information from SSA; and [i]nter\/intra-county duplicate benefit matches. MPP 20-006.12. 18. The County must submit specific identifying information to IEVS for each CalWORKs applicant, such as, but not limited to, name, SSN [and] date of birth. MPP 20- 006.211. The County shall input applicant data into IEVS at the first available opportunity but no later than five working days after the signed statement of facts is completed. MPP 20- 006.212. The County shall use information obtained through the IEVS for the purposes of [v]erifying the applicant’s\/recipient’s eligibility [and v]erifying the proper amount of benefits. MPP 20-006.3. 19. After the application is submitted, the applicant is required to, among other things: (a) complete all documents required in the application process; (b) provide all documents in her possession which are needed to determine eligibility; (c) report all facts the applicant believes to be material to her application or which the county has identified as affecting eligibility; (d) report any change in these facts within five calendar days of the change; (e) identify any third party who may be liable for care and services; and (f) identify any other family member required to be in the assistance unit. See MPP 40-105.11-105.16; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 11268. 20. Once applicants have been enrolled, they are subjected to ongoing eligibility verification through IEVS. See California Department of Social Services, Income and Eligibility Verification System, http:\/\/www.cdss.ca.gov\/fraudextranet\/PG2877.asp. Every quarter the [County] shall submit to IEVS income and eligibility information on each recipient of CalWORKs . MPP 20-006.221. 21. In addition to using IEVS to verify applicant eligibility and proper benefits amount, the County shall use information obtained through the IEVS for [d]etermining whether a recipient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF received benefits to which he\/she was not entitled and where appropriate, [c]onducting criminal or civil prosecutions. MPP 20-006.3 22. Among other measures designed to prevent fraud is the requirement that each adult in the household submit fingerprints that can then be checked through the Statewide Fingerprint Imaging System. MPP 40-105.3. 23. Meanwhile, the eligibility worker begins the process of compiling acceptable evidence to verify the linking and nonlinking factors of the applicant’s eligibility for aid. MPP 40-115.22. The regulations set forth in considerable detail what constitutes acceptable evidence for each such factor. See, e.g., MPP 42-111.1 (regarding proof of age); and MPP 42-407 (regarding proof of residence). 24. A face-to-face interview with the applicant is required prior to the granting of aid. MPP 40-131.11. This interview by the eligibility worker must cover a long list of topics, including the applicant’s obligation to report all facts material to a correct determination of eligibility and the grant amount, the joint responsibility of the county and the applicant for exploring all the facts concerning eligibility, and the kinds of evidence which may be needed to establish eligibility. MPP 40-131.3. 25. Within ten calendar days of application, the county must give written notice to the applicant of any required evidence and examples of alternative evidence, if any, to determine eligibility. MPP 40-126.32. The county shall, however, assist the applicant in obtaining any such evidence concerning eligibility from a third party if the applicant has made a good faith effort to obtain such evidence but did not succeed due to the third party’s failure or refusal to provide the necessary information. MPP 40-126.331. Moreover, the county shall not deny an application for failure to provide evidence of eligibility if the county has determined that the applicant is continuing to cooperate by attempting to comply in obtaining necessary evidence. MPP 40.126.34. 26. The state has prescribed the methods of gathering evidence of eligibility. See MPP 40-157.2. Throughout the entire application process, the county must inform the applicant what 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF evidence is desired, why it is needed and how it will be used. MPP 40-157.211; see also MPP 40-115.223. The applicant, on the other hand, must agree to participate in, and cooperate with the county in the evidence gathering process to the fullest extent possible. MPP 40-157.212; see MPP 40-115.221, 40-115.222. When it is not possible for the applicant to obtain necessary evidence, the county shall obtain it for him. MPP 40-157.213. When evidence is conflicting, inconsistent or incomplete, the investigation shall be pursued to the point that the preponderance of evidence supports the determination regarding the applicant’s eligibility. MPP 40-157.14. 27. State regulations require a home visit only when living arrangements or other factors affecting eligibility, or apparent eligibility in cases of immediate need or diversion, cannot be satisfactorily determined without such a visit. MPP 40-161. STATEMENT OF FACTS 28. CalWORKs is a state-funded program or activity, or a program or activity that receives state financial assistance, of which P100 is a part. 29. To the extent it could be considered a program or activity separate from CalWORKs, P100 is a state-funded program or activity, or a program or activity that receives state financial assistance. 30. With approval of the County Board of Supervisors, P100 began in 1997 as a pilot program proposed by the District Attorney’s office and the County Department of Social Services, ostensibly to increase efforts in Welfare Fraud prevention at the point of intake. Board of Supervisors Minute Order No. 45, April 29, 1997; AFDC Program Guide, Special Notice (hereafter Special Notice ) 98-60 at 1. 31. Effective January 4, 1999, the County expanded P100 to require home inspections for all new applications that were not deemed obvious denials. Special Notice 98-60 at 1. 32. P100 investigators are and have always been licensed peace officers. They previously worked out of the District Attorney’s office. Currently they are assigned to the Public Assistance Fraud ( PAF ) division of the Department of Child Support Services ( DCSS ). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 33. In San Diego County, all applications for CalWORKs benefits that are not denied outright are referred to PAF under P100, regardless of whether the applications present any reason to suspect ineligibility or fraud. 34. Apart from P100, the County also conducts investigations of specific individuals suspected of committing welfare fraud, knows as allegation-based or referral-based investigations. The lawfulness of allegation-based or referral-based investigation is not challenged in this action. 35. Upon receipt of a P100 referral, a PAF investigator makes an unannounced attempt to investigate the applicant at the address listed on the application. Special Notice 98-60 at 3. If no one is home, the investigator is supposed to leave his or her business card. See id.; County of San Diego CalWORKs Program Guide 20-000.B.5. 36. If the applicant is not home when the second home call attempt is made, another business card will be left with a note on it for the applicant\/recipient to call the investigator. County of San Diego CalWORKs Program Guide 20-000.B.5. 37. The notice sent to CalWORKs applicants concerning P100 indicates that the purpose of the investigation is to verify the facts related to your application for CalWORKs, and states that County policy requires that the investigation be completed . . . prior to approving ongoing CalWORKs benefits. 38. Because applicants are typically not notified when the investigation will occur, they must often remain effectively confined to their homes awaiting an unannounced and unscheduled visit. As a result, they may be effectively required to postpone job searches, skip medical appointments, and stop taking children to and from school for fear of suffering denial of income necessary to feed their families. 39. If the applicant is at home, the investigator seeks entry into the home and questions the applicant and others who may be in the home. The interrogation may address a variety of subjects, including matters unrelated to eligibility or that have already been documented and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF verified during the application process, including but not limited to child care, living, and sleeping arrangements. 40. The investigation may involve an inspection of the applicant’s home, which may entail viewing, among other things, the contents of private rooms, closets, cupboards, desks, dressers, hampers, laundry bags, and other areas or items not in plain view. 41. If the investigator’s attempts to contact the applicant are unsuccessful, or if the applicant does not submit to the P100 investigation, the application for benefits is denied. 42. According to recent data, 50.33% of San Diego County CalWORKs recipients are Hispanic, while 14.11% are African American. 43. Recent data show 33.5% of the County’s general population is Hispanic, and only 5.5% is African American. 44. Recent data show adult women represent 72.73% of enrollees in San Diego County’s CalWORKs Welfare-to-Work ( WTW ) program. 45. Recent data show adult women represent 39% of the County’s general population. 46. On information and belief, because nearly all CalWORKs recipients are required to participate in the WTW program, with very narrow exemptions, the WTW program’s demographics mirror or closely resemble those of the CalWORKs recipient pool. 47. The County currently employs several PAF investigators who spend a substantial amount of their time on P100 investigations based on unsubstantiated suspicion that an applicant violated any law. That time could be redirected to investigating suspected violations of law, including but not limited to fraud, perjury, embezzlement, [and] trafficking. MPP 20-007.113. 48. No other county in California operates a program similar to P100. Instead, other counties investigate claims of fraud based on individualized suspicion of applicant fraud rather than conducting indiscriminate home inspections of all applicants. 49. Los Angeles County previously operated a program modeled on P100, but it abandoned the program in or about 2009. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 50. Counties with CalWORKs caseloads of 1,000 cases or more are required to develop and administer fraud investigation programs administered by special investigation units ( SIUs ), which are distinct from county units performing eligibility and benefit determination functions. MPP 20-007.1, 20-007.21. Counties with smaller caseloads may maintain an SIU, but if they do not, they must designate one employee to be responsible for the referral of suspected fraud cases to the prosecuting authority for investigation. MPP 20-007.112. 51. SIUs shall be established and organized for the purpose of investigating suspected welfare fraud, and shall [i]nvestigate any activity, particularly during intake, which may constitute welfare fraud. MPP 20-007.1, 20-007.31. 52. The administration and operation of P100 cause a disproportionate adverse effect on the basis of race, color, national origin, ethnic group identification, or sex. 53. P100 is not justified by any legitimate governmental interest in fraud prevention. The costs of operating P100 exceed any savings arising from prevention of any fraud detected through the program. 54. Even if P100 were justified by any legitimate governmental interest in fraud prevention, any such interest can be better served through other means that cause less disproportionate adverse effect on protected classes, including but not limited to the use of existing procedures for verifying eligibility for CalWORKs benefits and allegation-based or referral-based investigations. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ILLEGAL OR WASTEFUL EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN STATE-FUNDED PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY BY ALL PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANT COUNTY UNDER CAL. GOV’T. CODE 11135 AND CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. 526(A) 55. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference each and every allegation set forth in Paragraphs 1-54, above, as if set forth in full. 56. No person in the State of California shall, on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, ethnic group identification, age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation, be unlawfully denied full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state. CAL. GOV’T. CODE 11135. 57. Section 11135 and its implementing regulations, 2 Cal. Code Regs. 11150 et seq., are enforceable by a civil action for equitable relief. CAL. GOV’T. CODE 11139. 58. The County’s administration of CalWORKs, of which P100 is a part, is a program or activity subject to 11135 and its implementing regulations. 59. In the alternative, P100 is a program or activity subject to 11135 and its implementing regulations. 60. Section 11135 and its implementing regulations prohibit disparate impact discrimination in the operation of any program or activity that is funded directly by the state, or receives any financial assistance from the state. 61. In carrying out CalWORKs and P100, the County is violating 11135 by causing a disproportionate adverse effect on the basis of race, color, national origin, ethnic group identification, or sex. 62. In carrying out CalWORKs and P100, the County is violating 2 Cal. Code Regs. 11154(i) because it is using criteria or methods of administration that (1) have the purpose or effect of subjecting a person to discrimination on the basis of ethnic group identification, sex, or color; and\/or (2) have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the CalWORKs program with respect to a person of a particular ethnic group identification, sex, or color. 63. The County’s policies, practices, and actions as stated in this complaint constitute an illegal or wasteful expenditure of public funds justifying an injunction under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. 526(a). 64. There is no adequate remedy at law if the requested injunction does not issue to prevent the illegal or wasteful expenditure of taxpayer monies. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF 65. There exists a real and present controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant regarding the implementation of P100 and the administration of CalWORKs in San Diego County. Plaintiffs contend that the actions of Respondents complained of in this complaint violate the law as specified above. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant contends to the contrary. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this court: 1. Issue a declaratory judgment that P100 is invalid because it constitutes an illegal form of disparate impact discrimination within the meaning of CAL. GOV’T. CODE 11135 and its implementing regulations; 2. Issue a declaratory judgment declaring that P100 is invalid because it constitutes an illegal or wasteful expenditure of public funds; 3. Issue a permanent injunction restraining Defendant and its officers, agents, servants, employees, representatives, all persons acting in concert with, at the direction or, in combination with, or participating with them, and other persons subject to their authority or control, from implementing in any way any provision of P100; 4. Grant costs of suit to Plaintiffs; 5. Award reasonable attorney fees to the extent permitted by law; 6. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: June 26, 2018 Respectfully submitted, By: _________________________ DAVID LOY (SBN 229235) ([email protected]) JONATHAN MARKOVITZ (SBN 301767) ([email protected]) Melissa Deleon (SBN 272792) ([email protected]) ACLU FOUNDATION OF SAN DIEGO & AND IMPERIAL COUNTIES P.O. Box 87131 San Diego, CA 92138-7131 Tel: (619) 232-2121 Fax: (619) 232-0036 E-Mail: [email protected] CRAIG E. COUNTRYMAN (SBN 244601) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF ([email protected]) ALEKSANDR GELBERG (SBN 279989) ([email protected]) MADELYN S. MCCORMICK (SBN 320063) ([email protected]) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 12390 El Camino Real San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: (858) 678-4050 ”